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Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation starts with the claim that c causes
e if ∼ C >∼ E, where c and e are events, C and E are the propositions that c
and e respectively occur, ∼ is negation and > is the counterfactual conditional.
The purpose of my project is to provide a counterfactual analysis of causation
which departs signigicantly from Lewis’s starting point, and thus can hope
to solve several stubborn problems for that approach. Whereas Lewis starts
with a sufficiency claim, my analysis claims that a certain counterfactual is
necessary for causation. I say that, if c causes e, then ∼ E >∼ C — I call
the latter the Reverse Counterfactual. This will often, perhaps always, be a
backtracking counterfactual, so two chapters are devoted to defending a con-
ception of counterfactuals which allows backtracking. Thus prepared, I argue
that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes, but not of mere conditions
for an effect. This provides a neat analysis of the principles governing causal
selection, which is extended in a discussion of causal transitivity. Standard
counterfactual accounts suffer counterexamples from preemption, but I argue
that the Reverse Counterfactual has resources to deal neatly with those too.
Finally I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual, as a necessary condition on
causation, is the most we can hope for: in principle, there can be no counter-
factual sufficient condition for causation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Two Problems
Suppose I am playing pool, and I miss a shot. My opponent accuses me of
being a little tipsy. I deny it vehemently: there was a definite slope on the
table. My accuser might say, “Well, slope or not, you must be drunk: otherwise
you would never have missed a shot like that.”
“Codswallop!” I reply. “It’s the slope. If there hadn’t been a slope, I would
have made the shot, no problem.”
“Maybe,” replies the silver-tongued scoundrel, “But even if the table does,
as you claim, possess some mild tilt, that doesn’t change the fact that if you
were sober you would have made the shot.”
The argument is about causation, even though the word “cause” does not
feature. My slanderous companion is applying a common test for causal rel-
evance, formalised in legal contexts as the sine qua non or but for test. It
has the form of a counterfactual: c causes e if, if c hadn’t happened, then e
wouldn’t have happened. My companion claims that if I hadn’t been drunk
then I wouldn’t have missed, which — we both take it — is tantamount to
claiming that my drunkenness is the reason I missed. In response, I also ap-
ply the test, claiming that if there had been no slope, then I wouldn’t have
missed. I am thus blaming the slope. But my companion points out that my
counter-claim is compatible with his accusation.
This is the first of the problems which I want to address. It is called the
problem of causal selection. When anything happens, we can often identify
a very large number of conditions upon which the happening of that event
depends. Many of our ordinary activities demand the presence of oxygen in the
atmosphere, for example. However, we very rarely mention oxygen when we are
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thinking about the causes of particular events. I know that oxygen is required
for me to cook dinner, but I do not say that the oxygen caused the dinner
to be cooked. The problem of causal selection is the problem of explicating
the difference between the cause (or causes) and the mere conditions for an
effect. It is a particularly pressing problem because, although we often rely
heavily on the distinction between cause and condition, the counterfactual just
mentioned does not respect it. And that counterfactual features in far more
serious contexts than the trivial conversation I have just recounted, notably
legal contexts.
Now suppose that, after a few more shots from the same locker, I lose the
game of pool. “Perhaps you are right,” I moan. “If only I hadn’t drunk all that
beer: then I wouldn’t be drunk, and I would have beaten you easily.”
“I’m not so sure,” says my friend.
“Well, you’re a terrible player,” I say, with wholly uncharacteristic rudeness.
“I would have won if I were sober.”
“But that’s not what I was questioning,” says my friend slyly.
“I don’t understand,” I admit.
“Well, you said that if you hadn’t drunk all that beer, you wouldn’t have
been drunk. But that’s not true. If you hadn’t drunk beer, I strongly suspect
you would have drunk something else — wine, perhaps. So you would still be
a little tipsy, as you usually are by this stage in the evening.”
“Maybe, but it was the beer that made me drunk this time,” I grumble.
We are exploring a second problem: the problem of causal redundancy.
Sometimes, causes are redundant: they have back-ups. There are various cases
of this sort: in this case, the back-up — my drinking something else — remains
potential, and does not actually occur. In other cases, the back-up does occur:
for example, an assassin shoots at the President, killing her; at almost the
same time, another assassin shoots, and her bullet hits the President just after
the first assassin’s bullet has killed her. The second assassin’s shot does not
kill the President, but would have done, had the first assassin not fired.
The problem of redundancy, like the problem of selection, presents difficul-
ties for the sine qua non test for causation. However, it presents the opposite
kind of difficulty. We saw that the problem of selection threatens the suffi-
ciency of the sine qua non test: it shows that there are many conditions sine
qua non which fail to be causes; hence the counterfactual does not suffice for
causation. The problem of redundancy, on the other hand, threatens the ne-
cessity of the sine qua non test. It shows that there are cases where, if the
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cause had not happened, the effect might nevertheless have happened anyway.
These two problems will be the focus of this project. To give them sharper
form, and to understand how they will be approached, it will be useful to agree
some background.
1.2 Background
The modern philosophical approach to analysis of causation begins with David
Hume [1748]. He brought into focus the way we routinely go beyond what we
observe in ascribing causation when all we ever see is coincidence. I strike a
match, and it lights; this is all I see, but I further believe that striking the
match caused it to light. This prompts two obvious questions. The first is
epistemological: How do I know that striking the match caused it to light?
The second is conceptual: What do I mean when I say that striking the match
caused it to light? When I believe this, what do I believe? These two questions
are closely connected: to justify my claim that striking the match caused it to
light, I must have some idea what further claims would bear out its truth or
show its falsity; and for that, I must have some idea what causation is, or at
least what it entails.
Philosophers approach the task of answering these two questions in rather
different ways. The approach which is most strongly suggested by my for-
mulation of these Humean questions, and the one I shall take, focuses on the
twin tasks of understanding and justifying singular causal claims. Thus I shall
not be discussing the meaning of and further justification required for general
causal claims, such as “Watching television rots the brain”. Nor shall I be
concerned with the kind of justification which might refute someone who has
serious sceptical doubts about the existence of causation.1 The epistemology
of causation is part of the analysis of causation, but only in a rather quiet way:
agreeing that causation has certain features might help us to justify, and hence
prove the truth of, particular causal claims, if those features can be shown to
be present in the particular cases in question. But this sort of justification,
although it can lead to increase in knowledge, is not designed to allay sceptical
doubts; nor is it suitable as a general description of the way we acquire causal
knowledge. Its main purpose is argument: the goal of participation in which,
is to link the matter in dispute to other facts which are agreed upon, in such
1An analysis in terms whose epistemology is less problematic would obviously help answer
a sceptic, but mine shall be a counterfactual analysis, and the epistemology of counterfactuals
is no less problematic than the epistemology of causation itself.
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a way as to persuade a rational disputant to agree, to jettison agreed facts or
to appeal to other facts which are not agreed.
Argument is also the goal of the other twin task, understanding causal
claims. Agreeing on the nature of causation allows us to argue about it, in
the manner just described. Once an understanding of a causal claim is agreed,
it becomes possible to justify it, by arguing that the case in question pos-
sesses whatever features our agreed understanding says that cases of causation
possess.
Seeking to provide material for disputes, albeit hypothetical ones, is cen-
tral to conceptual analysis, as I understand it. Sometimes, though, conceptual
analysis is considered to be a rather fruitless activity. Thomas Bontly cites a
range of reasons found in the literature for losing faith in conceptual analysis:
that psychological evidence tells against the notion that concepts have nec-
essary and sufficient conditions, exemplars providing a more accurate model;
that Quinean attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction show there are no
purely conceptual truths; and that content externalism in the philosophy of
mind raises the prospect that the necessary and sufficient conditions for in-
stantiating a philosophically interesting concept like “causation” might be as
much outside the head as the necessary and sufficient conditions for instantiat-
ing the concept “water” (Bontly 2006, 178). And, of course, there is no widely
accepted conceptual analysis of causation.
This has led some philosophers to pursue other kinds of analysis, notably
what Bontly calls empirical analysis. Bontly summarises thus:
...good old conceptual analysis may simply be the wrong way for
reductionism to proceed. Instead, many philosophers today are
prone to think of the analysis of causation as an empirical matter,
the idea being to reduce causation to some relation uncovered by
natural science. Such a reduction would be synthetic, not analytic;
a posteriori rather than a priori. And there are several intriguing
proposals as to what, on such an account, the causal relation might
turn out to be.
(Bontly 2006, 178)
This is not the sort of analysis I shall be pursuing. The reason is that it would
not seem to answer the need which I see conceptual analysis as addressing,
that is, the argumentative need. Even if it could be established that some
physical property was present in all and only cases of causation, this would
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not speak in an obvious and direct way to our ordinary disputes. For those
disputes concern our ordinary concept of causation. Moreover, it is hard to see
how likely candidates for causation could operate both between micro-particles
and between the kinds of ordinary things we handle with our ordinary concept:
chairs, tables, cars, and so on. This is not to detract from the interest of the
project of empirical analysis; but it is a different project, answering different
needs, from the one I shall be embarking on.
Nor do I feel forced to abandon conceptual analysis by the kinds of criticism
recently mentioned. Maybe our concepts, as psychological entities, are not well
modeled as having necessary and sufficient conditions. That does not mean
there is no need for conceptual analysis; it might change the shape and tools
appropriate to that analysis somewhat, with a greater focus on examples —
but modern thinking about causation is already driven by examples. The
fact, if it is one, that there are no conceptual truths does not immediately
entail that there is no answer about whether a concept is correctly applied in
particular cases; and even if it did, the practical pressure to handle those cases
(eg. in the courts) forces us to say something about them. Philosophers ought
to be well-placed to contribute. And the fact that the meaning of causation
might not be “in the head” clearly does not mean that we can’t argue about
whether causation is present in particular cases, especially when we have not
identified a plausible physical candidate for the essence of what we ordinarily
call causation, as we have in the case of what we ordinarily call water.
David Lewis builds a conceptual analysis of causation (cf. Collins et al.
2004, 30-39) from the intuitive counterfactual previously described: if c hadn’t
happened, e wouldn’t have happened. He proposes that counterfactual as a
sufficient condition for causation. That is, he claims:
If ∼ C >∼ E then c causes e.2
Lewis takes the relata of causation to be distinct and actually-occurring events.
Since Lewis makes this counterfactual sufficient for causation (Lewis 2004a,
78), he effectively ignores the first of our problems, the problem of causal
selection. For there are many events which meet his condition, and thus suffice
for causation according to Lewis, but which we do not ordinarily call causes.
We have the icy road, the bald tire, the drunk driver, the blind
corner, the approaching car, and more. Together, these cause the
2c and e are events, C and E stand for the propositions that c and e respectively occur,
∼ is negation and > indicates the counterfactual conditional.
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crash... And the crash depends on each. Without any one it would
not have happened... But these are by no means all the causes of
the crash. ...each of these causes in turn has its causes; and those
too are causes of the crash.
(Lewis 1986a, 214)
In my view, this attitude is a departure from the project of conceptual analysis
as I understand it to be motivated. It is a departure from the chamber of
ordinary debate about causation. For it is a departure from our ordinary
concept of causation. Clearly, when we put the claim “c caused e” to ordinary
use, we rely on a lot more than the claim that if c hadn’t happened, e wouldn’t
have happened. Otherwise, the pedestrian who is hit by the car that mounts
the pavement is as much to blame for her injury as the drunken and reckless
driver. The oxygen in the room is as good a predictor of a flame as the striking
of the match. My birth is as good an explanation of my late arrrival as the
delayed train. And so on.
Lewis accepts that there is more to many of our causal claims than the
counterfactual he singles out, but he thinks that this extra can be stripped
off, and that underneath is a core notion, free of “principles of invidious dis-
crimination” (Lewis 1973a, 162), which all our causal claims have in common.
To make good on this claim, it is necessary not only to argue that there is
such a notion, but that the parts which have been stripped off can also be
explained. Further, it must be explained why these parts are commonly asso-
ciated with causation, and why our ordinary application of causal concepts is
often precisely to make “invidious” discriminations between causes and mere
conditions for an effect: as, for instance, when we distinguish the innocence
of the pedestrian from the culpability of the driver. — At any rate, so I shall
argue.
Much more commonly, it is argued that Lewis’s theory does not identify
any such core of our causal concept. This argument focuses on the second of
our problems, causal redundancy. The problem presents a challenge to Lewis
to come up with a necessary condition for causation. For in cases of causal
redundancy, it is false that, if the cause had not occurred, the effect would
not have occurred. Various efforts have been made to produce more compli-
cated analyses which nevertheless centrally employ counterfactuals. Here, the
argumentative burden on me is rather different. I shall not need to argue for
the importance of accounting for causal redundancy, as it is widely accepted
(unlike the importance I allege for the problem of causal selection). I shall,
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therefore, devote my discussion of causal redundancy to arguing for my own
counterfactual necessary condition for causation, which remains true in cases
of redundancy.
That is the general shape of the project — the backdrop against which it is
pursued, and the general aims it has. Let me now give a more detailed outline.
1.3 Outline
Central Claim
My analysis will start from this claim:
If c causes e then ∼ E >∼ C.
The counterfactual in this claim is often just Lewis’s counterfactual, reversed:
so I call it the Reverse Counterfactual. It is offered as a necessary condition for
causation, whereas Lewis’s counterfactual is proposed as a sufficient condition.
I shall be defending the Reverse Counterfactual as a necessary condition, only
discussing sufficient conditions for causation in Chapter 7, where I shall argue
that there is no counterfactual sufficient condition for causation. Thus my
analysis is incomplete. However, that does not mean it fails to serve the
purposes of conceptual analysis described previously; moreover, since there is
a principled reason why no sufficient condition for causation is available, it
amounts to the most we can expect of a counterfactual analysis of causation.
Following is an abstract of each remaining chapter.
Chapter 2: Lewis’s Asymmetry Thesis
This chapter lays out the elements of Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals
which will be relevant for us, then discusses criticisms of one aspect of the
theory: the thesis that counterfactual dependence is temporally asymmetric.
Lewis’s semantic theory is sketched, followed by Fine’s objection to the role
in that theory of similarity between possible worlds. Lewis presents his fully-
fledged position on the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence as a response
to Fine’s objection. I make an effort to get clear on the proper structure of
Lewis’s position, particularly on the relation between three alleged asymme-
tries: the asymmetry of overdetermination, the asymmetry of miracles, and
the headliner asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. I endorse three crit-
icisms of Lewis’s position. First, I draw attention to the fact that Lewis’s
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own semantics requires the truth of at least some backtracking counterfactu-
als, or backtrackers. Second, I introduce Bennett-worlds. Third, I evaluate
Elga’s argument from certain statistical mechanical considerations, and com-
pare Elga-worlds to Bennett-worlds.
Chapter 3: Backtrackers Can Be True
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that backtrackers can be true, and
to provide a method for working out whether they are true. I argue that
backtrackers and foretrackers are not confined to distinct contexts, as Lewis
suggests: they are compatible, and can be true in the same context. I ar-
gue further that the grammatical complexity with which we prefer to express
backtracking reasoning need not indicate a relevant shift of context. Whether
an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence exists and what its nature might
be is, therefore, an open question, not to be settled by appeal to grammar.
Against that background, I suggest that we need a method to help us tell
when backtrackers are true, irrespective of distracting linguistic features. This
amounts to a further criticism of Lewis’s asymmetry of counterfactual de-
pendence, because it deprives that thesis of its explanandum — an ordinary
context in which the resolution of counterfactual vagueness makes backtrackers
mostly false. Lewis’s “visualisation” method is criticised, and the Ramsey Test
is found unsuitable as it stands. Drawing on hints from Frank Ramsey, Nel-
son Goodman and Dorothy Edgington, I propose a simple test which seeks to
harness our robust and temporally neutral abilities to make and assess induc-
tive inferences for the task of assessing counterfactuals. I dub it the Inference
Test.
Chapter 4: Selection
I strike a match, and it lights. It is unusual to say that the presence of oxygen
caused the flame, even though we might be fully aware that oxygen is needed for
the flame. This chapter presses the problem of selecting the cause from among
mere conditions, which has often been dismissed by theorists of causation
as a sort of whim. I start by arguing that selection needs to be accounted
for, and sketching some of the approaches which have been tried. I focus
on the strategy of assimilating causal selection to the contrastive mechanism
of causal explanation. Although this approach enjoys some success, I argue
that it fails either properly to explain or to enable us to justify our selective
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practices. I introduce the Reverse Counterfactual which, I suggest, captures
the intuitive notion that causesmake the difference to their effects. I argue that
the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes but not of mere conditions. This
yields an account of selection which overcomes the objections raised against the
contrastive strategy, and which links the context-sensitivity of causal selection
to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals. The relation between contrastive
explanation and the Reverse Counterfactual is discussed, along with various
objections.
Chapter 5: Transitivity
This chapter argues that the causes of the cause of an effect are not always
causes of that effect: that is, causation is not transitive. I begin by distin-
guishing various kinds of nontransitivity. I consider four motivations for the
common view that causation is transitive, and argue that none is compelling.
Two sorts of counterexamples to transitivity are then distinguished: those due
to distance (or failure of proximity) and those due to a special causal structure,
double prevention. I argue that proximity failure is closely linked to causal se-
lection. The Reverse Counterfactual tends to support the intuitive view that
very distant events are not causes, even if they may be mere conditions. Then
I argue, contrary to some recent literature, that cases of double-prevention
fail to be cases of causation. The Reverse Counterfactual agrees. Efforts by
McDermott, Paul and Hall to diagnose the difficulty with double prevention
are considered and found wanting. However, I agree with these authors that
double prevention does not constitute a real counterexample to causal transi-
tivity; I suggest that only an unselective notion of causation could persuade
us to think otherwise. Finally I consider how a valid substitute for counter-
factual transitivity might help explain why causation sometimes appears to be
transitive (unlike other nontransitive relations such as touching), and also why
distance should be relevant to causal transitivity.
Chapter 6: Redundancy
The term “redundant causation” is an umbrella. Overdetermination among
existing events is distinguished from redundancy due to non-occurring back-
ups. Symmetric and asymmetric overdetermination are further distinguished,
and within the latter, preemption and trumping are distinguished. It is pro-
posed that the Reverse Counterfactual holds true of cause-effect pairs even in
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cases of preemption. This gives us the basis for distinguishing causes from
preempted events. I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual is true only of
causes in some easy cases, allowing us to distinguish causes from preempted
events. Then I argue that we can make the same distinction in harder cases,
if we employ an intuitive notion of a causal chain. Next we discuss trumping,
where appeal to causal chains appears not to help. I argue that the Reverse
Counterfactual distinguishes trumping events from trumped events with what-
ever intuitive resources are provided to motivate the intuitive distinction; if no
such resources are provided, trumping collapses into symmetric overdetermi-
nation. Finally we discuss symmetric overdetermination, which does not yield
counterexamples in the way that preemption does. Nevertheless I argue that
the Reverse Counterfactual account avoids the difficulties which beset Lewis’s
account associated with mereological summing.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
A synopsis of the defence of the Reverse Counterfactual as a necessary condi-
tion for causation is presented. I then argue that there can be no counterfactual
sufficient condition for causation. I argue that simultaneous causation occurs.
Since the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is temporal, counterfactual
dependence can never offer a full characterisation of causation, no matter how
sophisticated a thesis might be proposed of the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence. Thus there is more to causation than counterfactual dependence
among particular events. I finish by compiling the more complicated versions
of the Reverse Counterfactual which are developed in earlier chapters, along
with other important claims which have been defended, in a concise summary.
1.4 Other Problems
There are various problems which I do not intend to tackle. Three stand out:
the nature of causal relata, the question whether causation is a relation, and
issues concerning probabilistic causation.
Lewis takes the causal relata to be events, which he further takes to be
properties of spatiotemporal regions (Lewis 1986c). I do not think that we need
total clarity on the nature of the causal relata, before we can make progress
with a conceptual analysis of causation. Even if causation is not between
events, or if events are not what Lewis says they are, it is to be hoped that
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a substantive analysis of our ordinary concept, such as we might appeal to in
settling a dispute, will depend only lightly if at all on the details.
I also try to avoid committing myself on whether causation is a relation.
When discussing causal transitivity and asymmetry, I take these properties of
causation to obey the logic of relations. Since causation must be relevantly like
a relation to support these properties, I treat causation as a relation for the
purposes of those discussions. However my analysis supports causation among
absences, which is potentially problematic for the view that causation is a re-
lation, since relations need relata. I leave this tension unresolved. Whether or
not causation is a relation, it seems that it should be able to support transi-
tivity and asymmetry. On the other hand, absences feature as causal “relata”
in ordinary talk, and thus it seems to me that a theory of causation must
also feature them if it is correctly to capture the nature and extension of the
concept underlying our ordinary talk.
If this tension is resolved with some clever way in which causation can have
the relational properties of asymmetry and transitivity, yet still meaningfully
admit causal absences, then my theory will meet with no problem. If, however,
absences are denied as causal relata, then not only will my theory be in error,
but so will our ordinary causal talk. In that case, the theory is none the worse
as a conceptual analysis. Whatever directive is given for excluding absences
and replacing them with presences will apply equally to the ordinary talk and
to the theory: it may simply be appended to the theory. For these reasons,
although it is an interesting question and important in other ways, I do not
think it matters to be precise about whether causation is a relation when we
are trying to provide a substantive analysis.
Perhaps most controversially, I eschew discussion of probabilistic causation
and of causation under indeterminism. There is little doubt that our ordinary
talk about causation often overlaps with talk about chance and probability. We
might say that smoking causes lung cancer, although it does not render lung
cancer inevitable, merely more probable. An analysis of the ordinary concept
of causation must therefore say something about how causation relates to these
concepts, even if it completely distinguishes them. I agree with Salmon that
simply denying any relation between causation and probabilistic concepts is
unsatisfactory.
It may be maintained, of course, that in all such [probabilistic] cases
a fully detailed account would furnish invariable cause-effect rela-
tions, but this claim would amount to no more than a declaration
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of faith. ...it is as pointless as it is unjustified.
(Salmon 1993, 137)
So I do not want to dismiss discussion of probability and chance out of hand.3
On the other hand, I do not want to discuss them, either. I might slightly
justify setting aside probabilistic causation in order to divide and conquer.
While exploring the relation between counterfactuals and causation, it might
make sense to ignore other difficult issues, even if they bear directly on the
subject of analysis — just as a physicist might ignore friction when studying
the laws of motion. Such an attitude can never be permanent, because the
phenomena which are idealised away must be included in any final analysis.
But the attitude may be acceptable in the interim, when no final analysis exists;
and that, surely, is the situation with the conceptual analysis of causation.4
1.5 Thinking About The Reverse Counterfac-
tual
Finally before we begin, it must regretfully be admitted that the central idea
is difficult. It is not complex: it is quite simple to say that, in general, if
the effect hadn’t happened then the cause wouldn’t have happened. But in
some ways simplicity makes the claim harder to explicate. Even though I am
convinced this claim is true, I fully admit that we do not normally say so, or
think so. One way to ease the headache, which has already been mentioned, is
to think of it as a counterfactual sufficiency claim. On Lewis’s account, causes
are counterfactually necessary for their effects; but I am proposing that they
are counterfactually sufficient (albeit in a slightly subtle sense, elaborated in
6.1). Another, perhaps more intuitive, pill to ease the headache is the idea of
difference-making, discussed in Chapter 4. To say that c causes e is, plausibly
(and in the absence of overdetermination), to say that c makes the difference
between e occurring and e not occurring. One way to understand the claim that
c “makes the difference” is that c just is the difference between the case where
e occurs and the relevant counterfactual scenario where e does not. But if c is
3Contributors to the compatibilism debates concerning, on the one hand causation and
indeterminism, and on the other hand and determinism and chance, include: Anscombe
1971, von Wright 1974, Lewis 1986a, 1994, Loewer 2001, Dowe and Noordhof 2004, Schaffer
2007.
4Collins, Hall and Paul say that a divide-and-conquer methodology is acceptable, given
how tough the analysis of causation is (Collins et al. 2004, 38–39).
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the difference between e occurring and not, then if e had not occurred, c would
not have occurred. (Otherwise c would not after all be any difference between
e occurring and not.) It therefore seems that the counterfactual, which is
difficult to get one’s head around, follows by an intuitive (if not watertight) line
of reasoning from a plausible understanding of at least some causal situations:
that causes “make the difference” to their effects. This conception of difference-
making may therefore be brought to mind in many cases where the Reverse
Counterfactual is difficult to comprehend or assess.
Chapter 2
Lewis’s Asymmetry Thesis
2.0 Abstract
This chapter lays out the elements of Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals
which will be relevant for us, then discusses criticisms of one aspect of the
theory: the thesis that counterfactual dependence is temporally asymmetric.
Lewis’s semantic theory is sketched, followed by Fine’s objection to the role
in that theory of similarity between possible worlds. Lewis presents his fully-
fledged position on the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence as a response
to Fine’s objection. I make an effort to get clear on the proper structure of
Lewis’s position, particularly on the relation between three alleged asymme-
tries: the asymmetry of overdetermination, the asymmetry of miracles, and
the headliner asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. I endorse three crit-
icisms of Lewis’s position. First, I draw attention to the fact that Lewis’s
own semantics requires the truth of at least some backtracking counterfactu-
als, or backtrackers. Second, I introduce Bennett-worlds. Third, I evaluate
Elga’s argument from certain statistical mechanical considerations, and com-
pare Elga-worlds to Bennett-worlds.
2.1 Introducing Counterfactuals
What I call counterfactuals are also known as counterfactual conditionals or
subjunctive conditionals, and are usually considered to be typified by sentences
of the form,
If it were the case that A then it would be the case that C.
We can also write the above as A > C.
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We will discuss Lewis’s conception of counterfactuals shortly, but at least
some properties of counterfactuals are widely agreed upon. Specifically:
• counterfactuals do not imply the truth of their antecedent, either logi-
cally or by convention in ordinary use (a property they share with other
conditionals);
• counterfactuals are not true in virtue of the falsity of their antecedent
(making them distinct from material conditionals);
• counterfactuals are not true in virtue of the truth of their consequent
(again, distinguishing them from material conditionals).
In other words, counterfactuals concern not just what is the case but what
would be the case. Analysing counterfactuals comes down largely to explaining
what that means.
The word “counterfactual” is used in two other ways, apart from this use as
a noun. It is used as an adjective to mean simply contrary to the facts. It is also
used in the phrase “counterfactual dependence”. I shall take Lewis’s definition
of counterfactual dependence. So it is something which holds between events,
and c counterfactually depends on a iff it is the case both that A > C and
that ∼ A >∼ C (Lewis 1973a, 166–7).1
The temporal direction of counterfactuals will be central here. What I shall
call a foretracking counterfactual, or foretracker, is one which goes forwards in
time: the antecedent denotes matters at a time earlier than the time of what
the consequent denotes. If the example above is a foretracker, a is before c.
A backtracking counterfactual, or backtracker, is one which goes backwards in
time: the antecedent denotes matters at a time later than the time of what
the consequent denotes. If the example above is a backtracker, c is before a.
We might try to be precise about what it is for a to be before c: whether, in
particular, a must be wholly before c, or must start before c starts, or must end
before c ends. For present purposes, however, I see no advantage in precision
— we only risk ruling out intuitive cases for no benefit, since my theory will
not rely on the notion of beforeness (even if Lewis’s does). Moreover, in the
1At the point to which the reference refers, Lewis appears to define counterfactual depen-
dence among propositions rather than events. But it is more natural to see the dependence
as being between events: after all, it is surely something about the events a and c, not the
propositions that they occur, which gives rise to the facts that A > C and ∼ A >∼ C.
Elsewhere Lewis himself speaks of counterfactual dependence between events, for instance
in the introduction to his Philosophical Papers — Volume II (Lewis 1986a, xii).
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cases we shall consider, it will be obvious what temporal direction, if any, the
counterfactual in question has.
One reason that Lewis’s counterfactual account received so much attention
is that it was based firmly in a comprehensive semantic theory of counterfac-
tuals. The theory of causation benefited in a general way from the background
theory of counterfactuals, because the background theory eased the worry that
to analyse causation in terms of counterfactuals is merely to swap one mystery
for another. The theory of causation also benefited more directly, since — as
we shall see — it makes direct use of some of the properties which Lewis’s
semantics ascribes to counterfactuals. In particular, Lewis’s theory of cau-
sation relies upon his thesis of the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence,
which can be roughly characterised as a ban on backtrackers. The analysis
of causation which I will propose employs backtrackers, so I must argue not
only against Lewis’s theory of causation, but also against his semantics for
counterfactuals, at least insofar as it implies the falsity of the counterfactuals
I wish to use to analyse causation.
Before we turn to that, an issue should be set aside. It may be doubted
whether counterfactuals — and indeed conditionals more generally — should
be considered to bear truth-values. A non-factualist such as Richard Bradley
[2007] would deny it, and would thus take believing a counterfactual to be
something other than believing it to be true. I will assume that counterfactuals
can and do bear one of two truth-values, true or false, and further that when
we believe them, we believe them to be true or false. This is not because I
am hostile to a non-factualist view. It is rather that I do not think the sorts
of changes which a non-factualist view would require will ultimately affect the
prospects for a counterfactual analysis of causation. The non-factualist does
not assert that there is no difference between those counterfactuals I call true
and those I call false, only that the difference is not a difference of truth-value.
Whatever the difference is, I hope it could be plugged into a counterfactual
analysis of causation, and preserve the substance of that analysis.
2.2 Lewis’s Semantics for Counterfactuals
2.2.1 Possible World Semantics
We have given a working definition of a counterfactual as something typified
by this sentence-type:
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If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C.
Over-attention to surface grammar can be unproductive, however. Sometimes
we might express ourselves differently, but mean much the same thing. At other
times we might express ourselves with this sort of construction, but use it in
an unusual way. Both difficulties may be compounded if there are languages
into which the English subjunctive construction does not straightforwardly
translate. We can avoid these difficulties if we identify counterfactuals, not by
natural-language expressions of a given form, but by the semantics appropriate
for them. It may be that other expressions are best interpreted with this
semantics on certain occasions, and that expressions of this form are sometimes
better interpreted differently.2
Lewis’s semantics appeals to possible worlds arranged in a system of spheres
of accessibility. The modal logical concepts of spheres and accessibility need
not be discussed here. Truth conditions of counterfactuals are given in terms of
comparative closeness of possible worlds, where closeness is a weak ordering (cf.
Lewis 1973b, 13–19). Lewis proposes that closeness is a relation of comparative
similarity (Lewis 1973b, 1).
The proposed truth conditions for counterfactuals are summarized as fol-
lows.
In brief: a counterfactual is vacuously true if there is no antecedent-
permitting sphere, non-vacuously true if there is some antecedent-
permitting sphere in which the consequent holds at every antecedent
world, and false otherwise.
(Lewis 1973b, 16)
Roughly speaking, A > C is vacuously true if its antecedent is necessarily false,
and non-vacuously true if, moving in towards the actual world, we eventually
get to a point beyond which all the worlds remaining between us and the actual
world where A is true are also worlds where C is true. It is false if we never
reach such a point: that is, if, no matter what A-world we take, there is always
one (which could be the one we took) as close or closer where ∼ C.
So far we have only discussed the “would” counterfactual: if it were the
case that A, then it would be the case that C. Sometimes, however, we also
2We can remain neutral, at this point, on what a counterfactual is to be identified with.
Counterfactuals could still be natural language constructions, but those satisfying certain
semantic constraints, rather than having a certain surface form. Or counterfactuals could be
identified with the propositions expressed by such statements, or with something else again.
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use “might” in counterfactual expressions: if it were the case that A, then it
might be the case that C. Let us use ≥ to stand for the might-counterfactual,
in the way we are using > for the would-counterfactual. Lewis interdefines the
might-counterfactual and the would-counterfactual, as follows:
A ≥ C =df∼ (A >∼ C)
A > C =df∼ (A ≥∼ C)
(Lewis 1973b, 2 — my symbolism)
The motivation for this definition is as follows. Suppose Jack asserts that if
he were to climb the hill, he would fall down and break his crown. Jill denies
it, yet she does not assert that if Jack were to climb the hill, he would not
fall down. She knows the path is slippery, and that falling down is a real
possibility. Rather, when she denies Jack’s assertion, she is committing herself
to the claim that if he were to climb the hill he might not fall down: it is not a
foregone conclusion that he would. This is compatible with the claim that he
might fall down.3 To summarise the truth conditions of a might-counterfactual
at a world i directly in possible world terms, as opposed to by interdefinition
with the would-counterfactual:
...the ‘might’ counterfactual is then true if and only if, as we take
smaller and smaller antecedent-permitting spheres around i with-
out end, and thereby confine our attention to antecedent-worlds
closer and closer to i, we never leave behind all the antecedent-
worlds where the consequent holds.
(Lewis 1973b, 21)
It should also be noted that would entails might, on Lewis’s view: A > C `
A ≥ C. This is roughly because, if some A-world where C is closer than any
where ∼ C (and so A > C), it follows that some A-world where C is at least
as close as any where ∼ C (and so, roughly, A ≥ C).4
3This definition of the might-counterfactual is thus connected with the denial of excluded
middle for would-counterfactuals. Robert Stalnaker disputes both Lewis’s denial of excluded
middle, and his definition of “might” [Stalnaker, 1981], which he points out is also used in
non-conditional contexts. To pursue these niceties would take us too far from the main
thread; we will, therefore, set them aside, and accept Lewis’s “might”, and his rejection of
counterfactual excluded middle. (For further discussion, see Bennett 2003.)
4In fact the situation is more complicated. Lewis claims that when A is not entertainable,
and hence A > C is non-vacuously true, then A ≥ C is false (Lewis 1973b, 23–4). I am
not sure how this squares with his assertion that A > C and A ≥ C are both true when
A is impossible (Lewis 1973b, 24–6), assuming that an impossible antecedent fails to be
entertainable. It does not matter for our purposes since we shall only be considering non-
vacuous counterfactuals of either sort.
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In general, when I say “counterfactual” without qualification, I am refer-
ring to the would-counterfactual. The might-counterfactual will be explicitly
specified when it is meant.
Lewis takes a stand on a couple of points which will be relevant but which
are not obvious. First, he holds that counterfactuals whose antecedent and
consequent are true at the actual world are true. This is slightly counterintu-
itive, because normally we would not assert a counterfactual unless we were
uncertain of the truth-value of the antecedent, or else thought it false. Serving
up a lasagne at my house, I would be unlikely to turn to you and say, “If you
were to come round for dinner, I would cook you a lasagne”. If I did say it, you
would probably take me to be referring to some other time, whose occurrence
is as yet a mere possibility. But Lewis thinks this is mere conversational, not
logical, implication.
This view arises from the Centering Assumption, which states that our
world is closer to itself than any other world is to ours. Lewis accepts the
Centering Assumption (Lewis 1973b, 26–31), for reasons which will become
clear in the next section, and this explains why counterfactuals do not imply
the falsity of their antecedents.
Another substantive point on which Lewis takes a stand concerns the or-
dering of worlds. It is sometimes easier to think of A > C as meaning that
it is the case that C at the closest world where it is the case that A. But
counterfactuals may be true where there is no closest world. There may be
either more or less than one closest A-world. If there are several worlds tied
for closeness, there is more than one closest A-world. Ties are impossible on
the Uniqueness Assumption, that there is at most one closest A-world. The
Uniqueness Assumption enjoys little support from our ordinary use of coun-
terfactuals, where we tend to specify counterfactual situations rather vaguely,
only up to the level of precision we feel to be required. Lewis rejects the
Uniqueness Assumption. But there may also be less than one closest world;
and the corresponding assumption that there is at least one closest world —
the Limit Assumption — is intuitively easy to make. The Limit Assumption
denies that there may be an infinite series of worlds, each closer to actuality
than the last, but none closest (Lewis 1973b, 20). Lewis also rejects the Limit
Assumption.5 His position on both the Limit Assumption and the Uniqueness
5Stalnaker endorses both the Uniqueness and Limit Assumptions (Stalnaker 1981, 88-9),
arguing that there is exactly one closest A-world. Note that the two assumptions together
entail counterfactual excluded middle, if the logical law of excluded middle holds: for there
will be exactly one closest A-world, and by logical excluded middle it will be the case that
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Assumption are explained by his view of what it is for one world to be closer
to actuality than another, to which we now turn.
2.2.2 Closeness As Similarity
Evidently, the sense of Lewis’s account of counterfactuals depends on the con-
cept of relative closeness among worlds. Lewis suggests that closeness is a
relation of “overall similarity between worlds” (Lewis 1973b, 14). Similarity
does an incredible amount of work for Lewis, and certain features are impor-
tant. “Overall” means that we take the whole possible world into account, not
just a part of it. Yet we do not have to take every respect of possible difference
into account in assessing overall similarity. Some respects of similarity count
for very little: for example, the similarities between grue things are of rather
little importance (cf. Lewis 1979, 42). Similarity is something which Lewis
thinks we have an intuitive grasp on, for instance when we remark on a pair
of identical twins or compare two essays for signs of plagiarism.
The more similar a world is, the closer it is. The identification of modal
closeness with similarity explains Lewis’s rejection of the Limit Assumption.
Lewis points out that there is no shortest line longer than an inch, and argues
on this basis that there is in principle no closest world in which a given line is
longer than an inch, since in principle there is no minimal difference between
a line one inch long and a line longer than one inch (Lewis 1973b, 20–21). His
adoption of the Centering Assumption can also be explained by his identifi-
cation of closeness with similarity, since it makes good intuitive sense to deny
that any distinct y can be as similar to some x as x itself.6 The Centering
Assumption is sometimes implicitly rejected when philosophers speak of close
worlds, rather than of some worlds being closer than others. However it will
be accepted here, because once again the issues will lead us too far astray, and
also in this case because no semantics in terms of non-comparative closeness
has gained wide currency.7
C∨ ∼ C at that world. So (A > C) ∨ (A >∼ C).
6Stalnaker agrees with Lewis about Centering: “Various constraints are placed on the
selection function... For example, it is required that the world selected relative to proposition
A be an A-world... And if the actual world meets this condition, it is required that it be
selected” (Stalnaker 1981, 88).
7In spite of this, it is remarkably common to hear people speak of close possible worlds in
a non-comparative sense. A notable example of a denial of Centering doing theoretical work
occurs in Robert Nozick’s discussion of knowledge. Among his conditions for knowledge,
Nozick requires of S to know that p that if p were true, S would believe that p — that is,
p > Bsp (Nozick 1981, 178). When an agent holds a true belief, this condition is trivially
satisfied on Lewis’s semantics. Nozick, however, requires that the belief be true not just at
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Kit Fine, among others, puts a simple and famous objection to Lewis’s
identification of closeness with similarity (Fine 1975). If Nixon had pressed
the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. But a world with a
nuclear holocaust is not very similar to the world we know and love today.
There are worlds where the button malfunctions, or the current somehow fails
to be transmitted, or something, and by the time Nixon cottons on, he has
changed his mind and the cataclysm is averted. These worlds seem, at first
sight, to be more similar to ours than any apocalyptic world, overall. So
it appears that Lewis ought to deny that if Nixon had pressed the button
there would have been a nuclear holocaust. By extension, it seems he must
deny any counterfactual where the consequent takes us drastically away from
actuality. But ordinarily, we do not assess counterfactuals by how drastic their
consequents are: indeed, we sometimes use counterfactuals when reasoning to
avoid drastic consequences.
This objection prompts Lewis to say more about similarity. When deciding
whether one world is more similar to ours than another, we should heed the
following four directives. Determinism is assumed in both temporal directions.
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread,
diverse violations of law.
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-
temporal region throughout which perfect match of par-
ticular fact prevails.
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, local-
ized, simple violations of law.
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate
similarity of particular fact, even in matters that con-
cern us greatly.
(Lewis 1979, 47-8)
A violation of law is a case where what goes on at the world under consid-
eration contravenes the natural laws of our world:
the actual worlds but at relevant close possible worlds. In requiring this, he clearly rejects the
Centering Assumption. If Timothy Williamson’s safety condition on knowledge is expressed
as the counterfactual Bsp > p, it also requires the violation of the Centering Assumption,
although Williamson denies that he is committed to a counterfactual expression (Williamson
2000, 148–50).
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...the violated laws are not the laws of the same worlds where they
are violated. That is impossible; whatever else a law may be, it is
at least an exceptionless regularity.
(Lewis 1979, 44-5)
At our world, w0, Nixon does not actually push the button. Lewis distin-
guishes four kinds of worlds where he does. Worlds like w1 are exactly like
ours until shortly before the time of the antecedent, when by a small miracle
the antecedent comes true. After that, they follow our laws. w2 typifies worlds
where Nixon presses the button, but no laws are violated: history is suitably
different to yield this button push nomically. w3 is a world where exact match
prevails until a small miracle, as in w1; but unlike w1, there is a further miracle
to suppress the most obvious lawful consequences of the button-push, so that
approximate match with w0 resumes soon after. Finally, worlds like w4 are
like w3 except that the second miracle secures exact rather than approximate
match with w0.
The closest worlds are typified by w1, which exhibits an exact match with
the actual world in matters of particular fact, up until, or until shortly before,
the time of the antecedent. There will be a minor violation of law — a small
miracle — shortly before Nixon presses the button. After that, matters unfold
lawfully, by the laws of our world. So the missiles are fired, Soviet warning
systems detect them and retaliate with an equally devastating salvo, and the
surface of Earth is substantially altered and rendered lifeless in a series of huge
nuclear explosions. w1 satisfies (1) totally, (2) partially, and (3) and (4) not
at all.
w1 is closer than worlds like w2 where Nixon presses the button but no laws
are violated. By determinism, w2 will differ in some degree from the actual
world w0 at every time — future and past — in matters of particular fact.
(Lewis argues that the difference will probably be great, because of the way
one thing leads to another.) So w2 violates (2) to a much greater extent than
w1.
Worlds such as w3 are ones where exact match prevails until just before
the miraculous button press, and then, by another tiny miracle, destruction is
averted. But w3 is further from w0 than w1. For although w3 may be similar
to w0 after the button press, it will not be quite the same. Nixon’s finger will
have left a print on the button. The bottle of gin on the side will be a bit
emptier, because he had a swig before he pressed. The man on the moon,
watching through his X-ray telescope, will have seen the button press; and
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other light waves carrying the same information out of the Pentagon windows
will be embarking on their journey to Alpha Centauri. Nixon’s memoirs will
be different. And so on. So the second small miracle — say, the current dying
in the wire — will secure only approximate similarity, (4), which is of less
importance than avoiding small miracles, (3). Both w1 and w3 violate (3), but
w3 does so twice. So w1 is more similar to our world, w0.
Finally, consider worlds like w4 where by some miracle exact match rather
than approximate match resumes after the button press. w4 is also more remote
than w1. For the miracle needed to suppress all the traces of the button press,
and thus secure exact match, will be a huge one. Light waves vanish, heat is
sucked back out of the wire, finger prints dissolve, gin vanishes from Nixon’s
stomach and reappears in the bottle, and Nixon’s memories are altered. This
is a violation of (1).
There are more arguments against, and counterexamples to, Lewis’s four-
fold definition of similarity than we will survey here. (For a concise list, see
Schaffer 2004b.) In particular, I wish to set aside a whole class of counterexam-
ples seeking to derive advantage from Lewis’s assumption of determinism and
the difficulty of extending the account to chances. We will be concerned only
with direct challenges to the temporal asymmetry which arises from Lewis’s
response to Fine, and which I shall now lay out.
2.3 Overdetermination and Miracles
2.3.1 The Structure of the Argument
Lewis’s asymmetry thesis and the issues surrounding it are complex, and it
will help a precise statement of the thesis to work up to it in a logical way.
The foundation is another asymmetry, the asymmetry of overdetermination.
This gives rise to the asymmetry of miracles, which in turn gives rise to the
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.
This is the exact reverse of the order in which Lewis presents the asymme-
tries (cf. Lewis 1979, 32-52). Lewis starts by suggesting that counterfactual
dependence is asymmetric, for entirely independent reasons which we will con-
sider in the next chapter. He then gives the four-fold definition of similarity
which we have just discussed. It takes a much smaller miracle, he argues, to
make a world like ours in the past diverge in the future, than it does to make
a world unlike ours in the past converge (or reconverge) at a later time. He
labels the asymmetry: the asymmetry of miracles. Finally he presents his ex-
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planation: the asymmetry of overdetermination. His reason for this order of
presentation is my reason for presenting them in the reverse order: that the or-
der of explanation runs from overdetermination, to miracles, to counterfactual
dependence. Lewis is proposing his thesis as an explanation and characterisa-
tion of various vaguely-felt asymmetries, and consequently he pushes through
to deeper levels of explanation as he progresses. In this chapter, however, we
are mainly interested in assessing the internal merits of the position, rather
than its explanatory virtues.
2.3.2 The Asymmetry of Overdetermination
Throw a stone into a pond. Given the laws of nature, and some background
assumptions, you will in theory be able to predict when the waves will start
arriving at the shore where you are standing. There is nothing special about
where you are standing: you could make this prediction equally for any other
point on the pond’s circumference. At least, you could if you knew enough
maths, physics and facts about the pond and the entrance of the stone, as-
suming of course that the process is wholly deterministic. Likewise, you could
in principle deduce when a projectile entered a pond, by considering the time
at which waves start arriving and the curvature of the wave-front, along with
various other facts, principles and background assumptions. Again, you need
not be standing just where you happen to be standing in order to do this:
other points on the shore would do just as well. There are very many wave-
segments we could consider, each of which determines the time and location
of the point at which the stone struck the water. On the other hand, that
event — the stone striking the water — determines very many different wave
segments. This process displays an asymmetry: an earlier state of affairs de-
termines very many later ones, and very many later states of affairs determine
this one earlier one.8
At any rate, this is roughly the picture Lewis wants us to accept. The
general thesis of the asymmetry of overdetermination then comes down to the
claim that processes like this one are very much more common than processes
displaying the opposite characteristics — processes such as stones being pro-
pelled from ponds by converging water-waves. Such processes are physically
possible, assuming that the fundamental dynamical laws are time-reversible.
But they occur very rarely. This brings out the contingency of Lewis’s thesis.
8According to both Lewis [1979] and Price [1992a], this example originates with Popper
[1956].
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It is a claim about how our world happens to be, not about how it has to be.
Let us make the notion of overdetermination precise. Logical overdetermi-
nation might be thought of as follows. Consider two arguments:
All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is mortal.
Only gods are immortal, and Socrates is not a god, hence Socrates
is mortal.
These combinations of premises each entail, and in that sense determine, that
Socrates is mortal. But they are not equivalent — neither pair of premises
entails either of the other premises.9 Moreover each premise is ineliminable:
remove a premise from one of the arguments, and that argument is no longer
valid. As they stand, however, both arguments are sound. The fact that
Socrates is mortal might be said to be logically overdetermined by the two
arguments: each determines it by logical implication; they are not equiva-
lent; and since neither features any redundant premises, neither contains a
premise identical with, equivalent to or entailing the premise set of the other
argument.10 (Note that this does not prevent overdetermining premise sets
sharing some premises.) More generally we can say that the fact denoted by
the proposition C is logically overdetermined by the premise set {X1, ..., Xn}
iff:
(i) {X1, ..., Xn} has more than one non-equivalent subset of premises
whose conjunctions P , Q, etc, each entail C [an entailment require-
ment];
(ii) no proper subset of the conjuncts of P , Q, etc, entails the fact C
[an ineliminability requirement];
(iii) C does not entail any subset of {X1, ..., Xn} [a non-premise-circularity
requirement].11
9Obviously, the first pair does not entail that only gods are immortal: even though men
aren’t, other things might be. Nor does it entail that Socrates is not a god: Socrates might
be a man and a god. Likewise, the second pair obviously does not entail anything about the
mortality of all men, since it does not rule out the possibility that some men are gods. Nor
does the second pair entail that Socrates is a man: he could equally be a goat, for example.
10To see this, suppose that we have two premise-sets {X1, ..., Xn} and {Y1, ..., Ym}, both
of which entail some conclusion C, and that one premise set {X1, ..., Xn} contains a set
of propositions {P} which entails the other premise set {Y1, ..., Ym}. Then all the other
propositions in {X1, ..., Xn} would be redundant for concluding C, since {Y1, ..., Ym} entails
C and {P} entails {Y1, ..., Ym}.
11If premise circularity is allowed then, since every fact implies itself, a fact would be
overdetermined iff there were at least one valid non-circular argument for it.
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We can say that C is logically overdetermined in general, without reference
to some particular premise set, iff there exists some premise set by which it is
logically overdetermined.
Using this notion of logical overdetermination, we can define the perhaps
more interesting notion of nomic overdetermination: an event e is nomically
overdetermined by a set of simultaneous events {e1, ..., en} not including e when
it is logically overdetermined by the set of propositions {E1, ..., En} that those
events occur, in conjunction with some law(s) of nature L. (There is no need to
require that all the laws of nature are invoked, but to deserve the title “nomic”,
at least one must be.) That is, e is nomically overdetermined by simultaneous
events {e1, ..., en} iff it is logically overdetermined by {E1, ..., En, L}. We can
say e is nomically overdetermined without reference to any particular set of
events when there exists some set of simultaneous events by which it is nomi-
cally overdetermined. We can also say that e is nomically determined (rather
than overdetermined) by a set of events {e1, ..., en} not including e when that
set logically determines it in conjunction with the laws.
It appears that Lewis’s asymmetry thesis is supposed to apply to nomic
overdetermination as we have defined it. In a deterministic world, every fact
will have at least one minimal set of conditions which nomically entails it
(Lewis 1979, 49). Lewis’s claim is that many more such minimal sets lie in
the future, relative to a given fact, than in the past. He gives an example like
the one we began with, of a wave emitted from a point source (Lewis 1979,
50), as a special case: many disjoint wave segments determine properties of
the source, together overdetermining it. Since the source does not overdeter-
mine the wave segments, there is an asymmetry of overdetermination in such
cases, Lewis claims. And there are many other cases like that, not confined to
wave phenomena. Whereas, just as there are very few reverse cases of waves
converging on a point, there are very few cases more generally where earlier
events overdetermine later ones.
Whatever goes on leaves widespread and varied traces at future
times. ... It is plausible that very many simultaneous disjoint
combinations of traces of any present fact are determinants thereof;
there is no lawful way for the combination to have come about in
the absence of the fact.
(Lewis 1979, 50)
Thus the future overdetermines the past to a much greater extent than the
past overdetermines the future. That is the asymmetry of overdetermination.
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The asymmetry is not total, however. Lewis accepts that the past overde-
termines the future occasionally and mildly:
We have our stock examples — the victim whose heart is simulta-
neously pierced by two bullets, and the like. But these cases seem
uncommon. Moreover, the overdetermination is not very extreme.
We have more than one determinant, but still not a very great
number.
(Lewis 1979, 49-50)
This is a case of causal overdetermination, which we have not yet discussed.
Presumably the thought is that cases of causal overdetermination must also
be cases of nomic overdetermination, because causation happens in accordance
with the laws of nature.
The asymmetry of overdetermination is probably the most basic and dif-
ficult aspect of Lewis’s views about temporal asymmetry, and raises many
questions. We shall consider some of them shortly (2.4). Before we move on,
it bears emphasis that the asymmetry of overdetermination is both a contin-
gent and a basic fact about the world — the latter less widely recognised than
the former, perhaps. The asymmetry thesis is contingent: it concerns the way
things are at this world. Moreover it is basic, in the sense that it is not reduced
to the asymmetry of entropy or to any other known asymmetry — which is the
starting point of some objections, as we shall see. In addition, the asymmetry
plays a fundamental role in Lewis’s theory.
Let me emphasize, once more, that the asymmetry of overdeter-
mination is a contingent, de facto matter. Moreover, it may be
a local matter, holding near here but not in remote parts of time
and space. If so, then all that rests on it — the asymmetries of
miracles, of counterfactual dependence, of causation and openness
— may likewise be local and subject to exceptions.
(Lewis 1979, 50–51)
This shows that the asymmetry of overdetermination is fundamental to Lewis’s
theory: that it is the ultimate explanation of the other asymmetries he men-
tions, and to some of which we now turn.
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2.3.3 The Asymmetry of Miracles
The asymmetry of miracles is the fact that small, localised, simple violations of
the laws of nature can make a world exactly like ours become unlike ours after
the violation, whereas to make a world factually unlike ours become exactly
like ours requires big, widespread, diverse violations of the laws of nature. A
small miracle is a small, localised, simple violation of law, and a big miracle
is a big, widespread, diverse violation of law (Lewis 1979, 47-8). The laws in
question are the laws of our world (Lewis 1979, 44-5).
The asymmetry of overdetermination gives rise to the asymmetry of mira-
cles:
I suggest that what makes convergence [of a possible world with
ours] take so much more of a miracle than divergence... is an asym-
metry of overdetermination...
(Lewis 1979, 49-50)
It works like this. Later facts nomically overdetermine earlier ones, meaning
many different sets of later facts nomically determine earlier ones. That means
that if a world unlike ours becomes exactly like ours, many subsequent sets
of facts nomically (by our laws) determine earlier facts which did not, at the
world in question, occur. For every such set of facts, a violation of (our) law
must have occurred; and there are many such sets. So violation of the laws
entailing these sets will be widespread and diverse. By contrast, earlier facts do
not nomically overdetermine later facts to anything like the same degree. This
means that a world which is exactly like ours at an earlier time and completely
unlike at a later time need not have violated our laws to a great extent.
2.3.4 The Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence
The asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is the result of the asymmetry
of miracles, and the identification of comparative closeness with comparative
similarity. We need not revisit Lewis’s treatment of the Nixon case — the
strategy there is quite clear. Since closeness is similarity, the worlds which
make our counterfactuals true must be more similar than other worlds. So
we avoid big miracles and look for match of fact, in the way he describes. If
we accept his four similarity criteria, we get the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence: for worlds that converge with ours require larger miracles to do
so, and are therefore further than some worlds that diverge from ours. So
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foretracking counterfactuals stand a chance of truth, whereas backtracking
ones do not.
The future similarity objection (the Nixon objection) is, of course, not an
objection that concerns backtrackers. It is an objection to the conception of
closeness as similarity. But Lewis’s answer to it yields the asymmetry of coun-
terfactual dependence, and thus (since it does so deliberately) kills two birds
with one stone. I think this is the explanation for a curious feature of Lewis’s
discussion of the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, which Bennett re-
acts to and which we shall now discuss: namely, that a friend of backtrackers
in any form surely does not suppose that backtracking counterfactuals entail
the world will be just as it is in the future. Suppose I say:
Mr D’Arcy did not ask for a favour today, but if Mr D’Arcy had
asked today, then he and Elizabeth would not have argued yester-
day.
In supposing so, surely I do not thereby suppose that Mr D’Arcy’s request
would have no consequences. Presumably Elizabeth does not actually grant Mr
D’Arcy a favour, since he does not actually ask. Does my backtracker therefore
commit me to thinking that if Mr D’Arcy had asked today, Elizabeth would
not have granted the favour, despite the fact that they would not have argued
yesterday? Surely not. But worlds that are dissimilar to ours throughout
their whole past and future are more dissimilar than worlds with large areas
of perfect match. Thus we are presented with a stark choice between worlds
where the future but not the past matches our world completely, and worlds
where the past matches but the future does not. Neither seems particularly
amenable for interpreting backtrackers.
More generally, even if the asymmetry of miracles does establish an asym-
metry in the way that future states of affairs may be greatly affected by small
differences in earlier states of affairs, it does not quite establish the asymmetry
of counterfactual dependence which Lewis asserts. It is with this point that
we shall start our critique.
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2.4 Internal Criticisms of Counterfactual Asym-
metry
2.4.1 Lewis Needs Backtrackers
There will often be a trade-off between exact match of fact and size of miracle.
Suppose Nixon is on the other side of the room, thinking peaceful thoughts, and
suddenly — bump — he travels four metres in an instant, and is pressing the
button with a scowl. Clearly we envisage nothing of the sort when we suppose
Nixon to have pressed the button. To avoid sudden bumps, we sometimes
locate the miracle a bit before the antecedent, despite the fact that this loses
us some match of actual fact. Lewis prefers a smooth, orderly transition: a
neuron somewhere in Nixon’s head miraculously fires a few minutes earlier,
and subsequently the button is pushed.
Lewis’s account must therefore endorse those backtrackers which take us
from the antecedent to the small miracle which brings it about. For instance,
if Nixon had pressed the button then, miraculously yet inconspicuously, a few
neurons would have fired in his brain shortly beforehand. As Bennett puts it:
[Lewis’s theory] provides generously for forward counterfactuals,
but the only backward ones for which it makes any provision are
the scanty affairs needed to get his closest worlds from likeness to
[w0] to the truth of the antecedent.
(Bennett 2001, 183)
Bennett goes on to point out that the affairs needed to make foretrackers true
might not be so scanty after all. Suppose I started to say:
If dinosaurs roamed the earth today...
It depends on context, but an obvious scenario in which dinosaurs would roam
the earth is one in which some meteorite impact millions of years ago was
averted, and the dinosaurs persisted. There are obvious interpretations of that
antecedent, natural interpretations in many contexts, on which the dinosaurs
never died out. In that case, the small miracle would have occurred millions
of years ago. So in the context where vagueness is resolved that way, we
have backtrackers concerning millions of years. And many of the things we
see on Earth today — skyscrapers, the internet — would probably be absent
(or at least might be) if the dinosaurs had survived, because we would never
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have ventured down from the trees. Of course, in some contexts we might
suppose dinosaurs to coexist with skyscrapers and the rest — as, for example,
in the film Jurassic Park. But the technological advances and DNA discoveries
featured in that film are not the only, nor even the most obvious, way to
suppose dinosaurs roam the earth today. So it is clear that the location of
the smallest miracle is highly context dependent: it is not always a matter
of backtracking just a little bit to insert an inconspicuous miracle, even if
there are opportunities to do so. Sometimes we backtrack a lot: we ignore the
possibility that reproductive technologies develop a bit faster and produce live
dinosaurs, in favour of a perterbation in the path of an asteroid millions of
years ago. Lewis’s own account, therefore, licenses backtracking in some more
subtle and sophisticated way than it sometimes appears to.
The question about where the smallest miracle might occur suggests a
semantics for backtrackers which does not deviate substantially from Lewis’s
picture. Bennett holds that a respectable semantics must be a “late fork”
semantics, like Lewis’s: that is, it must assume that counterfactual history
matches actual history, and forks off as late as it can. He suggests that true
backtrackers are interpreted by worlds where the late fork nevertheless precedes
the consequent.
The slack in Lewis’s account arising from the trade-off between miracle
size and match of fact means that such a theory is conceivable. On Lewis’s
theory, it remains rather opaque exactly how this trade-off works, and how
context affects it, as we have seen. A misfiring of neurons in the darkness of
Nixon’s skull is a miracle both sufficiently small and sufficiently late to be the
obvious candidate for the small miracle leading to the counterfactual button
push. In the case of the dinosaurs roaming the Earth today, however, the place
we naturally put the miracle is not the latest place we could put it. For some
reason, in some contexts we go back a lot further, with a huge cost in match
of matters of fact for doubtful gain in miracle-size. The principles governing
the appropriate location of miracles, like principles governing so many of our
common practices, are unclear, complex and subtle. This raises the prospect
that they could, after all, accommodate backtrackers.
Bennett’s proposal is not detailed,12 but it illustrates one way in which
12I am referring to his proposal in [Bennett, 2001] and [2003], where he rejects the law-
abiding theory advanced in [Bennett, 1984]. I have largely avoided discussion of the relative
merits of law-abiding and miraculous theories of counterfactuals. A canonical law-abiding
theory of counterfactuals is given in [Jackson, 1987]. Further discussions of the role of laws
in theories of counterfactuals include: Lewis 1973b, Goodman 1983, Kvart 1986, Bennett
2003, Pruss 2003.
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Lewis’s asymmetry of counterfactual dependence might be an overstatement.
Perhaps we do hold the past fixed to a much greater extent than the future in
counterfactual reasoning. But Lewis pushes this view to an extreme, on which
almost every backtracker is normally false. It is this extreme view which plays
a crucial role in his theory of causation, as we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7.
Bennett’s point here, I take it, is that Lewis’s own semantics does not fully
support this doctrine, because of the slack remaining around miracle size and
location. This casts doubt on how sharp a contrast can be drawn between true
foretrackers and false backtrackers: every foretracker is surrounded by true
backtrackers, and by no means is backtracking always kept to a minimum. I
suggest that Bennett’s argument gives us an initial reason to doubt Lewis’s
sharp contrast between false backtrackers and true foretrackers.
2.4.2 Bennett-Worlds
We just considered an attack on the move from asymmetry of miracles to the
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, of the strong flavour which Lewis
defends. If this attack succeeds, it is all I need. All I require, for the purposes
of my discussion of causation, is some view of counterfactuals on which back-
trackers are not automatically false. My discussion of causation could then be
seen as an attempt to further delineate the circumstances in which backtrackers
are true, and to better understand the more complex asymmetry which Lewis’s
sharp and simple one parodies. This is indeed how I see the coming discussion.
But there are other, perhaps more dramatic weaknesses in Lewis’s asymmetry
of counterfactual dependence, besides the one we have noted. Understanding
some of these weaknesses will provide further motivation for rethinking Lewis’s
asymmetry thesis.
Now we shall consider an attack on the asymmetry of miracles itself. If
the asymmetry of miracles is entailed by the asymmetry of overdetermination,
then this is also an attack on the latter.
Bennett asks us to imagine a world w1 whose history up to time t is just
like that at the actual world w0, and where a small miracle occurs at t.13 After
13It does not matter for present purposes whether t is an instant or a short stretch of time.
Let us assume it is an instant, for the sake of simplicity, and let us assume that miracles
can be instantaneous violations of law. Like Lewis, I assume that times may be identified
across worlds. Lewis says that this assumption may be abandoned “at the cost of some
complication” (Lewis 1979, 37), but does not give details. I take it that the complication
would stand for present purposes too. For these purposes, one complication that might
replace the assumption might be to define t by how much time has elapsed since the start of
history, or remains till the end. Or, if there is no start and no end, then for the purposes of
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Figure 2.1: Bennett Worlds
t, the world rolls on, obedient to the (deterministic) laws of our world. w1
is the sort of world which Lewis says makes our counterfactuals true. It is
a diverging world, meaning that it shares our history and then diverges by a
divergence miracle. By the asymmetry of miracles, divergence miracles may
be small.
Bennett points out that the small divergence miracle at w1 is also an equally
small convergence miracle with respect to another world, w2. To arrive at w2,
simply take a world which matches w1 after t, remove the small miracle by
which we generated w1 from w0, and let the past be determined by the laws
of w0. This world, w2, shares the laws of the actual world strictly, unlike the
slightly miraculous w1. With respect to w2, the miracle in w1 is therefore just
as minor an infringement of law as it is with respect to our world, w0. Yet
with respect to w2, the miracle in w1 is a convergence miracle, and w1 is a
convergent world. For the two worlds share actual fact after t but not before
t, and they would share laws if it were not for what happens in w1 at t.
In Figure 2.1, world histories are represented by lines. Parrallel lines indi-
cate exact match of matters of fact. w0 is a horizontal line, and w1 is horizontal
until t when it deviates. w2 is a straight line parrallel to the right-hand portion
of w1.
This argument undermines the asymmetry of miracles as a necessary thesis
about all worlds. However, as we saw (2.3.2), Lewis emphasises that it is a
contingent thesis, since it rests on the asymmetry of overdetermination, which
is contingent. Predictably, then, his response to Bennett’s objection is to deny
that our world is very much like w2, even though matters of fact at w2 converge
with those at our world at t. Lewis says:
this argument, t can be defined simply as the point before or after which two distinct worlds
are exactly alike.
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A Bennett-world is deceptive. After the time of its convergence
with w1, it contains exactly the same apparent traces of its past
that w1 does; and the traces to be found in w1 are such as to record
a past exactly like that of the base world w0... But the past of the
Bennett-world is not like the past of w0...
(Lewis 1986a, 57)
Lewis suggests that the traces at w2 would look very much like traces of the
past of w0. But (for all we have a right to think) the past of w2 may be nothing
like the past of w0. Then the traces would be deceptive, and this, Lewis says,
is a big difference between w2 and our w0.
Two obvious questions can be asked of Lewis’s response. The first is
whether deceptiveness of traces can constitute a big difference between worlds.
The second is whether Bennett-worlds are indeed deceptive.
Concerning the first question, it does seem that Lewis thinks deceptiveness
constitutes a big difference between worlds:
...in a world like w0, one that manifests the ordinary de facto asym-
metries, we also have plenty of very incomplete cross sections that
postdetermine incomplete cross sections at earlier times. It is these
incomplete postdeterminants that are missing from the Bennett-
world [w2].
(Lewis 1986a, 57-8)
But why should it matter if traces are missing at the Bennett-world? Distance
between worlds depends on how similar worlds are in matters of general and
particular fact. The asymmetry of overdetermination at our world may super-
vene on matters of general and particular fact, but it is not one itself. Since
Bennett-worlds share our laws, by definition of determinism they differ from
our world in at least some matters of particular fact at all times. But they
might still be fairly close. Not only do they share our laws, but their futures
are, in quite a strong sense, possible futures for our world. After all, we arrive
at a Bennett-world by first imagining a small miracle at a world like ours, and
that is just what we do on Lewis’s view when we imagine possible futures of
our world. It is not immediately obvious why a world must be distant, when
it shares our laws and when its latter period is just like ours would have been
under some counterfactual supposition.
The more damaging objection, however, arises from the second question:
Are Bennett-worlds really deceptive?
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Bennett’s view of his own worlds seems to have varied. In 1984 he believes
that his argument “does not harm Lewis’s position” (Bennett 1984, 63). He
accepts that the contingency of Lewis’s thesis protects it: Bennett-worlds may
fail to display asymmetry, but that just shows ours is not a Bennett-world. In
2001, however, Bennett offers a stiffer reply to Lewis’s response:
...on natural assumptions about the traces left in localized incom-
plete cross-sections of deterministic worlds, we should say that the
localized... traces at w1 are deceptive, while those at w0 and w2 are
not... Lewis gives an example to show how a world can be locally
deceptive about its past although no miracle has occurred. I con-
cede the general point (though with doubts about the example),
but I do not see why a Bennett-world must be like that.
(Bennett 2001, 197–8)
Bennett simply challenges Lewis’s unargued claim that a world like w2 must
contain traces of the history shared by w0 and w1 up to t. I endorse Bennett’s
challenge, and offer the following arguments in support.
First, Lewis’s proposal is unclear. The notion of a trace is not precise;
to do the work Lewis requires, it must be stronger than the strict notion of
an incomplete postdeterminant. Surely, almost any fact would qualify as an
incomplete postdeterminant, in the sense that more facts could be specified
to make a complete postdeterminant. Lewis has something stronger in mind,
it seems: not all incomplete postdeterminants are equal. Some facts are more
salient than others, if we are to pick them out and identify them as traces.
But salience is not the only property of traces. Presumably, a given fact —
even a salient one — could be combined with a great many other possible facts
to entail a great many different and contradictory earlier states of affairs. For
a trace to be misleading, as Lewis says Bennett-world traces are, it must be
suggestive, in the sense that it must somehow suggest certain earlier facts, when
it is equally compatible with other earlier facts. Salience and suggestiveness
are perfectly intuitive notions, central to inductive inference, but they are not
notions that have been captured in the discussion of nomic determination.
Second, in the absence of supplementation by notions such as salience and
suggestiveness, there is a fairly obvious reason why w2 will not exhibit mis-
leading traces. Consider some event14 e which happens at a time t−, before t
14The argument does not rely on events: we could use some fact about w1 before t, or
some proposition concerning w1 before t, true of w1 but not w2.
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at w0. Let us suppose e leaves traces such as e′, which occurs at time t+, a
time after t. The rest of the details of the Bennett-world set-up remain; so w1
is just like w0 up to t, when a small miracle occurs. Now ask: does the miracle
disrupt the lawful process by which the trace e′ is nomically determined?
There are two possibilities. The first is that it disrupts the lawful process.
Then there is no reason to suppose that e′ will be present in w1. If not, then
e′ will not be present in w2 either, since w2 matches w1 after t. Thus e′ is not
a deceptive trace in w2. And the same goes for every other trace of e at t+
depending on that lawful process. None of these traces at w0 will be deceptive
traces at w2. The other possibility is that the miracle does not affect the lawful
process giving rise to e′. In that case, e′ will be present in both w0 and the
miraculous w1. So it will be present in w2 as well, which matches w1 after t.
But if the laws by which it is nomically determined have not been disrupted,
then nor has the nomic determination. Hence e occurs in w2. Hence e′ is not
deceptive in w2, and nor is any other trace of e which is not disrupted by the
miracle at time t+. What goes for e goes for any other event at w0 before t.
Hence there are no deceptive traces at w2, in Lewis’s sense of deceptive trace.15
The latter part of the argument appears secure, but the former relies on
the assumption that, in general, a trace e′ does not occur unless it is nomically
determined by e. Of course Lewis could reject this assumption. Perhaps e′
would have come about by a different route, even if e had not occurred. We
should certainly accept that this might sometimes be the case. But is there
any reason to think this will be so in general? Some cases might happen to be
like that, but as Lewis himself observes, they are rather rare: they are cases of
causal redundancy. If the back-up causes actually occur, then we have nomic
overdetermination at the actual world, going from past to future. The idea
that overdetermination in this direction occurs on such a massive scale is, as
Lewis himself argues, implausible. Moreover it directly contradicts the thesis
Lewis defends, that massive overdetermination occurs of past by future but not
vice versa. It is only slightly less implausible that there is massive redundancy
among unactualised potential causes. And although it might not outright
contradict Lewis’s asymmetry of overdetermination, it rather goes against the
grain to invoke what would amount to a systematic overdetermination of the
15Strictly, we should not run the argument for all the traces together, but traces indi-
vidually. Thus, for any given trace e′ of e in w0, either the lawful process leading to it is
disrupted at t or it is not. If it is, then there is no reason to suppose that e′ is present at
w1, and hence at w2, and hence no reason to suppose that e′ is misleading at w2. If the
process is not disrupted, e′ is present at all of w0, w1 and w2, but not deceptive, for e is also
present.
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actual future by many unactualised pasts, in order to defend the proposed
overdetermination of the actual past by the actual future.
Bennett-worlds share our laws, but have small convergence miracles where
we have small divergence miracles. Lewis argues that Bennett-worlds are not
much like ours, because they would contain deceptive traces of a past that
never happened. Bennett contends that this assertion is unsupported, and I
have further argued that it is false. If I am right, then our world could be
(in fact, probably is) a Bennett-world — a world to which some world w1
converges by a small miracle. Supposing so does not involve supposing that
our world is radically deceptive, that ordinary inductive inference about the
past is insecure, or anything of the sort.
We can conclude that the asymmetry of miracles is to be rejected. If the
asymmetry of overdetermination entails the asymmetry of miracles then the
former must also be rejected. However the asymmetry of overdetermination
may be thought independently plausible, and hence appealed to in defence
of the asymmetry of miracles. Or it may, perhaps, be doubted whether the
asymmetry of overdetermination entails the asymmetry of miracles. So we
shall now consider an argument from Adam Elga to the effect that there is no
asymmetry of overdetermination.
2.4.3 Elga-Worlds16
Elga produces a highly engaging argument that Lewis’s comparative similarity
measure does not yield the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence after all,
because it does not yield the asymmetry of overdetermination upon which that
thesis rests. Elga asks us to imagine a hungry woman called Gretta, intent
upon frying an egg for her breakfast. At 7:55am she takes an egg from the
refrigerator. At 8:00am she cracks it into a hot frying pan. At 8:05am there
is a cooked egg in the pan. According to Lewis, a small miracle at 7:55am
could result in Gretta returning the egg directly to the refrigerator (in favour
of cornflakes, perhaps). At 8:00am the egg would not be cracked into the pan
and at 8:05am there would be no cooked egg. When we say, “If Gretta hadn’t
cracked an egg into the pan at 8:00am, there would have been no cooked egg
there at 8:05am”, what we say is true in virtue of the fact that the closest
no-crack worlds are of this sort. They are closest in part because the miracle
required is small and inconspicuous: a few neurons fire anomalously at the back
of Gretta’s brain at 7:55am, and she replaces the egg and goes for cornflakes.
16I am indebted to Adam Elga for helpful comments on this subsection.
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That is Lewis’s story. Elga asks us to imagine the egg-cooking process in
reverse, as if we were watching a video played backwards. At 8:05am there is a
warm cooked egg in the pan. It uncooks over the next five minutes, liquifying
and giving up heat to the pan (as well as absorbing some heat from the air). At
8:00am it is raw, and a pressure wave in the air and pan converges on the egg
to drive it upwards into its shell. The shell seals, and Gretta walks backwards
(rather slowly, presumably) to the refrigerator, turns round, and puts the egg
inside at 7:55am.
Elga makes two claims about this sequence of events. The first is that it is
possible as far as our fundamental dynamical laws go. The only laws it breaks,
says Elga, are statistical laws: the laws of thermodynamics. So if we could
create a situation just like the situation in Gretta’s kitchen at 8:05am, except
with the velocities of all the particles reversed, then the next ten minutes
would unfold in just the bizarre way we have described. The second claim is
that the state at 8:05am is very hard to achieve, because it is very delicate:
tiny changes to small groups of particles will disrupt the subsequent course of
events so that the egg just sits there, cooling slowly.
Make a small-miracle change to the end state of a process and run
the laws backwards. Certainly the change disrupts the coordinated
movement of the process in the neighbourhood of the change. If the
parts of the system are strongly coupled, then the region “infected”
by the change... will grow rapidly.
(Elga 2000, S322)
And many thermodynamically irreversible processes are indeed strongly cou-
pled, so that change in one part quickly spreads.
Granting these two claims, the consequences for Lewis’s various asymmetry
theses are as follows. The asymmetry of miracles fails for any strongly coupled
thermodynamically irreversible process. We just granted that tiny changes in
the velocity-reversed counterpart of Gretta’s kitchen at 8:05am would quickly
spread, leading to the marvellous backwards cooking processes failing to occur.
But this is just to grant that it would only take a small miracle to disrupt the
backwards process of uncooking, uncracking the egg, and so on. It is only by
the fundamental dynamical laws that the change will spread throughout the
system and disrupt it; the process is assumed to be totally deterministic. But
it is also totally time-symmetric, since the fundamental laws are reversible. So
what goes for the start state of that strange uncooking process goes for the
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end-state of the much more familiar cooking process. Therefore it only takes
a small miracle in a strongly-coupled, thermodynamically-irreversible process
to yield a world with a past quite unlike the actual past, but a future that
matches exactly: an Elga-world.
The argument also has consequences for Lewis’s asymmetry of overdeter-
mination. Contrary to Lewis’s claim, the past overdetermines the future, on
exactly the same scale that the future overdetermines the past: many disjoint
sets of later facts nomically determine any given earlier fact. But Elga shows
that this is false, by showing that small differences in later states of affairs
can nomically entail surprisingly extensive earlier consequences. In effect, this
shows that there are not as many disjoint sets of later facts as Lewis hoped for.
We need to specify an awful lot about the state of Gretta’s kitchen before we
have a description that nomically entails that she got an egg out of the fridge
ten minutes earlier. Among the normal-looking states of Gretta’s kitchen, we
must rule out many millions of states differing in tiny, humanly imperceptible
ways, yet whose backward nomic consequences would be thermodynamically-
irregular — that is, utterly weird. It no longer seems as plausible that very
many disjoint sets of facts about Gretta’s kitchen at 8:05am nomically deter-
mine that she got an egg out of the fridge at 7:55am. Thus it no longer seems
plausible that nomic overdetermination is asymmetric.
What work, we might ask, is the appeal to thermodynamics doing in Elga’s
argument? Elga’s argument shows that small convergence miracles to the
actual world are possible, but I have argued that Bennett’s argument already
suggests this (though perhaps not so conclusively). What more does Elga’s
argument achieve?
The appeal to thermodynamics plays for Elga the role that the asymmetry
of overdetermination plays for Lewis in his semantic theory of counterfactuals.
That is, it secures the spreading-out of consequences of a small miracle. A small
change in an end-state of a thermodynamically irreversible process nomically
determines earlier states which increasingly differ from the actual world. I take
it that the appeal to physics is intended to secure the point.
It is interesting to note that Elga-worlds, unlike Bennett-worlds, are in-
disputably deceptive. There are many states differing imperceptibly from the
state of Gretta’s kitchen at 8:05am, but which have come about by a different
and weird process. These correspond to the small changes we would have to
make to the start-state of the velocity-reversed process, in order to disrupt the
subsequent highly delicate uncooking process. These disruptions turn it into
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an ordinary cooling and eventual rotting process, which — viewed the right
way round again — will become weird unrotting and spontaneous heating
processes. Thus:
It only takes a small miracle to make the difference between the ac-
tual world (a world with many veridical traces of the egg-cracking)
and w3 (a world in which those same traces are all highly mis-
leading). In general, the existence of apparent traces of an event
(together with the laws, ...) falls far short of entailing that the
event occurred.
(Elga 2000, S324)
Thus Elga-worlds are definitely deceptive. But they are also definitely close,
by Lewis’s measure, since they are arrived at by imagining our world time-
reversed, inserting a single small miracle with spreading consequences, and
then righting the temporal order again. The miracle remains small because
the laws it violates are time-symmetric.
Previously I argued that any trace e′ would be present in a Bennett-world if
and, normally, only if e itself was present. Elga’s argument seems to show that
close worlds can have deceptive traces of a past which, at those worlds, didn’t
happen. Is there a tension? No, because Elga is not claiming — as Lewis was
— that traces are deceptive at lawful worlds to which other worlds converge by
a small miracle. The problem with that claim was the role of the miracle: either
it affected the traces, in which case removing it would remove the traces, or it
did not affect the traces, in which case the traces were presumably as veridical
as in any other world. But Elga-worlds are deceptive for a quite different
reason: because they amount to very unusual starting situations for processes
in which the statistical laws of thermodynamics are violated. Miracles have
nothing to do with the deceptiveness of an Elga-world. The state of Gretta’s
kitchen at 8am, when the raw egg is in the pan, is deceptive in the Elga-world
we have discussed, even though the miracle does not occur until 8:05am. For
although it looks just like the actual egg, which has been cracked into the pan,
in the Elga-world the egg has formed by a process of unrotting. Elga-worlds
are deceptive for an entirely different reason: because they have freakish and
improbable pasts but become very, indeed humanly indiscernibly, similar to
worlds that are thermodynamically standard. No miracle is require for them
to do this; the miracle is required only to secure exact subsequent convergence.
We could do away with the miracle, to produce a Bennett-Elga-world: a world
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with a freakish but fundamentally law-abiding past, and a future which does
not exactly match ours but which is exactly as likely as ours to unfold in some
humdrum, thermodynamically normal way. Even though this would not be
how our world unfolds, the Bennett-Elga-world would still be highly deceptive
about its past.17
2.5 Summary
We have rehearsed the elements of Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, and
the associated proposal that counterfactual dependence is radically asymmetric
— to the extent that backtrackers are, except in special circumstances, false.
And we have endorsed a selection of criticisms of this view. The asymmetry
cannot be a simple matter, since every foretracker whose antecedent is not itself
the smallest miracle that makes it true will semantically entail backtrackers
concerning the interval between itself and that little miracle. As we have
seen, even when we are assessing foretrackers, we sometimes backtrack more
than Lewis’s presentation of the asymmetry of miracles would suggest that we
strictly have to. If we sometimes backtrack more than Lewis’s presentation
suggests when assessing foretrackers, this raises the prospect that we might,
without deviating any further from Lewis’s principles than we already do when
assessing foretrackers, sometimes backtrack when assessing a backtracker. So
perhaps backtrackers can be accommodated on a Lewis-style theory after all.
We have also endorsed two more robust criticisms. Bennett-worlds under-
mine the asymmetry of miracles and Elga-worlds undermine the asymmetry of
overdetermination. Although these criticisms are more robust, it is important
to see that they are, in a way, less significant. In the end, they are merely
internal criticisms of Lewis’s efforts to capture an alleged asymmetry. They
show that Lewis’s theory does not yield an asymmetry, and thus that it does
not succeed in capturing one that really exists. It is important that we re-
hearse these attacks, but for our purposes, it is more important that we deny
there is an asymmetry of the sort Lewis is seeking to capture. This is the
purpose of the next chapter. In this chapter, I sought to rebut the efforts of
Lewis to capture the asymmetry of counterfactual depedence. In the next, I
seek to rebut the reasons for thinking there is a sharp temporal asymmetry
among counterfactuals.
17An excellent source of further discussion of the philosophical implications of thermody-
namic asymmetries is Huw Price (eg. Price, 1992a,b, 1996, Menzies and Price, 1993).
Chapter 3
Backtrackers Can Be True
3.0 Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that backtrackers can be true, and
to provide a method for working out whether they are true. I argue that
backtrackers and foretrackers are not confined to distinct contexts, as Lewis
suggests: they are compatible, and can be true in the same context. I ar-
gue further that the grammatical complexity with which we prefer to express
backtracking reasoning need not indicate a relevant shift of context. Whether
an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence exists and what its nature might
be is, therefore, an open question, not to be settled by appeal to grammar.
Against that background, I suggest that we need a method to help us tell
when backtrackers are true, irrespective of distracting linguistic features. This
amounts to a further criticism of Lewis’s asymmetry of counterfactual de-
pendence, because it deprives that thesis of its explanandum — an ordinary
context in which the resolution of counterfactual vagueness makes backtrackers
mostly false. Lewis’s “visualisation” method is criticised, and the Ramsey Test
is found unsuitable as it stands. Drawing on hints from Frank Ramsey, Nel-
son Goodman and Dorothy Edgington, I propose a simple test which seeks to
harness our robust and temporally neutral abilities to make and assess induc-
tive inferences for the task of assessing counterfactuals. I dub it the Inference
Test.
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3.1 The Compatibility of Backtrackers and Fore-
trackers
Take an event, and then suppose it away, first asking about the later conse-
quences, and then asking about the earlier events leading up it. There are
occasions when, if you suppose both away at once, you seem to risk saying
strange things. I am holding a glass, but suppose I had dropped it. We might
naturally suppose that, if the glass hadn’t broken under those circumstances,
I would have been rather surprised. Now suppose we assert that, if the glass
hadn’t broken, I wouldn’t have dropped it. There is a strong intuition that
these two counterfactuals are in tension: if the glass hadn’t broken, either
I would have been surprised at the non-breaking glass, or I would not have
dropped the glass, but not both. For then why would I have been surprised?
Contrary pairs of counterfactuals have the form A > C and A >∼ C.
Here, we have counterfactuals which are not direct contraries, being of the
form B > C and B > A; yet it seems they are not true together. Suppose that
at A-worlds I do not drop the glass, at B-worlds the glass does not break, and
at C-worlds I am surprised. If the closest B-worlds are also C-worlds, then it
seems they are not A-worlds: for C-worlds are worlds where I am surprised,
and that surprise would itself be surprising if I didn’t drop the glass. Likewise,
if we suppose the closest B-worlds are A-worlds, it seems they will not be
C-worlds: once again, worlds where I do not drop the glass give me no cause
for surprise at the unbroken glass.
Lewis explains this phenomenon by suggesting that counterfactuals are
vague. It is possible to know the facts you would need to decide whether a
counterfactual is true, even to be an expert in the relevant field, yet remain
undecided. For example, even an accomplished historian may be uncertain
about this:
(A) If Caesar had been in charge in Korea, he would have used nuclear
weapons.
The historian’s uncertainty may be brought out by asking her to consider
another counterfactual.
(B) If Caesar had been in charge in Korea, he would have used cata-
pults.
The expert knows enough about Caesar’s competence as a military comman-
der to be confident that he would not have used both catapults and nuclear
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weapons in Korea. So she regards these as contraries, in the simple sense that
they are not true together.1
On Lewis’s view (Lewis 1973b, 1979), the explanation is that counterfac-
tuals are vague, and until some of this vagueness is resolved, they lack deter-
minate truth-value. Vagueness is resolved by context: once it is understood
that we are discussing military psychology with reference to the Korean War,
it is clear that (A) expresses an interesting hypothesis, and (B) is facetious.
This point about counterfactual vagueness is a familiar one, and shows that
we should be cautious when mixing counterfactuals generally that we are not
illicitly switching between different resolutions of vagueness. Resolving the
vagueness of one counterfactual may render another counterfactual false under
that resolution.
On its own, this point shows nothing special about backtrackers. Never-
theless, Lewis suggests that backtrackers and foretrackers are not true under
the same resolution of vagueness. Examples like the one we began with (the
breaking glass) show that admitting backtrackers and foretrackers together
gives rise to all sorts of trouble. This is an idea Lewis gets from Downing and
Bennett (although the latter has subsequently revised his opinion). We can
illustrate with a story.
Elizabeth and Mr D’Arcy argued yesterday, so if Mr D’Arcy asked
Elizabeth for a favour today, she would not grant it. But Mr D’Arcy
is proud, and if they had argued yesterday, he would not have
asked Elizabeth for a favour today. This means that, if Mr D’Arcy
had asked Elizabeth for a favour today, they wouldn’t have argued
yesterday. But normally Elizabeth is kind: thus if they hadn’t
argued yesterday, she would happily grant Mr D’Arcy a favour. So
if Mr D’Arcy asked Elizabeth for a favour today, she would grant
it.2
We have contradicted something we previously found plausible, by arriving at
its contrary; and our reasoning employed backtrackers.
The moral drawn by Downing, early Bennett and Lewis is that backtrackers
and foretrackers do not mix. Lewis further explains that we ordinarily resolve
the vagueness of counterfactuals in a way that favours foretracking. In order to
give speakers their best chance of saying true things, we can be persuaded to
1This much-cited example originates at (Quine 1960, 222).
2Lewis replaces Elizabeth and Mr D’Arcy with Jack and Jim (Lewis 1979, 33–4).
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backtrack, charitable conversants that we are; but we slip naturally back into
a foretracking resolution as soon as the special backtracker-friendly contexts
have passed.
Indeed it does seem that we are persuaded to resolve counterfactual vague-
ness differently in this story, as we were in the story about the breaking glass.
This fact completely fails, however, to support the contention that foretrack-
ing and backtracking resolutions of vagueness are incompatible. It is this
contention, I take it, which underlies the claim that the ordinary resolution is
(largely) a foretracking one, and thus which the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence is directed at explaining. But, I shall now argue, the incompatibil-
ity of backtrackers and foretrackers under the same resolution of vagueness is
not demonstrated by this line of argument. In fact, there is no problem mixing
backtrackers and foretrackers; hence this is no reason to suppose they cannot
both be true under ordinary resolutions of vagueness.
The mere fact that backtrackers and foretrackers are sometimes incom-
patible does not entail any such strong conclusion. After all, the example of
Caesar in Korea shows that foretrackers are also sometimes incompatible in
just the same way, and clearly it is possible to hold more than one foretracker
true under a given resolution of vagueness. A later Bennett reconsiders the ar-
gument about Elizabeth and Mr D’Arcy, and makes the following diagnosis of
the problem. First we are asked in counterfactualising to attend to Elizabeth’s
anger and ignore D’Arcy’s pride, yielding the first claim, “If D’Arcy asked Eliz-
abeth for a favour today, she would not grant it”. Then we are asked to attend
to D’Arcy’s pride and to ignore Elizabeth’s anger, says Bennett, yielding the
counterfactual "If D’Arcy were to ask Elizabeth for a favour she would grant
it". The backtracker in the middle is not the source of the trouble:
The [Elizabeth and Mr D’Arcy] example has nothing essentially to
do with temporal direction, so it tells us nothing about backward
counterfactual conditionals...
(Bennett 2001, 180)
This is just the diagnosis I used to generate the example of the breaking glass
with which we started. But as Bennett points out, it has nothing to do with
backtracking.
We can illustrate the weakness of the Elizabeth and D’Arcy argument by
considering the following story:
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Elizabeth is kind, and well-disposed towards Mr D’Arcy. So if Eliz-
abeth and Mr D’Arcy hadn’t argued yesterday, she would happily
grant Mr D’Arcy a favour. So if Mr D’Arcy asked Elizabeth for
a favour today, she would grant it. But wait: Elizabeth and Mr
D’Arcy have some issues to work through. If Elizabeth and D’Arcy
had not argued yesterday, they would have argued today. In that
case, if Mr D’Arcy asked Elizabeth for a favour today, she still
wouldn’t grant it.
The addition of underlying issues in this example plays the role of Mr D’Arcy’s
pride in the previous example. It induces us to resolve the vagueness differ-
ently, holding different facts fixed under our supposition, and we end up with
an apparent contradiction. But all the counterfactuals here are foretrackers:
they are mostly recycled from the previous story, and the only one we added
is clearly a foretracker (if they had not argued yesterday, they would have ar-
gued today). If this line of argument shows that backtrackers and foretrackers
cannot be true under the same context, then by parity of reasoning, it shows
that foretrackers cannot be true under the same context. But that is absurd.
It is clear that, when we resolve the vagueness of a counterfactual, some
other counterfactuals may be false under that resolution. It is further clear that
some backtrackers might come out false when we resolve vagueness favourably
for some foretracker, and vice versa. This does not show that we can never
hold a backtracker with a foretracker, any more than the debate about Caesar’s
choice of weoponry in Korea shows we can never hold two foretrackers true.
The stories which are told to support the claim that backtrackers and fore-
trackers mix badly can be matched by stories which, by parity, would licence
the absurd conclusion that foretrackers mix badly. In fact, all such stories
show is that context is sensitive and easily manipulated, and that care must
be taken when mixing counterfactuals of any temporal direction. This removes
one reason for denying that backtrackers and foretrackers may be true under
the same resolution of vagueness.
3.2 Grammar
The other reason that Lewis takes backtrackers to be awkward is that their
expression is often awkward.
Back-tracking counterfactuals, used in a context which favours
their truth, are marked by a syntactic peculiarity. They are the
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ones in which the usual subjunctive conditional constructions are
readily replaced by more complicated constructions: “If it were that
... then it would have to be that ...” or the like.
(Lewis 1979, 34–5)
This, too, is supposed to be explained by the thesis of contextual resolution
of vagueness: the grammatical (syntactic) complexity is a way of adjusting
context to favour a special, backtracking resolution of vagueness. However,
we shall see that not all backtrackers are accompanied by grammatical com-
plexity, even if most are. The existence of a handful of backtrackers that, like
most foretrackers, are simple grammatical subjunctives does not tell decisively
against Lewis’s view, because any generalisation about a practice as complex
as natural language is highly likely to have a few exceptions. But it is odd
nonetheless, because on Lewis’s view, these backtrackers are actually false un-
der a standard resolution of vagueness, despite the fact we assert them without
any of the contextual markers of a “special” backtracker-friendly resolution of
vagueness. If such a resolution is occurring, its mechanism is mysterious; there
are no signs, apart from the truth of the backtrackers in question. If it is not oc-
curring, then these backtrackers are strictly false. Further, many backtrackers
which we have an aversion to expressing with a simple grammatical subjunc-
tive do not seem to be false so much as odd. Lewis’s explanation for their
oddity is falsity — which is not the same thing, and may further disrespect
our intuitions. But the avoidance of a falsifying resolution of vagueness is not
the only possible explanation for the grammatical complication of backtrack-
ers. If the grammatical subjunctive is often taken to have other implications,
causal ones for instance, then, I shall suggest, it becomes quite obvious why
we would not assert backtrackers using that construction.
Some backtrackers are intuitively true. For example:
Holmes’ Hypothesis. Sherlock Holmes finds the fingerprints of the Vice-
Provost on the door of the Library of King’s College. He hypothesises
that if the Vice-Provost hadn’t entered the Library, he wouldn’t have
left his fingerprints on the door. From this hypothesis, and the prints,
Holmes deduces (by modus tollens) that the Vice Provost entered the
Library.
Holmes’ Hypothesis is contingent, of course. The Vice-Provost could have
merely touched the door, but not gone in. Nevertheless, it is a perfectly intel-
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ligible hypothesis, and quite a reasonable one. We can, without special discom-
fort, entertain the supposition that it is true. But it is evidently a backtracker,
because the prints are left before the Vice-Provost enters the Library. More-
over it is not marked by any of the markers of special conversational context, in
the way we should expect if the vagueness resolution story about backtrackers
were correct. Grammatically, it is a straightforward subjunctive.
The importance of Holmes’ Hypothesis is not merely that it is intuitively
obvious. It is also used in a piece of reasoning, an instance of counterfactual
modus tollens. It is one thing to deny a backtracker that has been dreamed
up for the purpose of argument. It is another to deny a backtracker which
has been used in earnest. A legal case which featured Holmes’ Hypothesis
would not be thrown out, merely on the basis that Holmes’ Hypothesis is a
backtracker. More substantive grounds would need to be adduced, such as the
possibility that the Vice Provost touched the door but did not go in. But if that
and similar possibilities are ruled out, there seems to be no further, principled
reason why Holmes’ Hypothesis might not be true. It certainly seems unlikely
that any philosophical argument against backtrackers would defeat Holmes’
case in court.
Here is another example of an intuitively acceptable backtracker.
Steaming Coffee Counterfactual. I have a steaming cup full of hot coffee
before me, but if it wasn’t steaming, it wouldn’t be full of hot coffee.
It might be objected that this is not a backtracker, because the heat and
the steaming are simultaneous. I have no objection to such a reading, but
Lewis does. For his theory of causation must identify the above counterfactual
as a backtracker if it is to rule out the steam as a cause of the heat of the
coffee (Lewis 1973a, 170–1). This counterfactual is a direct counterexample
to Lewis’s solution to the problem of effects, since it is obvious that the hot
coffee causes the steam and not vice versa.
The Steaming Coffee Counterfactual seems quite intuitive to me. Certainly
to deny it seems intuitively difficult. We would have to assert that, if the cup
were not steaming, it might nevertheless be full of hot coffee: perhaps a tight
lid could have been fitted. But this is a china mug with no lid: surely we
can rule that world out as more distant than some where it contains no hot
coffee. And the lid is the least outlandish way I can think of to stop the coffee
steaming, while leaving the coffee hot. High atmospheric pressure and high
temperature, miraculous happenings just above the water, and so on are all
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rather far-fetched. There are, surely, closer worlds where the cup is not full of
hot coffee — it is empty, or nearly so, or else the coffee has gone cold, having
been poured twenty minutes earlier. And the thought that there must be closer
worlds like these is borne out very clearly when we ask what world we would
think we were in, faced with a cup which was not steaming.
Exhibition of intuitively true backtrackers is suggestive of some problem
with Lewis’s diagnosis of the problem with backtrackers. According to Lewis,
backtrackers are true in special backtracking contexts only; if these are not
carefully set up, the backtrackers sound bizarre, because they are false in the
default foretracking context (Lewis 1979, 34). Why, then, does there appear to
be a handful of exceptions? Lewis’s proposal amounts to an error theory about
certain, rather unpredictable corners of our common discourse and reasoning
processes. Holmes’ Hypothesis would not be thrown out of court, so it seems
that “common” may include professions such as law or medicine, where these
reasoning processes really matter. Likewise scientists and historians might
occasionally lapse unwittingly into falsity; and perhaps even — who knows?
— careless philosophers. The exceptions are rare, but by their nature we do
not notice them when they occur.
On its own, a handful of exceptions will not be conclusive; natural language
is a complex thing, and a generalisation may be true enough despite them. But
there is another, related problem. Consider this backtracker:
Odd Caesar Counterfactual. If Caesar had used the atom bomb in Korea,
he would have been in charge in Korea.
It is hard to make sense of the Odd Caesar Counterfactual without a bit of
thought. Yet it is, presumably, fairly plausible: if Caesar had used the atom
bomb in Korea, then he would have to have been in charge there, in order to
get his hands on an atom bomb and deploy it there. But this argument, even
if it is accepted, does not remove the strangeness. It simply is not something
we would say. This seems to undercut Lewis’s explanation of strangeness
in terms of its falsity in a certain context. The Odd Caesar Counterfactual
remains strange even in a context where we have convinced ourselves it is true;
a fortiori, it remains strange even when its vagueness is eliminated.
Note, too, how different the Odd Caesar Counterfactual is to (A) and (B),
which we considered earlier. There, clarification made it clear whether Caesar
would use nuclear weaponry or catapults. Neither (A) nor (B) was odd, and
they both remained perfectly non-odd even when vagueness was resolved to
make one true and the other false. The false one was no odder than the true.
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Previously I argued that declaring intuitively acceptable backtracking sub-
junctives false (such as Holmes’ Hypothesis and the Steaming Coffee Counter-
factual) amounts to an error theory about certain corners of our discourse. The
present problem is the complement of the previous one. It concerns declaring
intuitively odd backtracking subjunctives false. The problem is that falsity
fails to remove oddness. The point may be brought out, as I have tried to do,
by exhibiting intuitively unacceptable backtracking subjunctives which, after
a bit of thought and persuasion (even, if you like, context-shifting and vague-
ness resolution) we think are true. The point is that they still sound odd.
We would prefer to phrase them with a more complex construction even if we
accept they could be understood as expressing something true. Therefore the
purpose of the more complex expression cannot be to resolve vagueness in such
a way as to avoid falsity.
Falsity in context due to an unfavourable resolution of vagueness is not
the only possible explanation for the oddity of many backtracking subjunctive
conditionals. That might be explained if the grammatical subjunctive has fur-
ther conversational implications (just as “if” often implies “only if”). Notably,
the subjunctive sometimes suggests a causal connection; if so, then speakers
would naturally be wary of using it when this implication might create mis-
understanding. Holmes’ Hypothesis and the Steaming Coffee Counterfactual
might be exceptions to this conversational implication, perhaps because it is
so obvious that steaming does not cause coffee to be hot, and that fingerprints
do not cause entry. We need not develop any such theory; we need merely note
that other explanations for the oddity of backtracking subjunctives might be
developed. An obvious starting point would be to examine the psychological
connection between subjunctives and causation. But this is a task for psychol-
ogists, and one which they take seriously (cf. McEleney and Byrne 2006).
We should be wary of taking surface grammar as a logical or philosophical
guide. To do so can generate apparent problems where there are none. I have
suggested that one such merely apparent problem is the grammatical complex-
ity associated with backtracking counterfactuals, and the corresponding oddity
of backtracking grammatical subjunctives. Grammatical complexity arises, not
from any deep conceptual feature of counterfactuals, but from a concern not
to be misunderstood. The scope for misunderstanding might arise, I have sug-
gested, partly from the fact that the subjunctive construction is often used to
express or explain causal connection of some sort. But making this suggestion
precise — precisely specifying under which situation a subjunctive construc-
3.3. COUNTERFACTUAL ASYMMETRY: AN OPEN QUESTION 51
tion suggests what, if any, causal connection — is a linguistic or psychological
task, not a philosophical one.
3.3 Counterfactual Asymmetry: An Open Ques-
tion
Backtracking counterfactuals are often thought to be awkward. Lewis identi-
fies two kinds of awkwardness: the possibility that mixing backtracking and
foretracking reasoning will lead to contradictions, and the fact that many back-
tracking counterfactuals are not naturally expressed with simple grammatical
subjunctives, but with some more complex construction. Lewis’s solution is to
attribute the awkwardness of backtrackers to special features of the way the
ubiquitous vagueness of counterfactuals is resolved. According to Lewis, when
we resolve vagueness of counterfactuals, we usually do so in a way which rules
out backtrackers as false; the exceptions are those occasions when we allow
backtrackers and rule out foretrackers.
Nothing I have said so far shows this picture to be untrue. Perhaps we
do indeed resolve the vagueness of counterfactuals in favour of one temporal
direction at a time. But I have sought to remove the reasons Lewis gave to
think that we do this. Lewis argues that mixing backtrackers and foretrackers
leads to contradictions, because it involves flipping between different resolu-
tions of vagueness. I pointed out that merely exhibiting an example where
such flipping indeed occurs does not show that it must always occur when we
mix backtrackers and foretrackers. Lewis also argues that the awkward sound
of backtracking subjunctives can be explained by their falsity in ordinary con-
texts. I argued that this was no explanation because foretrackers do not sound
odd even when we decide they are false in context. Lewis also suggests that the
complexity which often accompanies backtracking expressions is an indication
that context is being manipulated to favour a different, backtracker-friendly
resolution of vagueness. I have argued that these indicators are not always
present: there are some intuitively true backtrackers.
In short, I have denied that the resolution of vagueness has any special
application to the question of how backtrackers and foretrackers relate. One
implication of these arguments is that surface grammar is not a reliable guide
to logic. Implicit in my discussion is the view that counterfactuals are not to
be identified with natural language sentences of a given form. What, then, are
counterfactuals? An obvious answer is that they are propositions satisfying an
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appropriate semantics. Another option would be to identify counterfactuals
with some sentence type in an artificial language employing “>”. We do not
need to decide; all the foregoing discussion implies is that counterfactuals are
not to be identified with a natural language sentence type. Any view which
allows various grammatical constructions to express counterfactuals (and that
includes Lewis’s) must identify counterfactuals with something other than a
single natural language sentence type. This puts “>” on a par with many
truth-functional sentential connectives such as “∨” and “⊃”, both of which
differ somewhat from their closest English counterparts.
The vagueness resolution story implies that backtrackers are usually false,
except in a few special cases; and then, foretrackers are false. Rebutting
this view thus removes a perceived obstacle to appealing to backtrackers in
philosophical theories, such as the analysis of causation which I am about
to propose. It also removes a central reason to accept Lewis’s asymmetry of
counterfactual dependence, since this was supposed to provide a semantics for
a standard foretracking resolution of counterfactual vagueness. I have argued
that, whether backtrackers are standardly false or not, resolution of vagueness
to make them false would not address either of the two difficulties which it
has often been thought to address. Whether backtrackers are true, how often
and in what circumstances, is an open philosophical question: and not, I have
argued, one that should be closed by appeal to grammatical features of natural
language.
If it is an open question what asymmetries of counterfactual dependence
exist, two questions suggest themselves. The first is: are there any good
positive reasons to think backtrackers are actually true? The second is: if so,
which backtrackers are true? The next three chapters can be seen as giving
partial answers to both questions. But before we can address either, we need
a tool: a method for assessing the truth of counterfactuals without being
prejudiced by their temporal direction.
3.4 Assessing Counterfactuals
3.4.1 Lewis’s Visualisation Method
Lewis’s semantics comes with an unofficial heuristic for assessing counterfac-
tuals. It goes like this. Imagine a world just like ours, and insert the smallest,
most inconspicuous change you can think of in order to make the antecedent
come true. Sometimes the smallest change might just be the antecedent com-
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ing true, but often it will do less violence to the laws of nature to backtrack
a little and insert something inconspicuous earlier. For example, rather than
imagining Nixon instantaneously teleporting from his leather chair across the
room to the control panel and pressing the big red button, you might imagine
a few neurons firing anomalously in his head a few seconds earlier, leading
him to get up, walk over to the button and press it. Then imagine the world
unrolling according to the laws of our world, and see whether the consequent
of the counterfactual comes true. If so, the counterfactual is true; otherwise,
it is false.
I call this a visualisation method, to emphasise the fact that it relies heavily
on our imaginative faculties. This is problematic in several ways. Imagination
does not readily respect the laws of nature in the way that the method asks
it to. It is quite hard to know what the smallest violation of the laws of
nature will be. It is also difficult to tell how affairs would have progressed
according to the laws of nature after that small miracle. Moreover even if
we think we can guess, there is no reason to suppose that what seems to
us like the smallest miracle would really be the smallest miracle, nor that
what seems to us like a lawful progression of events thereafter would really
be lawful. In short, our imagination is no guide to the comparative similarity
of possible worlds, because it is not connected in a truth-tracking way to the
determinants of comparative similarity. There is no reason to suppose we will
correctly imagine how a world will unfold according to the laws, nor will we
notice if we make a mistake. Likewise there is no reason to suppose we can
correctly compare the magnitude of various factual differences from our own
world, nor any reason to suppose we will notice if the one we choose is not the
smallest. The visualisation method is hardly a method at all: it is more like a
structured guess.
It might be wondered whether Lewis really means to propose a method
that involves imagination in such a central way. Perhaps not; he never explic-
itly proposes any method for assessing counterfactuals. This heuristic is just
the application of the imagination to his semantics for counterfactuals; but if
indeed it is used, it is nowhere spelled out explicitly. It may look a bit silly
when it is spelled out, but that is not due to a misrepresentation. Indeed a
surprising number of arguments and counterexamples appear to be decided in
this way: by leaning back, squinting into the middle distance, and visualising
worlds. When the method is stated explicitly, it suffers from an obvious weak-
ness, employing a faculty (imagination) which is not particularly well suited to
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discovering the truth about the subject to which the method is applied (laws
of nature and comparative magnitude of factual differences).
The Lewisian heuristic is supposed to yield the truth about counterfactuals
because it involves thinking about the things that actually make counterfactu-
als true: comparative similarity relations between possible worlds. This gives
rise to another criticism of the method. Even if somebody does believe that
they have the cognitive faculties for applying the visualisation method — ei-
ther due to a high opinion of their faculties, or because some cases are thought
to be very clear and simple — the method is thoroughly theory-laden. If the
results of thought experiments are considered to be a bit like the data pro-
duced by ordinary scientific experiments, then it is important that our data
are as free from bias as they can be. Otherwise the data might wrongly protect
a theory from falsification, or might wrongly falsify a worthy competitor; and
if there are competitors, the data may not be agreed upon by proponents of
other theories. The visualisation method is extremely biased towards Lewis’s
semantics. In the first place, we are asked to imagine the smallest change
before the antecedent, and then roll the world forwards. This automatically
renders the method incapable of showing any backtracker true unless it is one
of the handful concerning the interval (if there is one) between the antecedent
and the preceding small miracle. Moreover, the method cannot readily be re-
versed. It is very hard to imagine a world just like ours, imagine the smallest
miracle after the antecedent which would lawfully entail the antecedent, then
roll the world backwards according to the laws and see whether the consequent
comes true. The fact this is harder might be due to the falsity of backtrackers,
of course. But then again, it might not. We experience the world in a particu-
lar temporal direction, and our cognitive limitations might reflect that, rather
than any truth about the direction of counterfactual dependence. Moreover,
even if we could reverse Lewis’s heuristic, it would not yield a very fruitful
method. Clearly, even a proponent of backtracking counterfactuals will not
want to endorse a method which yields the result that if the past were differ-
ent, the future would be exactly as it actually will be.
The visualisation method is therefore unsatisfactory for two reasons: it is
of doubtful reliability; and it is informed by theory in a way which produces
bias.
Timothy Williamson, in an unpublished paper [Williamson, 2007], has
given more attention to the prospects for visualisation as a method of assessing
counterfactuals. His suggestion is that we use our usual expectation-forming
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capacities to arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals. This is a very interesting
contribution to the epistemology of counterfactuals, and it does not succumb
to the criticism that we cannot properly imagine worlds unfolding according to
the laws. On Williamson’s view, it is our ordinary expectation-forming capac-
ities which are applied to counterfactual scenarios: these have a solid basis in
everyday activities. The view I adopt in 3.4.3 below has a lot in common with
this line of thinking. Note, however, that an expectation-based epistemology of
counterfactuals still seems to struggle to explain our knowledge of backtrack-
ers, at least until explicit attention is given to the question of how expectations
can be formed about the past. Expectations are temporally asymmetric, so an
expectation-based theory will display temporal bias.
3.4.2 The Ramsey Test
Another candidate for an epistemic method for assessing counterfactuals arises
from a famous footnote of Ramsey’s:
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as
to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge
and arguing on that basis about q...
(Ramsey 1978, 145 — footnote 1)
On this slender basis, a considerable literature has grown up around the Ram-
sey Test for acceptability of a counterfactual. According to this test, in order
to decide whether a counterfactual is true, you add the antecedent to your
“stock of beliefs”, and then decide on that basis whether the consequent is
true.
The Ramsey Test does not suffer from the same theory-ladenness as Lewis’s
test, but it does suffer from some difficulties. Most centrally, it will not do
to hold fixed every belief logically independent of the antecedent. For that
will, in many cases, include the consequent. Therefore some heuristic of belief
revision is called for. It is widely supposed that we need an account of minimal
belief revision: a set of principles governing how we should adjust other beliefs
when we entertain a supposition, on the assumption that we should avoid
gratuitous adjustments, and yet make more adjustments than logic requires.
“Minimal” may be a misleading term, since really what we want is something
more like accurate belief revision. We want a method of adjusting beliefs in
light of suppositions which reflects how the things those beliefs are about would
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change if the suppositions were true. Lewis’s heuristic at least has this going
for it — that its recommendations concerning belief revision are motivated by
a view of how things would be different, were the suppositions in question true.
So the Ramsey Test, as it stands, will not help us. It requires supplementa-
tion with a heuristic for belief revision before it can provide determinate pro-
nouncements on given counterfactuals. This point can be brought out sharply
by noticing that the results of the Ramsey Test depend on how we add P to
our stock of beliefs. As Richard Bradley puts it:
We might suppose that as a matter of fact P is true; in which case
we would revise much in the way that we do when we learn of
P’s truth. Minimal revision in this case might require us not to
give up any firm beliefs not contradicted by P. Alternatively, we
might suppose or imagine that, contrary to the facts, P is true. A
supposition of this kind may be best accommodated by giving up
some of one’s beliefs not contradicted by P, to allow retention of
well-entrenched ideas about the way the world works.
(Bradley 2007, 3)
Thus, as it stands, the Ramsey Test is ambiguous between material and coun-
terfactual conditionals. We cannot use it, therefore, to provide a simple test
for counterfactual truth: the directive “Add P to your stock of beliefs, then
see whether you believe that Q” is ambiguous, depending on how P is added.
This is clearly a difficulty, but to respond to this problem would, surely, be
unnecessarily ambitious in the present, rather pragmatic, context. All we want
is a rough-and-ready method for helping us assess counterfactuals. We do not
need a fully-fledged theory of the psychology of that assessment, or of the
principles governing it. So if we can, we should try to avoid answering all the
problems thrown up by the Ramsey Test. To do this, I suggest we pull back
from the more ambitious reading of the test, and focus more generally on the
connection between inference and counterfactuals.
3.4.3 The Inference Test
Ramsey says:
‘If p, then q’ can in no sense be true unless the material implication
p ⊃ q is true; but it generally means that p ⊃ q is not only true but
deducible or discoverable in some way not explicitly stated. This
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is always evident when ‘If p then q’... is thought worth stating
even when it is already known either that p is false or that q is
true. In general we can say with Mill that ‘If p then q’ means that
q is inferrible from p... together with certain facts and laws not
explicitly stated but in some way indicated by context.
(Ramsey 1978, 144 — my symbolism)
The mention of inferribility is potentially very useful here. The important
point from our present, pragmatic point of view is the suggestion that we see
the move from antecedent to consequent as an inference. Inferences are things
we have a good practical grip on, therefore they are good test material.
Goodman picks up a similar line of thinking:
When we say
If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted,
we mean that conditions are such — ie. the match is well made,
is dry enough, oxygen enough is present, etc. - that “That match
lights” can be inferred from “That match is scratched.”
(Goodman 1983, 8)
Goodman develops an account of counterfactuals from this starting point. But
the question of whether inferences tell us something about the truth of coun-
terfactuals may be distinguished from the question of whether counterfactuals
are to be identified with inferences in some form. I shall endorse a positive
answer to the former question, but remain agnostic on the latter.
Dorothy Edgington displays sensitivity to some of the issues we are touching
upon. She suggests we ask what counterfactuals are for.
Why do we evaluate counterfactuals the way we do? What would
go wrong for us if we chose to evaluate them according to the
‘standard picture’? The question deserves more attention than it
has had in the vast literature on counterfactuals.
(Edgington 2004, 23)
Edgington suggests that counterfactuals are central in “empirical inferences to
conclusions about what is actually the case”. Since inferences are things which
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we make and assess all the time, they might provide the basis for an epistemic
method for assessing counterfactuals. Let us explore the possibility further.
The suggestion, then, is that there is a connection between our belief that
A > C and our willingness to assent to an inference from A to C. The task
we now face is to convert this remark into something like a test, which can
be applied to counterfactuals to discover their truth. I propose to adopt the
following test for counterfactual truth.
The Inference Test. A > C iff C may be inferred from A.
The phrase “may be inferred” requires elucidation. It does not mean, for
example, that if it were the case that A, then some agent would infer that
C. For if it were the case that A, the agent may be absent, deluded, or
otherwise engaged. Nor does it mean that, if it were the case that A, then
some actual agent infers that it would be the case that C. This does not make
sense: how can an actual inference be counterfactually conditional upon an
unactualised possibility? The right reading lies somewhere between these two
wrong suggestions. The phrase “may be inferred” should be given a normative
reading, synonymous with “it would be acceptable to infer”. The phrase thus
combines the two readings recently rejected. The thought is that A > C iff,
if A were the case, then an inference to C would be acceptable, by our actual
standards.
Of course, this does not eliminate dispositions: acceptability is a disposi-
tion, even qualified with “actual”. The presence of unanalysed dispositions may
be thought troubling, because dispositions are closely related to counterfactu-
als. One way to understand a disposition such as acceptability is in terms of
a corresponding counterfactual: an inference is acceptable by agent Billy just
in case, if the inference were made, Billy would accept it. In that case, the
Inference Test employs a counterfactual on both sides of its biconditional. We
might ask: How can a method guide us concerning the truth of counterfactu-
als, if it does not tell us how to eliminate them? It appears that we need an
antecedent grasp on counterfactual truth to apply the test.
The anxiety is misplaced. The Inference Test is an epistemic method, not
a theoretical analysis. So it does not matter if concepts on one side of the
biconditional reappear on the other, provided that we have a firm grasp on at
least one side at a time. If we tend to have firm intuitions about our actual
inferential dispositions, then we can apply these to counterfactual scenarios as
easily as to actual ones. There is no difference between assessing an inference
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which we would make in some counterfactual scenario, and assessing an ac-
tual inference which one has witnessed or has been told about, or which one
expects to occur.3 We often have firm intuitions about our actual inferential
dispositions, surely, for we often actually make and assess inferences. By ap-
plying these actual standards to counterfactual scenarios, the Inference Test
can guide our beliefs about counterfactuals, even though it requires a prior
intuitive grasp of some counterfactuals.
Does the Inference Test constitute a semantic theory of counterfactuals?
We will consider the question in more detail in 3.4.4. But let us be clear that,
despite the biconditional, the Inference Test is not supposed to provide truth-
conditions for counterfactuals. It does not have the status of a metaphysical
or semantic theory. Rather, it has the status of a coherence condition on our
beliefs. The Inference Test is normative; as such, agents might as a matter of
fact violate it. The claim is that it is incoherent to believe that A > C if you
do not accept that one may infer C from A (in the circumstances in which you
think A > C holds). Likewise, it is incoherent to accept that one may infer
C from A unless you believe that A > C (in the circumstances in which you
accept that the inference may be made). This is a test which we can apply
to see whether our beliefs in counterfactuals are coherent with our inferential
dispositions. It does not provide a hotline to counterfactual truth.
It might be objected that, on its own, A will rarely license an inference to
C. This is an important feature of the Test, however. The inferences we will
make depend on context. Counterfactuals likewise depend on context. The
Inference Test asserts that the acceptability in context of counterfactuals and
inferences vary together. Instead of a asserting that biconditional, we could
say: A > C in and only in the circumstances where C may be inferred from
A.
If the Inference Test is merely a coherence condition on our beliefs, then
how can it show anything about counterfactual truth? — By tying our rather
uncertain direct intuitions about counterfactuals to a much more robust set
of intuitions. Indeed, our inferential dispositions are only intuitions in the
philosophical sense, of statements which are to be accepted without argument.
In no other sense are they mere intuitions: they are not hunches. We use our
ability to form and assess inferences incessantly. Our survival, as individuals
and as a species, may frequently depend upon it. For this reason, we may
3Williamson deploys a similar line of reasoning in his discussion of expectations, where
he talks of our expectation-forming capacities being employed “oﬄine” [Williamson, 2007].
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be confident in conferring truth or falsity upon a counterfactual as a result of
applying the Inference Test. We could also reason the other way, of course,
to accept or reject inferences on the basis of counterfactuals; and perhaps we
sometimes do. It is a matter of judgement in each case. But in the cases
we shall be considering, the counterfactual intuition will invariably be much
weaker than the inferential one. In such cases, the Inference Test will be very
helpful.
It remains to justify the claim that the Inference Test represents a genuine
coherence condition upon our beliefs. To that end, suppose that you buy a
strong coffee, and I remark, “When you’ve drunk that you’ll be perky.” I am
inferring your future perkiness from my belief that you will drink the coffee.
Since counterfactuals and the deleterious effects of excessive caffeine con-
sumption are both playing on your mind, you pause for thought, then reply:
“You think that, if I were to drink this, I would be perky?”
“No,” I say, “That I deny.”
Now it would be natural for you to ask, “Then why do you think I’ll be
perky?” And if I offer nothing further, then it would be natural for you to
regard me as at least a little strange, perhaps due to having had rather too
much coffee myself. We can run a similar story to confirm the other direction
of the biconditional. You buy a coffee, I assert the appropriate counterfactual,
you tell me you plan to drink the coffee and ask whether I therefore think you
will be perky, I deny that I think anything of the sort, and so you think I am
strange.
I suggest that the reason you would think me strange is that if I am willing
to make the inference, then I should believe the counterfactual. It is this
directive of common sense or intuitive rationality which underlies the test I
have proposed.
The Inference Test clearly shares a lot of the motivation of the Ramsey
Test. Both concern rational belief revision. So what is the difference? Chiefly,
that the Inference Test says less, because it has a different purpose. The Ram-
sey Test offers a minimal (and perhaps normative) hypothesis about the psy-
chology behind evaluation and acceptance of conditionals. The Inference Test
merely asserts that we should accept counterfactuals and corresponding infer-
ences under exactly the same circumstances, without specifying what those
circumstances are. In this way, the Inference Test avoids specifying principles
of belief revision: it invokes our abilities to conduct belief revision appropri-
ately, rather than any hypothesis about how this is or should be done. We can
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package all the questions about belief revision under the heading “inference”.
The fact is, in certain circumstances, we do revise our beliefs in the light of
certain facts. Moreover, somehow, we are able to simulate this revision un-
der counterfactual suppositions. The underlying motivation for the Inference
Test is that, in some cases, we see this much more clearly when we are asked
to think about inferences than we do when we think straightforwardly about
counterfactuals.
Perhaps the Inference Test will not always work. There might be coun-
terexamples. It would be better if there were no counterexamples, but if there
are, that need not matter. A test for measles need not be perfectly reliable to
be useful: if the test is sufficiently cheap and easy to perform, it might still
play a part in routine medical tests. High risk groups might be subjected to
further tests in the light of negative results, if a false negative is feared. And
further tests might follow a positive result, if a false positive is feared. Few
medical tests are error-free in either direction, but that does not stop them
being useful. A similar usefulness is the goal of the Inference Test. It is not
proposed as an analysis, but as a heuristic, a guide, something else, apart from
possible worlds, to think about when we are trying to assess counterfactuals.
Even if there are counterexamples, the Test might still be useful in this way,
so long as we are satisfied that the cases where we use it are not themselves
counterexamples to the Test. And as we shall see, the cases with which we
shall be concerned are fairly straightforward.
3.4.4 Implications of the Method
An obvious question about the Inference Test concerns the relation between
the Inference Test and a semantic theory of counterfactuals. Does the Inference
Test imply an inference-based theory of counterfactuals, and does it rule out
a world-based semantics? Let us take the questions in turn.
An inference-based theory of counterfactuals, such as Goodman’s, seeks to
identify counterfactuals with deductive inferences. Well-known problems beset
such projects, especially concerning the choice of further premises needed to
make deductively valid inferences (cf. Goodman 1983, Kvart 1986, Edgington
1995). Whether or not they can be overcome, it should be clear that the
Inference Test does not commit us to such a theory: the normative standards
it invokes are not specified, and thus need not be limited to standards of
deductive reasoning. On the other hand, a theory which sought to reduce
counterfactuals to inductive (that is: non-deductive) inferences would face
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the significant challenge of specifying standards of inductive inference. The
Inference Test does not commit us to such a reduction, and so does not need
to take up those challenges.
Some theorists have been tempted to analyse in the other direction, and
appeal to counterfactuals to analyse inductive inference. The Inference Test
is entirely compatible with analysing inductive inference with counterfactuals.
Inductive inferences might be characterised by supporting certain counterfac-
tuals, for instance, a “tracking” counterfactual stating a counterfactual depen-
dence of evidence upon the truth of a given hypothesis. Lipton proposes the
following as a rough characterisation of a good inductive inference:
...a strong inductive inference is one where, had the conclusion been
false, you would not have made the inference...
(Lipton 2000, 185)
This is intended as a simple characterisation for further refinement, but the
refinements will not make any difference to question of whether counterfac-
tual accounts of inference are compatible with an inference-based method for
guiding our beliefs about counterfactuals.
On the one hand, Lipton’s proposal makes a good inductive inference a
sufficient condition for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual. It is,
therefore, well aligned with the claim that accepting an inference imposes
a coherence requirement to believe the corresponding counterfactual. The
Inference Test says that if you accept the inference, you should accept the
counterfactual, and Lipton’s tracking condition makes the counterfactual true
in circumstances where the inference is a good one. And if you accept the
inference, you presumably think it is good. So the tracking condition seems
to fit with our directive, since the directive says you should believe what the
tracking condition asserts.
On the other hand, the Inference Test further asserts that the inferibility
(in the sense recently outlined) of consequent from antecedent is a necessary
condition on our coherent acceptance of a counterfactual. If we accept the
counterfactual, we must accept the inference. In order to be incompatible
with the Inference Test, Lipton’s tracking condition would further need to
deny that inferibility of consequent from antecedent is a necessary condition
on our coherent acceptance of a counterfactual. The tracking condition on its
own clearly does not constitute or imply any such denial. The compatibility
appears likely to generalise to other accounts, but even if there are exceptions,
3.4. ASSESSING COUNTERFACTUALS 63
compatibility with just one analysis of inductive inference in terms of counter-
factuals suffices to show that the Inference Test is not in principle incompatible
with such analyses.
A related but opposite worry is that the Inference Test might be incompat-
ible with a counterfactual account of inductive inference, not by being contra-
dictory, but because it might make such an account circular. I hope that the
status of the Inference Test as a test, and not an analysis, is sufficiently clear
to avert this worry. The following picture is not circular: good evidence is
characterised by counterfactual reliability; and to find out the truth of a coun-
terfactual, we can ask whether we would accept a corresponding inference. An
analysis of inference in terms of a something more basic, counterfactual de-
pendence, is quite compatible with the thought that we might find out about
the more basic thing via the inferences it is used to analyse. Indeed, we might
even expect some such situation, just as our primary acquaintance with some
of the cruder, collective properties of atoms is through the medium sized dry
goods which they are thought to underlie.
So the Inference Test neither entails an inference-based analysis of counter-
factuals, nor rules out a counterfactual analysis of inference. However, it is not
entirely neutral with respect to semantic theories for counterfactuals. When
those theories make claims about the truth of counterfactuals, the Inference
Test will either confirm or deny the theory making those claims, depending
on whether it agrees with the claims. There are two ways this could prove
problematic.
First, a semantics might ground a logic of counterfactuals which the In-
ference Test does not fully reflect, either because it disagrees directly with
certain moves or because the Test is just too coarse to apply meaningfully
to complex moves. I do not think this is a serious problem. The Inference
Test can admit of exceptions, as we have seen. A semantic theory might also
admit of exceptions if it is understood, as such a theory must surely be, as an
idealisation with respect to common practices. Among those practices might
be the application the Inference Test.
Second, a semantics might disagree with some substantive claim about the
non-logical properties of counterfactuals. It is evident that we will encounter
problems of this sort:
...those who are adverse to backtracking counterfactuals may have
to analyse reliability with different conditionals, because of the
prevalence of inductive inferences that move from past to future.
64 CHAPTER 3. BACKTRACKERS CAN BE TRUE
(Lipton 2000, 185)
Obviously the Inference Test will be incompatible with a ban on backtrackers
for a similar reason. We make inferences in both temporal directions. So
counterfactuals must be true in both temporal directions.
At this stage, I hope this will be seen as an advantage. The Inference Test
lacks temporal bias. It is in an excellent position, therefore, to tell us something
about the truth of the matter concerning the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence. In the next chapter, we shall discuss causal selection. I shall argue
that the Inference Test reveals an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence
which is much weaker than Lewis’s. Some backtrackers are true, but they are
fewer than true foretrackers. In the next chapter, I shall use the Inference Test
to argue that the circumstances in which backtrackers are true correspond to
the circumstances in which we select the cause from the mere conditions for
an effect.
3.5 Summary
We began by considering the plausibility of the idea that backtrackers are false
under normal resolutions of the vagueness infecting all counterfactuals. Two
arguments for this claim were criticised. The first was that mixing backtrack-
ers and foretrackers leads to contradictions, because they are generally true
under different resolutions of vagueness. It was accepted that care must be
taken when mixing backtrackers and foretrackers, in order to avoid flipping
between different resolutions of vagueness; but it was argued that this point
applies equally to mixing foretrackers alone, and does not suffice to show that
backtracking and foretracking contexts are distinct. The second argument
concerned the grammatical complexity associated with backtrackers, and the
corresponding strangeness of backtrackers which are forced into the grammat-
ical subjunctive which is so natural for expressing foretrackers. I suggested
that the falsity of backtrackers could not explain their odd sound, and that
the complexity of backtrackers did not imply a shift of context to favour a spe-
cial backtracking resolution of vagueness. Thus both reasons for thinking that
backtrackers and foretrackers were true under different resolutions of vagueness
were rejected.
This line of argument is intended to deprive Lewis’s asymmetry of counter-
factual dependence of its explanandum. If there is no reason to suppose that
there is an ordinary, foretracking context, then there is no reason to seek an
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account of such a context — and thus no reason to argue for a sharp distinction
between true foretrackers and false backtrackers. This line of argument is also
directed at the more general worry, that even if Lewis’s asymmetry thesis fails
for internal reasons, some asymmetry of counterfactual dependence neverthe-
less exists. I did not argue that there is no asymmetry; rather, I argued that
there is no reason to think that backtrackers and foretrackers must be kept
apart, each to their own special context.
It might be objected that Lewis’s asymmetry of counterfactual dependence
was fundamentally motivated by explaining more general puzzles, which we
have not considered at all: in particular, the perceived “openness” of the fu-
ture contrasted with the fixity of the past. This is, in part, because the contrast
is not easy to get a grip on; nor is it obvious what an account of it would be
like. Lewis’s asymmetry of counterfactual dependence fails to provide a very
convincing account, because — as we saw in 2.4.1 — Lewis’s account allows
some backtracking. Yet it is not as if we regard the past as mostly but not
entirely fixed, or variably fixed depending on context. We may hold it fixed
variably with context, when we are entertaining various counterfactual suppo-
sitions; but that is quite different from regarding it as fixed in a variable and
not-quite-complete way.4 This qualm aside, it is far from clear that a very
general puzzle such as the asymmetry of openness directly motivates any very
specific explanation, such as Lewis’s asymmetry of counterfactual dependence;
the asymmetry of openness might be compatible with other explanations. The
other important asymmetries which Lewis had hoped to explain are the tem-
poral asymmetry of causation, and the direction of time itself. These questions
are largely beyond the present scope, but will be touched upon in Chapter 7.5
Having argued that the existence and nature of an asymmetry of coun-
terfactual dependence is an open question, not decided by considerations of
logic or of English grammar, we considered methods for assessing counter-
factuals without temporal bias. Lewis’s method was criticised — perhaps a
little unfairly, since it is not advanced as a method. But the method is in
widespread (if implicit) use, I fear: if so, identifying it and its flaws is impor-
tant; and if not, the only injury done is to a straw man. The Ramsey Test
was found to be insufficient as a test for counterfactuals, because its results
4In this point I am indebted to Peter Lipton.
5It might further be objected that we need an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence
for other purposes, for example, in causal decision theory (cf. Gibbard and Harper 1978,
Lewis 1981, Elga 2000). Such a need ought, however, to be subservient to the prior ques-
tion of whether there is in fact an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. If not, then
applications which depend on there being an asymmetry will need to be revisited.
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are not determinate until a heuristic for belief revision is inserted. However
Ramsey’s suggestion that the move from antecedent to consequent be seen
as an inference was picked up, with help from Edgington and Goodman, and
the Inference Test was proposed. It was defended as a coherence condition
on our beliefs: accept the counterfactual, and you must accept the inference
from antecedent to consequent. A cursory defence against obvious objections
was conducted, and the Test was presented as compatible with world-based
semantics for counterfactuals and with counterfactual analyses of inference.
Now we turn to the main topic: causation. However the discussion of
causation, particularly in the next chapter, can also be seen as an exploration
of the real asymmetry of which Lewis’s thesis of the asymmetry counterfactual
dependence is a parody. We will be exploring the circumstances under which
backtrackers are true. In Chapter 4, I shall argue that the circumstances in
which a backtracker is true are just those in which we distinguish the cause
from the mere conditions for a given effect.
Chapter 4
Selection
4.0 Abstract
I strike a match, and it lights. It is unusual to say that the presence of oxygen
caused the flame, even though we might be fully aware that oxygen is needed for
the flame. This chapter presses the problem of selecting the cause from among
mere conditions, which has often been dismissed by theorists of causation
as a sort of whim. I start by arguing that selection needs to be accounted
for, and sketching some of the approaches which have been tried. I focus
on the strategy of assimilating causal selection to the contrastive mechanism
of causal explanation. Although this approach enjoys some success, I argue
that it fails either properly to explain or to enable us to justify our selective
practices. I introduce the Reverse Counterfactual which, I suggest, captures
the intuitive notion that causesmake the difference to their effects. I argue that
the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes but not of mere conditions. This
yields an account of selection which overcomes the objections raised against the
contrastive strategy, and which links the context-sensitivity of causal selection
to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals. The relation between contrastive
explanation and the Reverse Counterfactual is discussed, along with various
objections.
4.1 The Problem of Causal Selection
Here are six propositions.
(1) Sometimes we say of the cause, but not of any mere condition, that
it is the cause of a given effect.
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(2) Sometimes we cite the cause, but not any mere condition, in ex-
planation of a given effect.
(3) Sometimes we use the cause, but not any mere condition, to predict
a given effect.
(4) Sometimes we seek to bring about the cause, but not any mere
condition, in order to bring about a given effect.
(5) Sometimes we make moral judgements on the basis that an agent’s
action is the cause of a given effect, which we would not on the
basis that it was a mere condition.
(6) Sometimes we make legal judgements on the basis that an agent’s
action is the cause of a given effect, which we would not on the
basis that it was a mere condition.
If any of these are true, then a question arises: what is the difference between
a cause and a mere condition? The problem of causal selection is the fact that
this question is hard to answer adequately. However, many philosophers of
causation do not think that selection poses a particular problem; they do not
acknowledge the problem of selection as such. For a notable example, David
Lewis developed his theory of causation extensively in an effort to deal with the
problem of preemption, but no changes were motivated by giving an account
of selection.
The reason is that Lewis did not believe that an account of the selection
of cause from mere conditions belonged in an account of causation. For he did
not believe that causal selection is strictly a feature of causation itself.
We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event
and call it “the” cause. Or we single out a few as the “causes”,
calling the rest mere “causal factors” or “causal conditions.” Or
we speak of the “decisive” or “real” or “principal” cause... I have
nothing to say about these principles of invidious discrimination. I
am concerned with the prior question of what it is to be one of the
causes (unselectively speaking). My analysis is meant to capture a
broad and non-discriminatory notion of causation.
(Lewis 1986a, 162)
Lewis’s analysis does indeed capture a non-discriminatory, unselective notion,
for on all his counterfactual accounts, there is no distinction between cause
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and mere condition. The starting thought is that c causes e if (∼ C >∼ E).
Sitting here at a desk in a warm dry room, I strike a match, and it lights. If the
lighting of the match is e, then clearly, on this embryonic Lewisian analysis,
the match strike and the presence of oxygen have an equal claim to be c.
For without either, the match would not have lit. This feature is preserved
through all Lewis’s considerable elaborations of the starting thought. On all of
Lewis’s accounts, the extension of the term “mere condition” would be just the
same as the extension of “cause”, disregarding conversational implication and
any other conventions. Even if we sometimes discriminate between causes and
conditions, and mark the discrimination by calling some event “the cause”, we
discriminate on some other basis than the instantiation of some general causal
difference between cause and condition. On Lewis’s view, we distinguish cause
from condition for reasons that are entirely our own.
The Lewisian view of causal selection is shared by another famous account
of causation which is otherwise very different. Mill was similarly hostile to
selection as a feature of causes themselves, despite his interest in experimental
methods for singling out causal factors. The reason was that Mill considered
causation a law, by which he meant an exceptionless regularity. Indeed Mill
thought that the law of causation was the only exceptionless regularity.1 This
led him to the doctrine of the “whole cause”, by the following route. We might
say that Jones’s eating a dish caused her death, on the basis that if she had not
eaten it she would not have died. But there is not an exceptionless regularity
between the eating of the dish and death, unless we specify the eating of
the dish so precisely that only Jones’s eating counts. Others with a stronger
constitution, or lucky enough to receive prompter and better medical care, eat
the same dish or another just like it, and survive. So strictly speaking, Jones’s
health, the other parts of her meal, and “perhaps even the present state of the
atmosphere” (Mill 1887, 237) jointly count as the cause, because only when
taken together are these exceptionlessly followed by the effect.
The real Cause, is the whole of these antecedents; and we have,
philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one
of them, exclusively of the others.
(Mill 1887, 237)
1“Now among all those uniformities in the succession of phenomena, which common
observation is sufficient to bring to light, there are very few which have any, even apparent,
pretension to this rigorous indefeasibility: and of these few, one only has been found capable
of completely sustaining it” (Mill 1887, 235). That one is the law of causation.
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In short, the dominant view across a broad spectrum of Humean accounts
denies that there is any difference between “the” cause and the mere conditions
for an effect (apart from our differential treatment) — either because each
condition is a cause (Lewis) or because the cause is all the conditions taken
together (Mill). But if any of (1)-(6) is ever true, then it follows that there is
some difference between cause and mere condition, in particular cases where
some of (1)-(6) are true. So on non-selective accounts of causation like Mill’s
and Lewis’s, any general difference between causes and conditions cannot be
objective; and the many objective differences which presumably exist between
a given cause and condition must be particular to the case in hand, and cannot
be general.
If (1)-(6) are not accounted for by a theory of causation, then they must be
accounted for (if they are to be explained at all) by appeal to something other
than a theory of causation. Yet the account ought also to throw some light
on the fact that we treat unselective causation with these selective foibles. In
fact there are two needs for such an account. The first is the obvious one:
an account of the principles governing causal selection is needed if we are to
understand those principles. The second need has been given less attention,
but deserves more: namely, the account should explain why we insist on using
causation as a selector in the way that we do, when causation is allegedly
so ill-suited to the task. Why do we appeal to causal concepts in order to
distinguish the match strike from the presence of oxygen, the arsonist’s action
from the builder’s, and so on, across the contexts of (1)-(6), if there is no
general difference between the event we distinguish and those from which we
distinguish it in those cases? On an unselective account of causation, we
systematically misuse our causal concept by using it to select causes from
conditions: we make what Lewis calls an “invidious discrimination”, which
according to Mill we have “philosophically speaking, no right” to make. Such
a view amounts to a sort of error theory about much of our ordinary causal
talk; error theories can be correct, but they generate an explanatory need —
the need to explain why we have fallen into systematic and widespread error.
This is a prima facie objection to the prevailing view, that an account of
causal selection does not belong in an account of causation. I am aware of no
serious efforts answer this objection, and thus to meet this second explanatory
need we have identified. No proponent of an unselective view of causation
seems to have devoted much thought to explaining why we use it selectively.
Efforts have been made, however, to give accounts of the principles governing
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causal selection. I shall seek to present existing work on causal selection as a
sort of progression through three increasingly sophisticated strategies. Then
I shall consider the most sophisticated of these in detail, and argue that it
answers neither of the needs just identified. Finally I shall propose and defend
an account which I hope is more successful, and try to explain the limited
successes of previous accounts.2
4.2 Three Steps Towards an Account of Selec-
tion
4.2.1 The Special Event Strategy
Perhaps the most obvious way to try to account for causal selection is to seek
to identify the kinds of events which we tend to select as causes. This approach
has the advantage of pragmatism, since no great theory is required to observe
which kinds of events we identify in which circumstances. Hart and Honore
adopt this strategy. They suggest that we distinguish two sorts of events
from the general background: human interventions and abnormal events. It
may be hard to give a precise account of these, but as lawyers their interests
are pragmatic, and although it may be hard to account for, the fact is that,
in practice, we can usually identify both human interventions and events we
consider to be abnormal relative to the usual course of things.
Hart and Honore note that selection is flexible (my term), in the sense
that we select different events as the cause in different circumstances. They
differentiate two ways in which selection depends on context. Consider an
explosion, requiring fuel, oxygen and ignition. If it occurred in a petrol station,
we would usually say that it was caused by the ignition — the dropping of the
cigarette, the spark, or whatever it was. We would not usually say that it was
caused by the presence of oxygen. This choice, however, is flexible in two ways.
First, of that very explosion, we might sometimes admit that the oxygen is a
cause, if the context changes suitably: for example, if we are discussing the
chemistry of explosions, or the possible measures for preventing them. Thus
selection of the cause is relative to the context of inquiry — the context in
which we discuss, ask about, investigate or mention the effect. Second, if a
similar explosion occurred not in a petrol station but in a factory, following a
2One area where causal selection is currently topical, which I shall not discuss but which
could benefit from philosophers taking causal selection more seriously, is epidemiology (cf.
Whitbeck 1977, Krieger 1994, Parascandola and Weed 2001), .
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leak in a process normally conducted in a vacuum, we would probably identify
the leak of air into the process as the cause. Thus selection of the cause is
relative to the context of occurrence — the time and place where the effect
occurred, the frequency of such events, and properties of the wider situation
more generally. (Adapted from Hart and Honore 1985, 10.)
Hart and Honore’s discussion usefully emphasises the complexity of our
selective practices, identifying and clarifying flexibility as an important feature
which any account of selection must accommodate. Their book also serves to
emphasise the weight we put upon causal selection — the seriousness with
which we regard the difference between cause and condition. After all, their
discussion concerns the place of causal selection in the law, and a lot that we
value can hang on legal decisions. This is a point to which we will return in
4.3.2 below.
However their approach suffers from a number of drawbacks if it is seen as a
philosophical theory of causation. It does not have the metaphysical credentials
we would expect of a modern theory of causation. Its form is disjunctive, its
two central concepts (human intervention and abnormal event) are both vague,
and the resulting theory would be highly interest-relative. Hart and Honore
advance their theory for legal, not metaphysical, purposes, so perhaps this
is not surprising. Perhaps, then, we should see theirs as an account of our
selective practices, independent of any account of causation.
But then the account clearly will not answer the second of the questions
we set out at the beginning of the chapter. It will not explain why we use
causation — causal concepts, causal language, causal reasoning — to select
causes from mere conditions.
Moreover, it is far from clear that it will answer the first, descriptive, ques-
tion adequately from a philosophical point of view. Describing our selective
practices is not the same as offering an account of them for philosophical pur-
poses. Mere description may be useful for clarifying legal argument, but it will
not answer the obvious philosophical question: it will not explain why we sin-
gle out human acts and abnormal events. And until the principles underlying
our preference for these sorts of special events have been given, there is a high
risk of counterexamples (cf. Beebee 2004).
For these reasons, then, the special event strategy is at best a starting
point for a principled account of selection. It may offer useful rules of thumb
for legal contexts, but it seems neither sufficiently explanatory nor sufficiently
reductive to amount to an enlightening philosophical theory.
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4.2.2 The Causal Field Strategy
Mackie also toys with the special event strategy, and comes to similar conclu-
sions to Hart and Honore about the sort of events we tend to select as causes.
However he proposes an explanation for our tendency to select those sorts of
events. Mackie’s account starts with the thought that all causal statements are
responses to causal questions, and that causal questions are to be understood
as questions about what makes the difference:
A causal statement will be the answer to a causal question, and
the question ‘What caused this explosion?’ can be expanded into
‘What made the difference between those times, or those cases,
within a certain range, in which no such explosion occurred, and
this case in which an explosion did occur?’
(Mackie 1974, 35)
In answering such questions, Mackie thinks we rule out irrelevant events in
two ways. First, such questions are asked and therefore answered against
the background of a causal field, which is simply a set (he says range) of
possible cases sharing some features with the actual case. We ignore all the
many possible ways in which the effect could have been prevented, except
those which are differences between the actual case and another case in the
causal field. For example, we ignore the possibility that the Earth never came
into being, that the factory was never built, that the town was flooded in a
seismic upheaval, and so on when we consider what caused the explosion: we
are looking for differences between the case where the explosion occurred and
cases where it did not — but only within a restricted field of cases. These cases
are alike in respect of the existence of the Earth, the presence of a factory, and
the absence of encroaching seas. So we do not identify these factors as causes,
even though we agree that they are counterfactually necessary for the effect.
Relativising causal questions to a restricted field does not, according to
Mackie, always narrow things down to just one difference:
Any part of the chosen field is decisively ruled out as cause; a
more elusive point is that among factors not so ruled out which
are severally necessary for the effect, we still show some degree of
preference...
(Mackie 1974, 35)
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The more elusive part of our selective judgements reflects our interests in
particular circumstances, Mackie thinks. For example:
...we may agree that the collision was caused just as much by
Smith’s driving straight ahead as by Brown’s deviating to his right
without warning, but say that it is more important, for moral and
legal purposes, to draw attention to the second of the two causal
relationships.
(Mackie 1974, 36)
His position is that causes are those differences relative to a particular causal
field, and that interests further select among these causes, when mention of
the fact that a given event is a cause “happens to be irrelevant” (1974, 36).
Subsequent work has not paid much attention to Mackie’s strong distinction
between these two elements in causal selection — namely, relativity to a causal
field, and interest-relativity. But Mackie is explicit that he considers them both
to be important. He thinks that we could do away with either component of
the account altogether — making selection either purely interest-relative or
purely relative to a causal field — but that in fact both elements are present
in our thinking (cf. Mackie 1974, 36).
The causal field is not absolute for any given cause-effect pair; rather,
it varies with the context. In particular, it varies depending on what causal
question (perhaps implicit) a given causal claim answers (Mackie 1974, 35). An
obvious objection would deny that all causal claims are responses to implicit
questions. We will discuss this objection when we consider the contrastive
strategy (4.3.1). On the other hand, the suggestion that causal statements
are answers to implicit questions enables Mackie to account for the flexibility
of selection, relative to the context of inquiry. Obviously, the answer we give
depends upon the question we ask: so when we ask, “Why did this explosion
occur?”, we might implicitly be asking, “What made the difference between this
explosion and other, non-exploding petrol stations?” The other petrol stations
we have in mind are well-supplied with oxygen, so we pass over the oxygen as
a possible cause of the explosion. However, the answer will be different when
the implicit question is, “What made the difference between this explosion and
other occasions when this delicate manufacturing process did not blow up?”
Oxygen may have been absent on those occasions, so we would not rule it out
as a cause (though as previously explained, whether we mention it and thus
positively rule it in depends further on our particular interests in the case).
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So causal fields explain why selection is relative to the context of inquiry,
if they are determined by implicit questions as Mackie suggests. However it
is less clear that the causal field approach explains how selection depends on
the context of occurrence, at least as Mackie develops it. Causal fields are
defined by the implicit questions to which causal statements are allegedly an
answer. This makes it clear how selection can depend on inquiry. But it is
not clear how selection depends on the context in which things happen, since
it is not clear why certain events prompt certain sorts of questions. It may
be perfectly obvious that an explosion in a petrol station suggests a different
question from an explosion in a factory. But why? Even assuming that it is
clear how a particular question generates a particular causal field, it is not
clear how a particular context generates that question. The relation between
context of occurrence and context of inquiry is not explained. Yet Mackie’s
account of selection makes it entirely dependent on the context of inquiry; so if
his account is to explain how selection depends on the context of occurrence, it
will need to explain how our inquiries depend on their subject matter. That is
a difficult and strange task; usually we suppose that we can investigate what we
want, and that choices about what question to ask are entirely pragmatic, or
interest-relative. It seems, then, that in the end, Mackie’s account must make
the dependence of causal selection on the context of occurrence pragmatic: as
pragmatic as our choice of what question to ask. This is not necessarily a
criticism, but it serves to show that — despite the machinery of causal fields
— Mackie’s position is still fairly close to that of Mill and Lewis.3
4.2.3 The Contrastive Strategy
Another unclarity in Mackie’s suggestion concerns the way in which causal
fields are generated by questions: what is the precise nature of those ques-
tions, and how do they determine a causal field? It seems to me that con-
trastive accounts of selection can be seen as refining this aspect of Mackie’s
account (sometimes explicitly, as in the case of Schaffer [2005]). Mackie’s own
examples, such as that of the explosion (given previously on page 73), are ex-
pansions of causal questions into contrastive why-questions : questions of the
form, “Why X rather than Y ?” This suggests that contrasts play a central role
in determining what Mackie referred to as the causal field. The contrastive
3A concise formulation of Mackie’s account of causal selection can also be found in
[Mackie, 1965]. Two recent and quite different attempts to develop a Mackian position
are [Menzies, 2004] and [Schaffer, 2005].
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accounts we shall consider drop the “causal field” terminology, but their effect
is the same: contrasts determine a set of cases sharing certain features, thereby
narrowing our attention to the handful of differences remaining. Contrastive
accounts may therefore be seen as deepening Mackie’s approach, by replacing
the blunt notion of a causal field with the notion of a contrast. Contrasts,
unlike causal fields, are things we are already familiar with. Moreover the con-
trastive account of selection is more specific about the mechanism by which our
causal claims pick out a set of possible cases, against which we compare the ac-
tual case for differences. In both respects, it constitutes a superior explanation
of causal selection, while yielding a theory of roughly the same shape.
We shall focus on the contrastive strategy. It is probably the best-known
style of account of causal selection. This may be partly because it can be im-
plemented without commitment to any particular theory of causation. Thus it
typifies the style of account which the Mill-Lewis line of thought recommends.
It is also a promising kind of account, enjoying some remarkable successes, as
we shall now see.
4.3 The Contrastive Strategy
4.3.1 Contrastive Explanation and Causal Selection
Lipton hopes to shed light on causal selection by appeal to contrastive causal
explanation, and he does so without endorsing any particular theory of causa-
tion. Moreover, he has also given explicit attention to other items (apart from
explanation) on the list (1)-(6), notably selection in legal contexts. This is a
context where explanation is often not the explicit goal, so it offers a good test
for the strategy of assimilating causal selection to the contrastive mechanism
claimed for causal explanation.
The central piece of Lipton’s account of contrastive explanation is his Dif-
ference Condition, offered as a necessary condition on explanation:
To explain why P rather than Q, we must cite a causal difference
between P and not-Q, consisting of a cause of P and the absence
of a corresponding event in the case of not-Q.
(Lipton 2004, 42 — emphasis original)
For example, suppose Able and Baker both propose to Suzy, who accepts Able.
Suzy’s mother asks her why she accepted Able (P ) rather than accepting Baker
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(Q). Suppose that Suzy says, “Because Able proposed.” That might be a good
explanation, if Baker did not propose. But since Baker also proposed, then
clearly the fact that Able proposed is no explanation at all of Suzy’s preference
for Baker. We have an event — Able’s proposal — which is indeed a cause
of the acceptance (P ), but which fails Lipton’s Difference Condition in virtue
of the presence of a corresponding event — Baker’s proposal — in the case of
Baker’s rejection (∼ Q). On the other hand, if Suzy said, “I’m marrying Able
because he is a devastating logician,” then we might have an explanation: for
Baker is not a devastating logician. Thus we have a cause of Able’s acceptance
(P ), namely Able’s logical prowess, which is absent from Baker’s rejection
(∼ Q), because Baker is logically mediocre. The Difference Condition is,
however, only a necessary condition on explanation, and I hope the example
illustrates this too: Suzy’s mother is unlikely to accept Able’s logical prowess
in explanation of Suzy’s choice, even though it meets the Difference Condition.
Nevertheless, logical prowess cannot be excluded as an explanation of Suzy’s
choice in the decisive way that we earlier excluded Able’s proposal, which failed
the Difference Condition.
Lipton’s proposed strategy for dealing with causal selection is to claim that
selection of the cause employs the contrastive mechanism claimed for this sort
of explanation:
...a cause marks a difference between the situation where the effect
occurs and a contrasting situation where it does not.
(Lipton 1992, 136)
This yields a contrastive account of selection. For each of (1)-(6), we say of the
cause, and not of any mere condition, that it is the cause, because the cause is
a difference between this case where the effect occurs and contrast cases where
it does not.
One obvious problem is that, in general, there may be many differences
between the history of a given effect and the history of a given non-occurring
contrast. This is a problem inherited from the account of contrastive explana-
tion from which this account of causal selection is descended. Lipton therefore
acknowledges the need for further principles.
...the contrasts we construct will almost always leave multiple dif-
ferences that meet the Difference Condition. At the same time,
however, some causally relevant differences will not be explana-
tory in a particular context, so while the Difference Condition may
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be necessary for the causal contrastive explanations of particular
events, it is not generally sufficient. For that we need further prin-
ciples of causal selection.
(Lipton 2004, 47)
Lipton duly provides a discussion of these further principles. Contrast is not
the whole story. Nevertheless, just as the Difference Condition is offered as
a necessary condition on explanation, so it might be for causal selection. We
might consider the contrastive strategy as indicating an important necessary
condition for an event to qualify as the cause, even if the condition is merely
necessary, not the whole story. For this reason I am not inclined to regard this
problem as a very serious one: accounting for selection in terms of contrast
might still be illuminating even if the account is only partial.
Since Lipton’s account of selection is a descriptive analysis of common
practice, the argument for it proceeds largely by exhibiting examples where
the cause indeed appears to be the difference between the case where the effect
occurs and some contrast; and, of course, contesting any counterexamples. I
do not propose that we debate the success of the contrastive account in this
respect: the idea is plausible and thoroughly discussed elsewhere (cf. Lipton
2004, Schaffer 2005), and my interest is in the prospects for this strategy of
accounting for selection if contrast can be shown to line up appropriately with
our selective intuitions in a significant range of cases. I shall argue in 4.3.2
below that even if the cause marks a difference between the effect and some
contrast case, a contrastive account of selection encounters serious difficulties.
One misplaced strategic objection to the contrastive approach should be set
aside. Menzies objects that “one of the central assumptions of the strategy —
that every causal statement must be understood in the context of an implicit
contrastive why-question — is too strong” (Menzies 2004, 150). This is an
understandable reaction, especially given that, as we saw, Mackie’s account of
selection explicitly endorses the view that every causal statement is an answer
to an implicit why-question. But I think Menzies’ objection is misplaced,
because the contrastive strategy need not endorse this view. Note that we have
described the contrastive strategy without hinting at implicit why-questions.
The strategy requires that there be a contrast for the effect when we select the
cause from among the mere conditions, but it does not require that there is an
implicit question about why the effect rather than the contrast occurred. The
claim is not that causal selection is contrastive explanation, but merely that it
shares the contrastive mechanism. The assumption that selection is relative to
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some contrast for the effect in question is a weaker assumption, than that causal
selection always implies a why-question. It is also more plausible, because of
the familiar flexibility of selection: in different contexts, we cite different events
as the cause of the same effect. I might say the lasagne was good because I used
more tomatoes, but my dinner guests would say it was because I am finally
learning to cook. This flexibility would be explained neatly by the contrastive
strategy, because different contexts might yield different contrast choices, and
thus different selections. Although why-questions are a source of contrast,
there is no reason to think they are the only source, and thus no reason to tie
the flexibility of selection to the vigour of our enquiries.4
4.3.2 Two Objections
Here come two objections to the contrastive account of causal selection, both
arising from difficulties about how the choice of contrast is determined. Lipton
argues that any such objection to his account of explanation is ill-founded:
My goal... is to show how the choice of contrast helps to determine
an explanatory cause, not to show why we choose one contrast
rather than another. The latter question is not part of providing a
model of explanation, as that task has traditionally been construed.
It is no criticism... of my account of contrastive explanation that it
does not tell us why we are interested in explaining some contrasts
rather than others.
(Lipton 2004, 46)
This response may be appropriate for an account of explanation, but not, I shall
argue, for causal selection, for two reasons. First, explaining causal selection
requires us to explain, not just why a certain cause is selected given a certain
choice of contrast, but why that contrast was chosen in the first place. Second,
justifying moral and legal decisions which involve causal selection requires,
not just saying why a certain cause is appropriate given a certain contrast, but
justifying that choice of contrast in the first place.
4I think a parallel response could be made in defence of Mackie’s position. Although
Mackie commits himself to the claim that all causal statements are responses to implicit
why-questions, the notion of causal field does not require this. Menzies develops a causal
field account of selection which does not make causal fields relative to implicit why-questions,
as we shall see in 4.6.3. Menzies has three other objections to the contrastive strategy
[Menzies, 2004]. Two are specific to Lewis’s account of contrastive explanation, and do not
apply to Lipton’s. The remaining one we shall consider shortly.
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The explanatory shortfall of the contrastive account of selection may be
brought out in various ways. Menzies puts it like this:
...the two-part strategy [of giving an account of causation and then
tacking on a contrastive account of selection] is unsatisfactory from
an explanatory point of view. It unnecessarily duplicates the idea
of a cause as something that makes a difference: first in the anal-
ysis of “objective cause” as something that makes a counterfactual
difference; and then again in the contrastive explanation account
of the “context-sensitive cause”... [S]urely it would be a surprising
fact, requiring elaborate explanation, if our framework for concep-
tualizing causation used in two different but crucial ways the very
same idea of difference making. It would be much more likely that
our conceptual framework was developed on the basis of a single
fundamental application of this idea.
(Menzies 2004, 150-1)
Menzies is relying on a platitudinous notion of cause as something which
“makes a difference” to its effect. He takes it that this notion is central both
to the analysis of “objective” causation, and to the analysis of causal selection.
If so, he says, then we should seek a unified analysis of causation and causal
selection which applies the intuitive idea of difference-making. An analysis
which is not unified in this way generates an explanatory need, one that has
not been answered.
This objection is a more specific variant of the general prima facie objec-
tion I put in 4.1, where I suggested that an unselective account of causation
generates a need to explain our selective application of causal concepts (besides
failing to address the preexisting need for a descriptive account of the prin-
ciples governing selection). Another specific variant of this line of objection,
which is also present in Menzies [2004], is that counterfactuals themselves are
context-dependent. Thus context already plays a role in a counterfactual the-
ory of causation. On an unselective counterfactual theory, context comes into
play in two quite different ways: first, in fixing the truth-values of the counter-
factuals which determine what causes what, and second, in choosing between
those counterfactuals when cause is distinguished from mere condition.
Perhaps the most striking way to bring out the explanatory shortcomings
of the contrastive approach arises when we remember that explanation and
prediction are often symmetric. An explanation of the observed position of
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the moon in terms of its roughly Newtonian progress from its position this
time yesterday will also be a prediction of the current position of the moon,
if it is offered at an earlier time, or at a present or later time in the absence
of an observation. This symmetry is not always present, but there is usually
an identifiable reason for its absence. In the present case, if the contrastive
account is a good explanation of causal selection, we might expect it to make
predictions about what we will select in certain circumsances. But a contrastive
account yields no concrete predictions without an account of contrast choice.
For example, it does not tell us that I will select the match strike rather than
the oxygen to explain or predict or produce the flame, no matter how much
information we make available. For it requires a contrast for the flame before it
can get started. This is not a case where the explanation/prediction symmetry
breaks down; the contrastive account is not intended as an account of contrast
choice. Turning our attention to prediction merely emphasises that, if causal
selection indeed employs a contrastive mechanism, then contrast choice must
also be explained. For, if indeed it employs a contrastive mechanism, then
causal selection includes a decision about which contrast is appropriate for a
given context. The contrastive account cannot predict what we will select in
a given context until we have fed it the contrast appropriate to that context.
This, I suggest, is a clear indication that the contrastive account does not fully
explain selection.
The second class of objections concerns moral and legal justification for
decisions which depend upon the distinction between cause and condition.
Causal selection is central, not only in explanatory contexts, but also in moral
and legal contexts. The contrastive account derives from an account of ex-
planation, but moral and legal contexts differ from explanatory contexts in a
relevant way. We are free to explain what we wish: the context of explanation
does not determine what we should explain, only whether an explanation is
good given an explanandum. It is far from clear that contexts of moral and
legal evaluation are similar in this respect. If an arsonist burns a warehouse to
the ground, she is morally and legally condemned, not merely because we hap-
pen to take an interest in evaluating her actions, but simply because she has
done something wrong and illegal. In this case, as in many others, her crime is
a cause: she caused the destruction of a warehouse (as well as satisfying what-
ever other conditions are necessary for the crime of arson). We may allow that
the choice of effects whose causes are to be morally or legally evaluated may be
left out of an account of causal selection. But even if we specify independently
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that the fire is to be evaluated, the contrastive account still gives too much
latitude. If we contrast the burning of the warehouse with the absence of a
warehouse at all (eg. in the course of a comparative study of crime patterns
in industrial versus residential areas), the action of the builder qualifies as a
relevant difference. Yet we imprison the arsonist, and may employ the builder
for the rebuild: this shows, as clearly as anything can, that we do not treat the
builder as causing the fire. The moral and legal weight that our discrimination
between builder and arsonist must bear is substantial, and until we have an
account of the way we choose our contrast, the contrastive account does not
hold up. It only provides an account of how selection proceeds once we have
a contrast. In moral and legal contexts, the choice of contrast matters just
as much as the contrastive mechanism, since both determine the facts upon
which moral or legal judgement is to be passed. And it is clearly not morally or
legally acceptable, as it often is explanatorily acceptable, to leave one of these
determinants entirely up to us: it is a matter of fact, not up to us, whether
the arsonist or the builder committed a moral or legal crime.
Both my objections may be seen as deepening an objection I sketched
against Mackie in 4.2.2. There, I criticised his causal field account for making
selection depend entirely on the context of inquiry, and not at all on the context
of occurrence. That was because the causal field was generated entirely by an
implicit why-question. I have argued that contrasts need not be generated
by implicit why-questions. Nevertheless, the contrastive account as it stands
does not relate the source of the contrast at all to the context of occurrence.
Perhaps you might think that it should not: if we believe, with Lewis and
Mill, that selection is something we contribute after the causal facts are fixed,
then perhaps an account which makes selection suitably independent of the
context of occurrence would be desirable. But even this radical view about
the place of selection does not excuse us from accounting for it. Our actual
selective practices do appear to depend on the context of occurrence as well as
the context of inquiry, as Hart and Honore point out. If we accept that (and
surely we should), then even an account of selection which makes it entirely
independent of the facts of causation, and entirely dependent on our attitude
towards those facts, must explain how the context of occurrence affects our
choices. The intention of the two objections I have put is to push this point.
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4.3.3 Pragmatics
It is often, I suspect, assumed that both kinds of objection are to be handled by
an appeal to pragmatics (cf. Lewis 2004a, Menzies 2004, Schaffer 2005). The
explanatory need generated by an unselective account of causation is to be an-
swered, in each of its various forms, by giving an account of the pragmatics of
causal selection, and especially of contrast choice. Pragmatic factors might ex-
plain why we use causal terminology to make distinctions which are not purely
causal, just as pragmatic factors might be thought to explain why we commonly
use “if” to imply “only if”. In reply to Menzies, perhaps difference-making is a
central causal notion, but when we select cause from conditions we are taking
into account further pragmatic considerations which are absent when we ap-
ply the concept to determine the “objective” cause. Likewise, counterfactuals
depend on context to resolve their vagueness and thus arrive at a determinate
truth-value; there is nothing wrong with supposing that, even after vagueness
has been resolved, pragmatic considerations might make some true counter-
factuals more salient, more relevant or more appropriate to mention in some
contexts than others. I suggested that the contrastive account’s lack of predic-
tive power illustrated lack of explanatory power, but pragmatic accounts are a
standard class of exceptions to the prediction/explanation symmetry. Even if
general principles governing the pragmatics of a certain practice are given, the
principles rarely suffice for predictions, because pragmatic considerations are
usually complex, subtle and generally resistant to fully reductive explanation.
The objection from moral and legal justification might likewise be thought
to succumb to a pragmatic treatment. Clearly, in moral and legal contexts,
we have interests which might be absent in the case of explanation. Perhaps,
then, the contrastive account lifted from the explanatory context is indeed
more basic. The interests we have in moral and legal contexts are further,
additional interests; we can call the process by which these interests arise from
context “pragmatic” either because they are somewhat irrelevant to the basic
mechanism of selection, or else — more positively — because we are gesturing
towards some general account of how context determines certain interests, and
thus ultimately plays a role in causal selection.
These are merely sketch responses on behalf of the contrastive approach,
and it is hard to assess their merit without a fuller account. Nevertheless,
there are weaknesses in the general strategy of appealing to pragmatics.
First, it is worth noting that a positive account of the pragmatics of causal
selection is called for. Merely alluding to pragmatic considerations, as a sort
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of “black box”, will not provide a satisfactory theory of selection. It is easy
to invoke pragmatics in an entirely platitudinous way, amounting to nothing
more than the admission that selection is flexible and depends on context.
The question is how. Until that question receives an answer, the two lines of
objection cited are not satisfactorily rebutted. Merely repeating that selection
is flexible and depends on context will provide only the weakest, most general
explanation of why we select what we do. Likewise, it is little advance simply
to assert that the choice of contrast is not entirely “up to us” in moral and
legal contexts: to justify the weight we put on selection in those contexts, we
need to say something more about what does determine choice of contrast.
Second, there is no very obvious candidate for a pragmatic theory answer-
ing these needs. When devising a pragmatic account, obvious places to look
for inspiration include Searle’s theory of speech acts (Searle 1969, 1975) and
Grice’s theory of conversational implicature (Grice 1975, 1978). It is hard to
see how a theory of speech acts would be directly relevant to our present prob-
lem. Grice’s work might be more directly useful, concerned as it is with the
distinction between the strictly true and the true-but-misleading. To say that
the presence of oxygen caused the flame might be false but misleading; and
indeed this Gricean picture is the one Lewis suggests (Lewis 2004a, 101). This
general remark, however, does not amount to an account of the pragmatics
of causal selection. It is far from obvious how the Gricean maxims are to be
applied to generate such an account (Menzies 2004, 147), and some of the
notions appearing in the maxims, such as the notion of relevance, might seem
uncomfortably similar to what we had hoped to analyse.
Switching our attention to the objection from justifying moral and legal
practices, we might pretheoretically suppose that the fact about who caused
the warehouse to burn is to be settled by principles which are not moral or legal.
It is a factual question, we might think. A pragmatic account of contrast choice
might violate this pretheoretic supposition, if the principles governing selection
in moral and legal contexts differed from those in other contexts. This would be
the most natural way for a pragmatist to account for the flexibility of selection.
But it would be problematic. We might, on reflection, admit that the moral or
legal context determines a different selection from, say, a scientific explanatory
context. But we do not, I think, normally suppose that there are special moral
or legal principles of selection. We admit that causal selection is flexible,
and that our interests are determining factors; but it does not follow that any
special principles apply in moral or legal contexts. If they did, the justificatory
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problem would become pressing, because moral and legal evaluation of facts
is naively supposed to take place after, and independently of, those facts. But
on such a picture, those facts would be determined by principles which were
specific to the moral and legal context. This is a particularly strong kind of
context-dependence: the kind that we normally accept, I suggest, implies only
that context plays a determining role in causal selection, having some sort of
input — not that it also supplies the principles governing that determination.
These criticisms of the pragmatic/contrastive account need to be stated
with care. The initial criticism of the contrastive account is that, without
an account of contrast choice, it provides an incomplete account of causal
selection. The need for an account of contrast choice is not felt by many (but
see Menzies 2004). Presumably this is because the pragmatic considerations
that govern it, however difficult to state, are thought to be neither especially
problematic nor especially interesting. My main argument against such a view
is to insist that it leaves our account incomplete. There are two ways I want
to avoid being misunderstood. First, I do not want to be taken as questioning
the flexibility of selection. The suggestion that selection includes a pragmatic
element should be sharply distinguished from the suggestion that it is flexible,
meaning that we will select different things in different contexts. The latter
is an evident fact. If the appeal to pragmatics is taken as a mere restatement
of this fact, as I think it sometimes is, then obviously it is no analysis. If, on
the other hand, it is taken as an analysis of the flexibility of selection, then it
is inadequate because no theory has been provided. Second, I do not want to
be taken as saying that there can be no pragmatic account of contrast choice.
Rather, I am suggesting that no account has been given. Lewis gestures at an
account in terms of conversational implicature, but he does not provide one.
At this stage, I do not want to claim anything stronger than that no adequate
account of contrast choice has been provided, and thus that the contrastive
account of selection is incomplete. Once I have proposed my own account, I will
be in a position to make the stronger claim, that the pragmatic/contrastive
account is explanatorily suboptimal with respect to the objections we have
considered.
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4.4 The Reverse Counterfactual
4.4.1 Contrast Choice and Counterfactuals
Suppose we accept that the mechanism of causal selection is contrastive, and
ask: What determines the choice of contrast? I strike a match, and it lights.
On the contrastive account, the reason we select the strike as the cause of the
flame is that we entertain a contrast between this situation, in which the match
lights, and certain others, in which it does not light, but in which oxygen is
still present. The question, then, is why we pick this contrast rather than a
contrast where the match is still struck but the oxygen is absent. The strength
of the contrastive approach is that it allows that we sometimes do pick such a
contrast; the weakness is that it gives no indication of how or why.
At this point, instead of crying “pragmatics”, let us remember Menzies’
point about the concept of difference-making. Causes are widely considered to
make a difference to their effects: on Lewis’s account, the difference they make
by occurring is between the effect occurring and not. But when we ask which,
among these events, is the cause, we might be understood as asking what
makes, not just a difference, but the difference. Then the question is: The
difference between what and what? One obvious answer might be: between
the effect occurring, and the counterfactual scenario in which the effect does
not occur. Contrast thus specified, the rest of the process occurs as described
by the contrastive account. The difference between the case where the effect
occurs, and the contrast case where it does not, is selected as the cause. There
may be more differences than we mention, so an appeal to pragmatics may be
ineliminable; but we have significantly confined its role.
The idea, in short, is that the contrast case is often just the closest pos-
sible world in which the effect does not occur. I shall propose an account
based on this idea, and argue that it answers the objections raised against the
contrastive/pragmatic strategy.
4.4.2 The Difference Between Cause and Condition
I now propose a counterfactual which is true of causes and not true of mere
conditions. The counterfactual is arrived at by reversing the Lewisian coun-
terfactual, to yield:
The Reverse Counterfactual Necessary Condition on Cau-
sation
4.4. THE REVERSE COUNTERFACTUAL 87
If c causes e then ∼ E >∼ C.
Call the counterfactual in this necessary condition the Reverse Counterfactual.
Clearly the Reverse Counterfactual will often be a backtracking counterfactual
— one whose antecedent denotes something temporally later than the conse-
quent. Lewis and others have given backtrackers a bad name, but I view them
more favourably, for reasons indicated in Chapters 2 and 3.
I strike a match in a warm, dry room, and it lights. I assert that if the
match hadn’t lit, then I wouldn’t have struck it. In support, suppose you come
into the room to find me holding a lighted match. Now ask what you would
have thought, had the match not been lit. Unless you have reason to think
otherwise, you would assume I had not struck the match. To dispute this is
to question the reliability of matches quite generally, any time they light; a
perverse scepticism, belied by their usefulness. (This is an application of the
Inference Test.)
Immediately it will be objected that, if the match hadn’t lit, perhaps I
would still have struck it, but clumsily, without sufficient force or speed. After
all, matches don’t always light. I think this is not an objection, but indicates
an advantage of the account. For what we must say to get round the apparent
objection is that, from an unlit match, we would infer that the match was not
struck well — not hard enough, not fast enough, or some such. These factors
are indeed part of the cause of the flame: they are causally relevant. It is
no harm if the Reverse Counterfactual identifies them as such. For when we
say the match was not struck well, we are not introducing an endless ceteris
paribus clause, including all the necessary conditions for the flame, as we shall
now see.
The Reverse Counterfactual sharply differentiates the striking of the match
from the presence of oxygen. There is no reason to suppose that if the match
had not lit, there would have been no oxygen in the room. In this particular
case of a match lighting, in this warm, dry, airy room, we do not infer the
absence of oxygen from an unlit match. So we cannot use that manner of
argument to support the claim that, if the match had not lit, the room would
have suddenly evacuated. Nor does this counterfactual have any intuitive
plausibility.
The contrast can be brought out sharply in worlds-talk. It is, at least,
arguable that the nearest worlds5 where there is no flame are worlds where
5Here and at other points I make the Limit Assumption. This is purely for the sake of
exposition. The Limit Assumption plays no role in the account.
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there is no match-strike. Whereas it is not plausible that the nearest worlds
where there is no flame are worlds where there is no oxygen.
4.4.3 Flexibility
Perhaps the most obvious question we might ask about this proposal is whether
it can account for the flexibility of selection. It has been heavily emphasised
that what we select depends on context, both of inquiry and of occurrence.
To reflect this flexibility, the Reverse Counterfactual must be true of different
events in different contexts. It must explain why we are sometimes willing to
say that the presence of oxygen caused the flame rather than the match-strike,
and why we sometimes unselectively allow that they are both causes.
The Reverse Counterfactual, like any other counterfactual, depends both
on context of inquiry and on context of occurrence. As a result it can explain
the flexibility of causal selection relative to both kinds of context. In 3.1 we
saw that counterfactuals are relative to the context of inquiry: depending on
the conversation, we change our views about whether Caesar would have used
the atom bomb or catapults had he been in charge in Korea.
But this is not relativity to context of occurrence: what changes our views
of the counterfactuals in that case is a shift of conversational context, not a
difference between the context in which some actual event occurs and that in
which some other actual event occurs. I suggest we understand relativity of a
counterfactual to context of occurrence as follows. A counterfactual∼ A >∼ C
is relative to context of occurrence just in case:
• the counterfactual ∼ A >∼ C has a different truth value to ∼ A′ >∼ C ′,
where
• a and a′ are actual events of the same kind, as are c and c′.
We need only a very weak notion of “same kind”: the events need not be
exactly similar; rather, they must be similar enough, such that the reason for
giving different truth-values to the two counterfactuals is not that the events
concerned are different. I suggest that counterfactuals are relative to context of
occurrence, in the sense given. The context in which the events they mention
occur is a determining factor of the truth-value of the counterfactual.
The point is obvious when we consider an example:
If I hadn’t pressed the light switch, the light wouldn’t have lit.
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Consider this counterfactual in relation to two events. First, I am on my
own at home and I switch the light on as dusk approaches. In that case, it
seems that if I hadn’t pressed the light switch, the light wouldn’t have lit.6
Second, suppose my wife is at home too. In that case, we might suppose that
if I hadn’t pressed the light switch, she might have done; so it is false that,
if I hadn’t pressed the light switch, the light wouldn’t have come on. This
counterfactual, then, is true of one occurrence when I am home alone, and
false of a similar occurrence when I have company. The point is also obvious
on Lewis’s semantics. If I am on my own in the house, the closest worlds where
I don’t press the switch are ones where the light stays off; whereas if my wife
is at home, at least some of them are worlds where she switches the lights on.
It seems, then, that counterfactuals are relative to the context of occurrence.
Hence the Reverse Counterfactual account makes causal selection relative to
the context of occurrence.
Since it is a counterfactual, therefore, the Reverse Counterfactual depends
on both context of inquiry and on context of occurrence. Now the question is:
Does it do so in the same way as causal selection? First, consider this same
match-strike, in a warm dry room, from the perspective of a chemistry lesson.
In that case, we might well also pick the oxygen as a cause. I suggest that
we explain this by saying that the context of that chemistry lesson determines
a resolution of vagueness on which the closest no-flame worlds include worlds
without oxygen (though perhaps to complete this story we need an account of
joint causes, given in 4.5.2 below). Second, consider a match-strike suitably
similar to this one, but occurring in a different context: a chamber that is
ordinarily oxygen-free (perhaps as part of some manufacturing process). On
this occasion, oxygen has leaked in, so when the match lights we cite the oxygen
as the cause of the flame (cf. Hart and Honore 1985, 10). I suggest that this,
too, is reflected by the Reverse Counterfactual. We select the oxygen in this
situation because the nearest worlds where there is no flame are ones where
the match is still struck, but the oxygen is absent as usual.7
6Of course, it is possible that the light could have come on some other way, but that is
the stuff of thrillers and ghost stories — thrillers if someone else turns out to be present
after all, ghost stories otherwise. This point just emphasises the way context of occurrence
affects the truth of the counterfactual.
7It might be objected that, in citing the Reverse Counterfactual as an explanation of
our selective practices, I am relying on an implied claim that the Reverse Counterfactual is
sufficient for causation (whereas officially, I maintain that it is necessary but not sufficient).
I owe this objection to Arif Ahmed. The correct reply, I think, is that the objection artifi-
cially restricts the explanans. Spelled out, my claim is not that the Reverse Counterfactual
explains causal selection: rather, it is that the fact that the Reverse Counterfactual is a
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It seems, then, that the Reverse Counterfactual can provide an account
of the flexibility of selection. The reason is that counterfactuals depend on
context. So my suggestion amounts to this: that the principles governing
the context-dependence of causal selection are just those which govern the
context-dependence of counterfactuals. This is not quite the whole story about
flexibility, and we will discuss it further in 4.6.1. But before we do that, let
us consider how an account of this shape handles the objections we considered
against the contrastive account (4.4.4), and then flesh out the details of the
proposal (4.5).
4.4.4 Two Objections Answered
If this is right, then we have a distinction between cause and condition: we can
only show the Reverse Counterfactual to be true of the cause, and not of mere
conditions. Does this account of selection handle the objections raised in 4.3.2?
Both those objections pushed the point that, if selection is to be accounted
for contrastively, then an account of contrast choice needs to be included,
and in 4.3.3 I argued that appeals to pragmatics were neither adequate in
their current form, nor particularly promising. The Reverse Counterfactual is
equivalent to the contrastive strategy plus the claim that the contrast is just
the contextually appropriate counterfactual situation (nearest possible world).
As such, it provides an answer to the general problem which those objections
pushed, because it implies an account of contrast choice. That is the general
answer: let us see how the proposal answers the two specific lines of objection
which were intended to push that point.
The Reverse Counterfactual answers the objection that the contrastive ac-
count is insufficiently explanatory. Menzies noted that the notion of difference-
making is employed twice, on the contrastive account: “first in the analysis of
‘objective cause’ as something that makes a counterfactual difference; and then
again in the contrastive explanation account of the ‘context-sensitive cause” ’
(Menzies 2004, 150). The proposed account achieves greater theoretical unity,
necessary condition on causation explains causal selection. In offering my analysis as an
explanation, I may indeed be relying on a claim that a certain fact (namely, the truth of
my analysis) in some sense suffices for causation to be selective. But that reliance does not
amount to (and in fact is incompatible with) suggesting that the Reverse Counterfactual
itself is sufficient for causal selection. By way of analogy, the claim that counterfactual
reliability is necessary for knowledge might be advanced as an explanation for the fact that
we tend not to regard counterfactually insensitive beliefs as knowledge (if indeed that is a
fact). Clearly, this would not imply that counterfactual sensitivity of belief is also sufficient
for knowledge.
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however, since it applies the notion of difference-making in only the counter-
factual way. Causes make the difference to their effects; I have suggested that
causes make the difference by being the difference between the actual case
where the effect occurs and the counterfactual case where it does not. (Which
case this will be depends on context, of course, as discussed in 4.4.3.) Relat-
edly, this feature answers the objection to the contrastive account that it makes
selection doubly dependent on context: first for resolving the vagueness of the
Lewisian-causal counterfactuals, and then in determining the selection among
those counterfactuals. Context-dependent selection between true counterfactu-
als should not be confused with context-dependence of counterfactuals. The
Reverse Counterfactual considerably reduces the role of former in accounting
for causal selection.
I suggested that the prediction/explanation symmetry could be employed
to bring out the explanatory shortcomings of the contrastive account. It can
equally be employed to bring out the explanatory successes of the Reverse
Counterfactual. The Reverse Counterfactual yields concrete predictions about
the events we will select as the cause in a given context. We saw this just now:
the argument that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of the match strike and
false of the presence of oxygen amounts to a theoretical prediction. If cases
can be found where the Reverse Counterfactual appears to be true of a mere
condition, or false of the event we select as the cause, then we will need to
revise or abandon the approach. I take it that this falsifiability is a further
point in favour of the proposal over the contrastive account; it is hard to see
how a contrastive account could be vulnerable to such counterexamples while
the pragmatic account of contrast choice remains schematic.
The objection from moral and legal justification is also well-handled by the
Reverse Counterfactual. Our arsonist might object that the builder is just as
much a cause of the fire, and thus that we are treating her unfairly in sending
her to prison. The first way in which the Reverse Counterfactual offers a su-
perior justification for imprisoning the arsonist is simply that it offers a better
explanation of this particular selection. Since there is a naive supposition that
justice is not arbitrary, justification will be served by explanation. I have just
argued that the Reverse Counterfactual is explanatorily superior to the con-
trastive account. We can reply to the arsonist that the builder is not the cause
of the fire: given the circumsances, it was the arsonist, and not the builder,
who made the difference between the fire and no fire.
To contest this point, the arsonist would need to argue that the builder
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made as much of a difference. This argument is of the same kind as the debate
which might arise about whether Caesar would have used catapults or the
atom bomb in Korea. Debates of this sort are not confined to the moral or
legal context. We have, I suggest, a considerably improved justification for
sending the arsonist to prison if we can reduce the debate to a kind which is
not specific to the moral or legal sphere. For in those spheres, there is a naive
requirement that fact and evaluation should be distinct. We do not, in moral
and legal contexts, think that the arsonist caused the fire for moral or legal
purposes. We think she caused the fire, independent of any moral and legal
evaluation: and that is why we condemn her morally and legally.
The Reverse Counterfactual does not eliminate context-dependence of se-
lection, but it offers a unified account of the way in which selection depends
on context. There is no special kind of consideration which comes into play in
moral or legal contexts; there are no special moral or legal principles of selec-
tion. It is just the same kind of consideration that comes into play in other,
non-moral and non-legal contexts, such as the context of lighting a match in
a warm, dry room. I suggest that this considerably helps to justify selection
in moral and legal contexts. Selection might still depend on the moral or le-
gal context, but that is nothing special about selection for moral and legal
purposes: selection always depends on context, whatever kind of context it is.
4.5 Refinements
4.5.1 Absent Causes
We have defended the Reverse Counterfactual with regard to a couple of ex-
amples. Granting that the initial defence is successful, we should ask whether
results obtained by considering these examples are likely to generalise. One
obvious potentially non-general feature of the examples is that they are some-
things, not nothings. If we wish to allow causation by absences, we should
check the Reverse Counterfactual against an example of causation by absence.
Suppose I fail to water the plant on my window-sill, and it wilts. Normally we
would say that it was my failure, not yours, nor the Queen’s, which caused the
plant to wilt. The Reverse Counterfactual agrees. If the plant had not wilted,
I would have watered it; but it is false that if the plant had not wilted, you
would have watered it — after all, you probably don’t even know where I live.
And it seems at least as far-fetched that Her Majesty would have paid a visit.
We can support the Reverse Counterfactual, and undermine the others, by the
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Inference Test. If, in these circumstances, my plant had not wilted, then (if
you somehow came to hear of it) you would infer that I had been watering the
plant, and you would neither infer that the Queen, nor that you yourself, had
watered it.8
It is sometimes thought that allowing absences as causes opens up an enor-
mous can of worms, especially on Lewis’s view: for in any given case there
is a truly huge number of absences which, had they been presences, would
have prevented the effect. This motivates Beebee, for example, to deny that
absences cause.
There is no genuine causal difference between those cases that com-
mon sense judges to be cases of causation by absence and those that
it judges not to be cases of causation by absence.
(Beebee 2004, 293)
Beebee offers a critique of various solutions to the question of how we select
the putatively causal absence from among a series of increasingly outlandish
absences which, had they been presences, would have prevented the effect. For
example:
One of the causes of your reading these words right now is the
absence of a lion from the room.
(Beebee 2004, 298)
As far as Beebee can tell, efforts to prevent results like this all fail.9 The
absurdity of a view which licenses assertions like the one above is a significant
factor driving Beebee to adopt the opposite view, that no absences cause.
There may be reasons to deny that absences cause (cf. Lewis 2004b, Men-
zies 2002), but it should be pointed out that the problem of selection is not
one of them. For then parity of reasoning would dictate that we deny that
presences cause, since they too suffer from the problem of selection. Perhaps
the problem is not as severe, in the sense that there are fewer positive mere
conditions (consisting of actual events or states of affairs) than there are neg-
ative ones (consisting of the absence of possible states of affairs). But it is far
from clear that the severity of the problem is directly proportional to the num-
ber of conditions. One of the things which, I argued, makes selection difficult
8I am indebted to Kit Patrick for first alerting me to the possibility that the Reverse
Counterfactual might help with selection among causal absences [Patrick, 2005].
9The efforts she criticises do not bear much resemblance to mine: she focuses on the
special event strategy of Hart and Honore.
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to explain is the moral and legal weight we put on it. I argued that point by
comparing the imprisonment of an arsonist with just one alternative, the im-
prisonment of the builder. It is not immediately clear that explaining a choice
among more alternatives is any harder than explaining this choice between
just two. In any case, selecting the cause among positive mere conditions is
often of great importance; it is not clear that ruling out mere conditions that
are absences is more important.
Moreover, at least one solution — the Reverse Counterfactual — to the
problem of selection among presences will generalise to absences, as I have
just argued. There may be good independent, perhaps theoretical reasons to
deny that absences cause, but our present concern is to map our ordinary
concept of causation with counterfactuals, and in this context absences seem
as apt as presences to count as causes. There is no special problem of selection
for causal absences, and no special solution either.
4.5.2 Joint Causes
Another notable feature of the examples we have been working with is that
they are not cases of joint causation. In joint causation, the Reverse Counter-
factual is false of each of the jointly-causal events. Suppose you and I together
lift a table. Assuming we are both similarly motivated (or similarly lazy), and
assuming we are both up to the task, then there is no particular reason to
say that, if the table had not risen, you would not have lifted: for you might
have done, and I might not have. The same goes for me. The Reverse Coun-
terfactual is therefore false of both our efforts; yet we presumably consider
ourselves to have together caused the table to lift. We distinguish our efforts
from the continued solidity of the ground, which is a mere condition of our
accomplishment in this case.10
The obvious solution is to say that if the table hadn’t risen, then at least
one of us would not have lifted, and thus that ∼ E >∼ (C1&...Cn) where
c1, ..., cn jointly cause e. Unfortunately, however, if we allow that counterfac-
tuals with conjunctions for may satisfy the necessary condition on causation
imposed by the Reverse Counterfactual, we have an immediate problem. For
any propositions P and Q, ∼ (P&Q) follows from ∼ P . So any conjunction
will qualify as the cause of any effect, provided the real cause is one of the
conjuncts. If the match had not lit, then it would not be the case that I struck
the match and you scratched your ear. But my strike causes the flame without
10In the following solution I am indebted to Torben Rees.
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any assistance from your scratch.
To block this difficulty we could seek to disallow counterfactuals with con-
junctive consequents. But that would rule out the proposed account of joint
causation. Therefore I suggest we further stipulate that each conjunct must
figure ineliminably. So if c1, ..., cn are joint causes of e then (i) ∼ E >∼
(C1&...Cn) and (ii) for every non-empty proper subset {cx, ..., cy} of {c1, ..., cn},
∼ (∼ E >∼ (Cx&...Cy)). That is, there must be no proper subset of the
candidate joint cause which itself meets the condition initially proposed for
qualifying as the joint cause. If there is, then the others are eliminable.
For example, you help me lift a table: we jointly cause it to rise. If the
table had not risen, then it is not the case that both you and I would have
lifted. However we cannot, with confidence, say that you would not have lifted,
nor that I would not have lifted. Thus neither of our lifts qualifies on its own
(so neither is eliminable). This appears reasonable and intuitive. Moreover
it is supported by the reasoning which led us to conclude that the Reverse
Counterfactual failed for joint causes: for that turned on noticing that we
could not say that if the table hadn’t risen, you wouldn’t have lifted, because
if the table hadn’t risen then you might have, but I might not have, and vice
versa. Finally, note that the solidity of the ground fails the condition. In the
circumstances we would surely agree it is false that, if the table had not lifted,
the ground might have given way. Otherwise the menial task would acquire a
new urgency.
4.5.3 Mere Conditions
We have given an account of the difference between cause and mere condition.
But we have given no account of the difference between a mere condition and
a causally irrelevant event. Endorsing a selective notion of causation does not
mean denying that the presence of oxygen is relevant to the lighting of the
match in a way that the football results fail to be. I suggest that a condition
d1 for an event e is just a counterfactually necessary condition: that is, an event
d1 satisfying the Lewisian counterfactual, ∼ D1 >∼ E. A mere condition can
then be defined as a condition which fails to satisfy the Reverse Counterfactual:
that is, a condition which is not the cause.
One consequence of this view is that the cause c of an event e might not
be a condition for e at all. For it does not follow from ∼ E >∼ C that ∼
C >∼ E. This feature of the account will be exploited in Chapter 6 to provide
a solution to preemption counterexamples, and overdetermination problems
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more generally, which arise directly from the fact that causes are not always
counterfactually necessary conditions for their effects.
We might wonder, however, whether this view of the cause/condition differ-
ence is too extreme. What, if any, is the connection between the two notions?
Intuitively, a mere condition is still causal. On my account, the cause is given
by the Reverse Counterfactual, which is false of mere conditions; what, then,
makes mere conditions causal? Another way to push the same point would be
to ask about the notion of causal relevance. Presumably both causes and mere
conditions are causally relevant to their effect, yet I am suggesting entirely
distinct criteria for causehood and mere conditionhood. What, then, is the
nature of the causal relevance which — intuitively — they share?
The obvious answer is the disjunctive one: c is causally relevant to e just in
case c is a condition or a cause of e. Except that they both satisfy a counter-
factual, they have nothing more in common. I do not think this is a problem.
Lewis held up the prospect of analysing all of causation with a single coun-
terfactual, but given the complexity of causal concepts and the range of uses
to which we put them, we should perhaps not be surprised if a counterfactual
analysis of causation must appeal to more than one counterfactual. Moreover,
the fact that Lewis’s account of causation is so radically unselective strongly
suggests that he achieved such a unified analysis at the expense of part of what
he was analysing.11
A further point can be adduced in support of the idea that being a cause is
something different from being a condition (mere or otherwise). The Reverse
Counterfactual might be thought of as making causes counterfactually suffi-
cient for their effects, in a certain sense (to be clarified in 6.1). In that case
we can explain why causes are often also conditions. If c is counterfactually
sufficient for e, and if there is nothing else that is counterfactually sufficient
for e, then c will be counterfactually necessary for e (since, if nothing else will
suffice for e, then without c, e would not occur). Thus causes will also be con-
ditions when there is no kind of causal redundancy. This would explain why,
by our lights, Lewis mistook conditions for causes. It would also explain why
11There is obviously a great deal more to say about causal relevance. Kvart suggests that
we should employ a notion of causal relevance in analysing counterfactuals (cf. Kvart 1986,
1991, 1994). Consequently, analysing causal relevance in terms of counterfactuals “put[s]
the cart before the horse” (Kvart 1994, 98). Nevertheless, I do not think our views need
be incompatible. All I claim here is that causal relevance has counterfactual entailments —
that is, that counterfactual dependence of some sort or another is a necessary condition on
causal relevance. This is consistent both with analysing counterfactuals in terms of causal
relevance and with my defence of the Reverse Counterfactual as a necessary condition for
causation (see Chapter 7).
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his analysis struggles with redundancy of various kinds. For c can be the cause
of e even when it fails to be a condition, and cases of redundancy are exactly
cases where c causes e without being a condition for e. This must count in
favour of my contention that causes need not be among the conditions for an
effect. It will also provide the starting point for our discussion of redundancy
in Chapter 6.
4.5.4 A Principled Argument
The Reverse Counterfactual has been defended and developed with respect to
a particular example, but I have also stressed its connection with the quite
general idea that causes make the difference to their effects. Now that I have
proposed my account, let us revisit that idea.
The underlying thought is that it is implausible to maintain that some event
caused another without maintaining that its occurrence made the difference
between the occurrence of the effect and its failure to occur. That thought is
widely accepted,12 and on its own it does not presuppose a selective notion of
causation: Lewis’s account can be seen as specifying that an event c makes the
difference to e just in case, if c hadn’t happened, e wouldn’t have happened.
It follows that a lot of events make the difference to any given effect.
I have suggested a different understanding of difference-making, however:
that an event makes the difference by being the difference between the actual
case and the counterfactual scenario where the effect would not occur. This
view seems, to me, implicit to some degree in various other authors: in Mill’s
Method of Difference [Mill, 1887], in Mackie’s remarks about causes and effects
being differences relative to a causal field (Mackie 1974), in Lipton’s Difference
Condition on contrastive causal explanation [Lipton, 2004], and even in Lewis’s
account of contrastive causal explanation [Lewis, 1986b]. But if the view I
propose is correct — if an event makes the difference by being the difference
between the case where the effect occurs and the counterfactual scenario where
it does not — then the Reverse Counterfactual must, in principle, be true of
all causes. For it is just the counterfactual supposition described — supposing
what would be the case if the effect hadn’t occurred.
“The” counterfactual supposition is of course a misnomer, because coun-
terfactuals are vague; in a given case, the appropriate counterfactual scenario
(possible world) for determining the truth of the counterfactual will depend on
12For example: Mill 1887, Mackie 1974, Lewis 1973a, Hart and Honore 1985, Lipton 1993,
Menzies 2004, Schaffer 2005.
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context of inquiry and of occurrence, as we have discussed, in just the way that
the vagueness of counterfactuals is always resolved. I have already indicated
how this allows us to account for the flexibility of causal selection. Now that
I have filled in some of the details of the account, let us consider some more
general questions about it. We shall consider the relation between the Reverse
Counterfactual and contrastive explanation (4.6.1). This discussion will be
useful in rebutting an objection, due to Peter Lipton, that the Reverse Coun-
terfactual cannot match the flexibility of our causal selective practices (4.6.2).
Then we will briefly compare the Reverse Counterfactual with a proposal of
Peter Menzies’ — another account seeking to assimilate the context-sensitivity
of selection to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals (4.6.3).
4.6 Objections and Comparisons
4.6.1 The Reverse Counterfactual and Contrast
Despite constituting a rejection of the strategy of assimilating causal selection
to contrastive causal explanation, the Reverse Counterfactual account of se-
lection shares the key idea behind the contrastive approach: that the cause
is what “makes the difference”. From this fact, I hope to draw some support
for the Reverse Counterfactual account of selection, and to explain both the
successes and the shortcomings of the attempted extension of the contrastive
mechanism from causal explanation to causal selection.
Although I am advocating a radically selective account of causation, this
is entirely compatible with citing mere conditions in causal explanation. The
beaker of water boiled because I lit a bunsen burner under it. Nevertheless I
might explain the boiling of the water in terms of the molecular structure of
water and the atmospheric pressure, because the chemistry lesson makes that
appropriate. I already suggested that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of the
atmospheric pressure in such a situation, because of the way it depends upon
context. There is, however, another point to be made. Sometimes, explanation
and causation may come apart. The cause is not always the explanation. The
teacher will explain a flame by appealing to the presence of oxygen. Yet even
chemistry teachers will not generally accept the presence of oxygen to have
caused the small bonfire at the end of the bench.
The Reverse Counterfactual is, as we have seen, equivalent to the con-
trastive account of selection plus a counterfactual account of contrast choice.
This means that it fits very neatly with a contrastive account of causal ex-
4.6. OBJECTIONS AND COMPARISONS 99
planation. Normally, on the view I am proposing, the choice of contrast is
determined by the nearest possible worlds, and which worlds are nearest de-
pends on context in the ways we have discussed. When we explain, however,
we might be seen as manipulating the standards governing which worlds are
nearest. One way to do this is by specifying a contrast. For example, ask-
ing “Why did the match light?” naturally yields the answer, “Because it was
struck”. If, however, we ask, “Why did the match light, rather than not light-
ing, when it was struck?”, we have, as it were, manually adjusted the context
so as to ignore the most obvious counterfactual scenario where the match is not
lit. The striking of the match has been specified as occurring in the relevant
antecedent-worlds. Now we are asked to look for the nearest counterfactual
scenario where the match does not light, but was still struck. Assuming, as I
think is legitimate, that we hold constant other features of the ordinary match-
strike — the dryness of the match, the competence of the striker — we arrive
at worlds where there is no oxygen.
If this is correct, then we have shown how the contrastive account of expla-
nation fits with the proposed account of causal selection. And more excitingly,
we have found an answer to one of the questions we started with. For we can
now see why causation is used as a selector in explanation. We use causation
to select in explanation because causation is selective. Contrastive causal ex-
planation is a way we have of extending the selective aspect of causation to
identify events which are not the cause, but which are causally relevant.
4.6.2 When the Cause is Counterfactually Stable
We might be suspicious of the suggestion that the cause is always the most
counterfactually “fragile” event — the one that is absent in the nearest worlds
where the effect is absent.13 Might there not be examples where the event we
call the cause is not, after all, the event which is absent in the counterfactual
scenario? Suppose we are attempting to measure background radiation. We
achieve a reading, and say that the cause of the reading was background ra-
diation. However, if we had achieved a wild reading or no reading at all, we
would have inferred some problem with the equipment, and certainly not that
the background radiation was markedly different from what was previously
thought.14
13This sense of “fragile” is meant to aid understanding, and is not the Lewisian technical
sense, on which an event’s fragility is a measure of the richness of its essence (Lewis 1986a,
196).
14The objection and counterexample I owe to Peter Lipton.
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Scientific experiments are often like this, and put pressure on the manner
of arguing from inference which I have employed, since they are contexts where
what we infer may vary depending on the outcome of the experiment. A good
reading would be taken to confirm the presence of background radiation, but a
bad one would lead us to infer that the equipment is not working. In addition,
we might wonder what sort of semantics of counterfactuals could ever yield
the result that a world where background radiation is absent is closer than one
where a delicate piece of equipment malfunctions.
In response, I suggest that there is a quite ordinary sense, in which the good
reading may naturally be said to be caused by correctly functioning equipment,
just as the bad reading may be said to be caused by poorly functioning equip-
ment. That is why the scientists who first measured background radiation
were so proud: they had, in a very obvious sense, caused the readings. They
made the difference between readings and no readings. But the background
radiation did not: it would have been present, surely, regardless of whether
it had ever been successfully measured. On the other hand, if we assume the
equipment is functioning correctly, then the background radiation does make
the difference between reading and no reading. In the context in which we
say that the radiation caused the reading, we hold constant the working of
the equipment and a range of other local conditions — even per imposibile,
and even if we don’t know what they all are. Then the radiation makes the
difference between reading and no reading; and then, if there had not been a
reading, there would have been no radiation.
This example serves further to clarify the relation between mere conditions
and causes. What is a mere condition in one context of inquiry may be a
cause in another. I have suggested that the context-sensitivity of the Reverse
Counterfactual reflects this fact. The example also shows how contrastive
explanation extends the selective aspect of causation. We do not need to
specify or even know about all the factors which determine the truth value of
the Reverse Counterfactual in the context of this experiment. But one obvious
way we might manipulate those factors, communicate how we understand them
and direct the interests of others, is by specifying contrasts. Thus I might
contrast the reading with the lack of a reading on the same properly functioning
piece of equipment, in order to direct your attention away from the possibility
of mechanical error and towards the phenomenon we are seeking to measure.
Nor is it an accident, I think, that this counterexample should be alleged
in an experimental context, where explanation is a prominent interest. The
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claim that the radiation causes the reading is arguably a causal explanation
in disguise, rather than denoting the particular cause of this particular event.
The experimental context is a highly developed and consciously refined con-
text of inquiry, deliberately constructed to enable us to isolate what would,
normally, be mere conditions. In the experimental context, it may be the case
that if the reading had been different, then the radiation would have been
different. Contrasts are a simple and powerful way to manually adjust the
context-dependence of counterfactuals.15
Thus asserting that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of causes might also
help account for the success of the Difference Condition on contrastive causal
explanation. That condition requires that a good explanation be a relevant
causal difference between the explanandum and some contrast. When the
contrast is simply the nearest counterfactual situation where the explanandum
does not occur, as in many salient cases it will be, the Reverse Counterfactual
picks out as the cause an event which the Difference Condition picks out as a
good explanation. The contrastive account of selection sees causal selection as
an extension of the selective mechanism employed by explanation of a certain
sort. The approach I am advocating sees the situation the other way round: the
contrastive account of explanation extends the selective aspect of causation,
to cover cases where our explanatory interest is not in the cause, but in a
mere condition. It effectively generalises the selective mechanism of our causal
concept. The selective aspect of causation is part of the reason why it is a
useful explanatory tool.
4.6.3 Menzies’ Causal Models
My account of causal selection seeks to account for the flexibility of selection
by assimilating it to the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals. It is widely ac-
cepted that counterfactuals are sensitive to the context of inquiry, and I have
argued that they are also sensitive to the context of occurrence — a point which
I think is fairly obvious. Menzies takes causal selection seriously, and rejects
15Lipton discusses the possibility that contrasts might be a special way of resolving the
vagueness of counterfactuals so as to allow backtrackers (Lipton 1993). He notes that if
something more substantive could be said about how contrasts resolve vagueness to allow
backtrackers, his account of contrastive explanation could employ backtrackers and thus
would move closer to Lewis’s. I have argued that vagueness is not at issue, and that we can
endorse backtrackers directly, in standard contexts. The place I envisage for contrast is as
helping specify which antecedent-worlds we are interested in — a particularly useful tool
with which we can cut through a lot of the inherent vagueness of counterfactuals, whether
foretracking or backtracking.
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the contrastive strategy, as we have seen. He also seeks to account for causal se-
lection “by giving an account of difference-making in terms of context-sensitive
counterfactuals” (Menzies 2004, 178). His idea is to make causal judgements
relative to causal models, which are a technical elaboration of Mackie’s idea of
a causal field. Causal models determine their own similarity-ranking among
possible worlds, Menzies suggests. His discussion is sophisticated and I shall
not expound the details here, but the nub of it is that to be a cause, an event
c must satisfy both ∼ C >∼ E and C > E (Menzies 2004, 170–1). Mere
conditions will satisfy the former condition, but fail the latter, if we drop the
Centering Assumption, which Menzies says we should (Menzies 2004, 166).
Then it is likely false that in all the nearest possible worlds (relative to a given
causal model) where the oxygen is present, the match lights.
Apart from its complexity, which I have suppressed in my thumbnail sketch,
this solution has two serious drawbacks. The first is that rejecting the Center-
ing Assumption is a serious business. I have argued (Chapter 3) that endorsing
backtrackers does not constitute a serious departure from Lewis’s semantic the-
ory — the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is a further thesis, which
can be dropped or modified. Dropping the Centering Assumption, on the
other hand, means either abandoning or supplementing the idea that counter-
factuals are to be analysed in terms of comparative similarity between worlds.
Although philosophers are rather sanguine about dropping the Centering As-
sumption when it suits them (as I mentioned in 2.2.2), it bears emphasis that
no analysis of counterfactuals in terms of non-comparative similarity between
worlds has gained currency. Until such an analysis is advanced, any account
which rejects the Centering Assumption incurs serious losses, and must score
highly in other respects if it is to be preferred to an account which is compatible
with the Centering Assumption.
Second, the causal model account does not seem to perform especially well
against the objections we considered against the contrastive account. It is
hard to see how it generates any real predictions. We are free to stipulate
that, when I strike a match in a warm dry room, the causal model consists
in a certain set of worlds, such that the match-strike is a difference among
them whereas the oxygen is not. But it is hard to see how this amounts to
a prediction: without a substantive theory of non-comparative similarity, we
can say what we want about which worlds are closer, and we will be almost
immune to challenge. I have suggested that this indicates a lack of explanatory
power. Likewise, the suggestion that selection is relative to a causal model does
4.7. SUMMARY 103
not fully explain the moral and legal weight we put on it, unless we can say
something further about what gives rise to the causal model. Menzies focuses
on the way causal models generate spheres of “normal worlds” against which
differences are made (Menzies 2004, 160–69), and does not emphasise any
particular problem with the origin of causal models. But my arguments about
the generation of contrasts apply equally to causal models: in accounting for
ordinary selective practices, it is essential that we understand, not merely how
causal models (or contrasts) give rise to selections, but what gives rise to causal
models (or contrasts) in the first place. Menzies denies that he is committed
to a “crude relativism” on which causation is mind-dependent, and he denies
that all causal models are as good as each other because of the existence of
natural kinds: but he accepts that “a plausible metaphysics is likely to allow
that any particular spatiotemporal region instantiates several kinds of systems”
(Menzies 2004, 159), and causal models are defined over systems (Menzies
2004, 160). In his favour, Menzies seeks to employ the context-sensitivity of
counterfactuals to analyse the context-sensitivity of selection — a strategy
which I also endorse. So it may be that Menzies would have the resources
to say more about how causal models — and hence causes — depend on the
context of occurrence. But ironically, the introduction of the notion of a causal
model actually reduces the prospects in this regard, because it generates a need
for a further argument to show how causal models are relative to the context
of occurrence. Perhaps such an argument could be advanced (though at the
cost of further complexity); but as it stands, Menzies’ analysis is in the same
boat in this regard as the contrastive strategy.16
4.7 Summary
Selection is slippery: it is not always easy to identify our intuitions about which
event is the cause, even when we are entirely clear how a given effect came
about (or at least, do not feel that the cause lies among events we do not know
about or understand). Perhaps this is why the difference between cause and
16Another author expressing dissatisfaction with Lewis’s gloss on difference-making is
Carolina Sartorio. Her proposal states: “If C caused E, then, had C not occurred, the
absence of C wouldn’t have caused E” (Sartorio 2005, 75). This account counts the presence
of oxygen as the cause of the match lighting: if the oxygen had been absent then the absence
of oxygen would indeed not have caused the match to light. But Sartorio’s discussion is not
directed at the very general problem of selection have discussed, but at the much more
specific problem of ruling out as causes events which merely switch the route by which a
given effect happens (cf. Hall 2004a, Sartorio 2005).
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condition has rarely been seen as a general, objective difference. Moreover we
can be persuaded to talk with some flexibility about what the cause is. Perhaps
this is why causal selection has seemed inessential to our concept of causation.
There is no physical difference between cause and condition — no physical
property possessed by all and only causes. Perhaps this, too, contributes to the
view that there is no real difference, apart from our discriminatory treatment,
between cause and condition, despite the obvious point that even a selective
counterfactual theory of causation would not imply any physical difference
between cause and condition.
Whatever the reason, causal selection has not received sustained and sys-
tematic attention in the way that other aspects of causation have. I identified
three strategies which have been employed to understand selection: the spe-
cial event strategy, the causal field strategy and the contrastive strategy. I
suggested that they could usefully (though perhaps loosely) each be seen as
refining the previous strategies. We discussed the contrastive strategy in de-
tail, and I advocated two specific objections: that it fails fully to explain
causal selection; and that it fails adequately to justify our moral and legal de-
pendence on causal selection. Both the objections were presented as pressing
the contrastive strategy to give an account of contrast choice.
The Reverse Counterfactual was introduced in the light of the notion of
causes as difference-makers to their effects. I argued that the Reverse Coun-
terfactual is true of causes, but false of mere conditions. I suggested that we
could account for the flexibility of causal selection by the context-sensitivity
of counterfactuals. Since counterfactuals depend on both context of occur-
rence and context of inquiry, I suggested we can explain why causal selection
is relative to each of these. This yields an account which is more explanatory
than the contrastive account, since it includes an account of the principles
governing contrast choice. It also offers a better justification of the moral and
legal weight we put upon selection, since it makes the principles governing
selection important and quite general: they are just the principles governing
our assessment of any counterfactual. The difference between cause and con-
dition is not, therefore, one which is peculiar to moral and legal contexts, or
peculiarly governed in those contexts. Another, more principled argument was
advanced. Developing the idea that the Reverse Counterfactual underlies the
vaguely-specified but frequently-invoked intuitive notion that causes make the
difference to their effects, I sought to argue that the Reverse Counterfactual
must in principle be true of causes, if causes really do make the difference
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between the effect occurring and not.
The Reverse Counterfactual was compared to the contrastive strategy. It
was argued that contrast still has an important role to play in explaining
how the context of inquiry can sometimes determine that we select as causes
events which, like background radiation, are absent only in rather distant pos-
sible worlds, and which are usually seen as mere conditions. The Reverse
Counterfactual offers considerable theoretical unification, employing just one
notion of context-sensitive difference-making, and explaining why contrastive
explanation is such a powerful model of causal explanation. On the standard
contrastive view, context determines the truth-value of the Lewisian counter-
factuals, and then comes into play again in a separate way to determine our
choice among those counterfactuals, all of which are true in the circumstances.
On the Reverse Counterfactual account, context comes into play just once, to
determine the truth-value of Lewis’s counterfactuals and of the Reverse Coun-
terfactual. Contrastive explanation is just a special way we have of specifying,
manipulating and communicating context.
The obvious unanswered question of this chapter is how the Reverse Coun-
terfactual might be incorporated or developed into a full theory of causation.
This project will face several challenges. In particular, the Reverse Counterfac-
tual is proposed as a necessary condition for causation. To achieve a sufficient
condition, we would need new solutions to the problems associated with causal
asymmetries — centrally, the difference between cause and effect, and the dif-
ference between effects of a common cause and cause-effect pairs. For Lewis’s
ban on backtrackers was his solution to those problems. These challenges will
be taken up in Chapter 7; notice, meanwhile, that the selective feature claimed
for the Reverse Counterfactual corresponds to a counterfactual asymmetry of
sorts. The Reverse Counterfactual is true of many fewer events than the cor-
responding Lewisian counterfactual. Or, removing all presuppositions about
temporal direction but retaining temporal order, we have many more counter-
factuals going one way than the other, corresponding to the outnumbering of
causes by conditions. This is a milder and subtler asymmetry than Lewis’s. I
hope that what we lose in an elegant account of causal asymmetries, we may
gain in our understanding of the real nature of the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we shall learn more about the circumstances
in which backtrackers are true, and find more reasons to accept the Reverse
Counterfactual as a necessary condition for causation.
Chapter 5
Transitivity
5.0 Abstract
This chapter argues that the causes of the cause of an effect are not always
causes of that effect: that is, causation is not transitive. I begin by distin-
guishing various kinds of nontransitivity. I consider four motivations for the
common view that causation is transitive, and argue that none is compelling.
Two sorts of counterexamples to transitivity are then distinguished: those due
to distance (or failure of proximity) and those due to a special causal structure,
double prevention. I argue that proximity failure is closely linked to causal se-
lection. The Reverse Counterfactual tends to support the intuitive view that
very distant events are not causes, even if they may be mere conditions. Then
I argue, contrary to some recent literature, that cases of double-prevention
fail to be cases of causation. The Reverse Counterfactual agrees. Efforts by
McDermott, Paul and Hall to diagnose the difficulty with double prevention
are considered and found wanting. However, I agree with these authors that
double prevention does not constitute a real counterexample to causal transi-
tivity; I suggest that only an unselective notion of causation could persuade
us to think otherwise. Finally I consider how a valid substitute for counter-
factual transitivity might help explain why causation sometimes appears to be
transitive (unlike other nontransitive relations such as touching), and also why
distance should be relevant to causal transitivity.
5.1 Kinds of Nontransitivity
A relation R is transitive just in case (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)((Rxy&Ryz) ⊃ Rxz). A
nontransitive relation (or a relation that is not transitive) is any which fails to
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meet the foregoing condition, ie. any such that (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)((Rxy&Ryz)& ∼
Ryz). Even if a relation R is nontransitive, it might fail to be intransitive: R is
intransitive just in case (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)((Rxy&Ryz) ⊃∼ Rxz). If three cubes of
the same size are placed so that the whole of one face of one cube is in contact
with the whole of one face of a second cube, and the whole of one face of that
second cube is in contact with the whole of one face of a third cube, then it is
never the case that the whole of any face of the first cube is in contact with
the whole of any face of the third (indeed, no faces will touch at all). The
relation among cubes of the same size of having faces aligned and in contact
is intransitive. Whereas the more commonplace relation of simply touching
is nontransitive, but not intransitive: three cubes may be placed so that all
three touch, or so that two touch a third without touching each other. I will
argue that causation is nontransitive in the same way that simply touching is
nontransitive: that is, causation is neither transitive nor intransitive.
5.2 Motivations for Transitivity
There is a tendency among philosophers in the post-Lewis tradition simply to
insist that causation is transitive (cf. Hall 2004a,b, Ramachandran 2004), and
it can be quite hard to get a grip on the motivations for the insistence and on
the issues at stake in a debate on transitivity. In this section I shall identify
and criticise four motivations for decreeing causation to be transitive. In each
case I shall argue that the motivation is inadequate, especially given that the
insistence on transitivity has led philosophers to neglect a more open-minded
study of our intuitive judgements about transitivity and their governing prin-
ciples.1
1Recent deniers of transitivity include Hitchcock [2001], who accepts counterexamples
like those in 5.5.1 below. I shall not discuss Hitchcock’s account in terms of structural
equations, however. This approach seeks to develop a more sophisticated counterfactual
approach which admits of causal “variables”. This may be very sensible for certain practical
and technical purposes (cf. Granger 1969), but it does not seem to help much with two
fundamental issues concerning counterfactuals. First, the greater complexity threatens to
obscure the difficulty of identifying the principles concerning what to hold fixed and what
to change, in counterfactual suppositions (cf. Hall and Paul 2003). Second, Hitchcock’s
account assumes a ban on backtrackers, which I have already argued is unwarranted. For
these reasons, despite the interest of Hitchcock’s approach and related accounts such as
Yablo’s [2002], I feel that a satisfactory discussion would take us too far off course.
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5.2.1 “Bedrock Datum” Intuition
The complexity of our causal judgements with regard to transitivity has not
merely been ignored: it appears to have been denied. For example:
That causation is, necessarily, a transitive relation on events seems
to many a bedrock datum, one of the few indisputable a priori
insights we have into the workings of the concept.
(Hall 2004a, 181)
If this is an a priori insight then it is available only upon philosophical re-
flection, since ordinary thinkers show no evidence of it. Moreover, an a priori
insight is quite different from an a priori argument: I might be convinced by
an argument, but for someone like me who is blind to the insight, reports of
it in others are not enlightening.
5.2.2 Accounting for Preemption
Paul says:
[Regularity and counterfactual] accounts need transitivity to avoid
important counterexamples...
(Paul 2004, 206)
As far as counterfactual accounts go, she is presumably influenced by Lewis’s
theory of causation, which makes causation transitive in order handle pre-
emption counterexamples. We will discuss Lewis’s treatment of preemption
in Chapter 6. Three points may be mentioned here, however. First, Lewis’s
theory and many others need causation to be transitive in order to handle
preemption (cf. Paul 2004). But that doesn’t mean that every other theory —
not even every other counterfactual theory — needs causation to be transitive.
Second, making causation transitive only provides a promising solution to pre-
emption when combined with a denial of backtracking counterfactuals, as we
shall see in 6.3.1. I have devoted two chapters to rejecting this denial; in the
present context, they amount to independent reasons to reject Lewis’s account
of preemption, and thus to reject that account as a motivation for making
causation transitive. Third, even if we grant Lewis’s denial of backtrackers
(as most do), none of Lewis’s solutions to preemption, nor any other solution,
is generally accepted as decisive. Preemption is widely considered to be the
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most difficult and perhaps a fatal problem for the counterfactual analysis of
causation. Proponents of particular solutions to preemption will argue that
making causation transitive is a small price to pay for solving preemption. But
since there is no agreement about how to handle preemption, this line does
not constitute a general and independent reason to accept causal transitivity.
The fact that transitivity is a feature of many different accounts of preemp-
tion provides little inductive support for the idea that it is necessary for a
successful account of that sort. For these accounts are not very successful: an
inductive argument is at least as viable from the failure of all such accounts
to the rejection of transitivity.
5.2.3 Apollo
Lewis provides an explicit argument in favour of the transitivity of causation.
Normally, we do not say that birth causes death:
“Counterfactual analysis of causation? — Yeah, yeah, my birth is
a cause of my death!” said the scoffer. His birth is indeed a cause
of his death; but it’s understandable that we seldom want to say
so. The counterfactual dependence of his death on his birth is just
too obvious to be worth mentioning.
(Lewis 2004a, 101)
This is an instance of the view that causal selection is a matter of conversa-
tional, but not logical, implication. According to Lewis, to mention the birth
as a cause of death would be inappropriate, but not strictly false.
In support, Lewis argues as follows. It has been foretold that your death
will have catastrophic consequences for Apollo, who therefore orders an un-
derling to prevent it. The underling chooses to do so by preventing your birth.
However he fails. You are born, and die, with catastrophic consequences for
Apollo. In that situation, it is natural for Apollo — and us — to consider your
birth a cause of your death, and to curse his underling for failing to prevent
your birth, for the reason that the failure led to your death. Now suppose
that, as far as earthly affairs go, that world and ours are exactly similar. If
we accept that your birth causes your death in that world, but deny it in the
actual world, then you seem to accept that whether your birth causes your
death depends on heavenly affairs. Lewis thinks that is obviously wrong:
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...it would be entirely appropriate for Apollo to complain that your
birth caused your death. And if it’s appropriate to say, presum-
ably it must be true. But now we may suppose that, so far as
earthly affairs go, actuality and our unactualized comparison case
are alike in every detail... So, if you agree with the scoffer that your
birth didn’t cause your death in actuality, you must think that idle
heavenly difference can make a difference to what causes what here
below! That is hard to believe.
(Lewis 2004a, 101)
The argument is supposed to bring out that we can at least sometimes think
of contexts where we override our initial judgements, and assert transitivity
after all. This shows that apparent transitivity failure is a feature of context.
Causation, in Lewis’s opinion, is not a feature of context, but is intrinsic to the
events involved. So we must say the same thing about the Apollo world and
our godless actuality, since the same sequence of events leads from my birth
to my death in both worlds. It is, Lewis assumes, more plausible to think that
birth causes death in both worlds than to deny it in both worlds. And this
assumption is surely right.
Even if the Apollo argument were persuasive, it seems unlikely that it is
the reason why so many philosophers consider it at least acceptable to assume
that causation is transitive; after all, that assumption appeared in Lewis’s 1973
theory, and the Apollo argument was first published in 2000. Moreover this
argument is not persuasive. It relies on two claims: (i) that my birth causes
my death in the godly world; and (ii) that what goes for the godly world must
go for the godless. Both claims may be disputed.
First, the only way to persuade me that my birth caused my death in
either world is to specify my death extremely imprecisely. None of the features
which my death actually has (whatever they may be) are caused by my birth,
however. If we specify the death a bit more precisely — let us suppose it is
death by thunderbolt — then little plausibility remains to the suggestion that
my birth was its cause. The birth may have been necessary for the death, but
the thunderbolt is what killed me. Nor will it help to specify my birth more
precisely, assuming that my birth included no obvious omens of my demise:
we will be little inclined to see any of the features of an ordinary birth such as
mine, as causes of my dramatic death.
Second, we could deny that causation is intrinsic in the relevant way. In fact
we need not even deny it: we need merely regard as suspect an argument which
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appears to rely on the claim that causation is intrinsic, given that whether
causation is intrinsic is a difficult and not entirely obvious question (cf. Menzies
2002). On my view it is far from clear that causation is intrinsic. For on
my view causation is selective, and selection depends on context, which by
definition fails to be intrinsic to the events in question. Lewis’s argument brings
out how his view and mine are at odds, and also how asserting transitivity and
denying selection are strongly connected.
If this rather flippant attitude towards the instrincness of causation both-
ers you, note that Lewis’s account also fails to make causation intrinsic, if my
argument in 4.4.3 is correct. For all counterfactuals are relative to the context
of occurrence; I count it as an advantage of Lewis’s semantics that it brings
this point out. Thus any counterfactual account of causation fails to make cau-
sation intrinsic to the events concerned, because whether one causes the other
depends on the truth of a counterfactual, which in turn depends on the context
in which the two events occur. And context fails to be intrinsic if anything
does. Lewis denies he is relying on any strong thesis of intrinsicness; “all we
need is that earthly causal relations supervene on the intrinsic and nomological
character of all things earthly” (Lewis 2004a, 101). But we could still deny
that: asserting that a relation is context-dependent amounts to denying that
the relation under consideration supervenes on the intrinsic character of the
relata. And for what reason would we rule that non-earthly things cannot be
part of the context of causal relations — apart from the rhetorical pull which
the word “earthly” might exert on a physicalistically inclined modern?
5.2.4 Opposition to Selection
The transitivity claimed for causation might be seen as a special case of the
unselective nature of causation more generally. That is how Lewis sees it:
We have the icy road, the bald tire, the drunk driver, the blind
corner, the approaching car, and more. Together, these cause the
crash... But these are by no means all the causes of the crash.
...each of these causes in turn has its causes; and those too are
causes of the crash.
(Lewis 1986a, 214)
If, like Lewis, you are committed to an entirely unselective notion of causa-
tion, then you might thereby be motivated to consider causation transitive.
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On Lewis’s view, a chain of counterfactual dependence suffices for causation.2
Cases where we select the cause from mere conditions are counterexamples to
this claim. So, too, are cases where we allow events in one part of the chain
to count as causes, but not those in another part. As Hall puts it:
...transitivity helps to make for an egalitarian relation: Events
causally remote from a given effect will typically not be salient
— but will still be among its causes for all that.
(Hall 2004b, 228)
Hall is clearly suggesting a connection between causal transitivity and an un-
selective — “egalitarian” — notion of causation.
Is there any difference, then, between endorsing transitivity and denying
selection? There is, but for practical purposes, the difference does not matter.
We could imagine a counterfactual view which did not identify causation with
chains of counterfactual dependence, but with single steps — so ∼ C >∼ E
was a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for c to cause e. Then, we
would have an account which was unselective among mere conditions, but on
which causation was non-transitive.3 However, such an account is prima facie
implausible, because then even mild cases of redundancy no longer count as
cases of causation. The fact you were about to get up and put the lights just
when I did, means that my pressing the switch did not cause the lights to come
on: it is false that, if I hadn’t pressed the switch, the lights wouldn’t have come
on. So although opposition to selection does not entail transitivity, for practical
purposes it might as well, because denying transitivity while endorsing an
unselective notion of causation makes for an extremely unappealing view of
causation which, to my knowledge, nobody holds.
This explains why denying selectivity and endorsing transitivity are so
closely linked. It hardly needs to be pointed out that this is not, by my lights,
2Strictly, a chain of causal dependence is required; but I do not use this terminology,
because it is biased against my view. As a reminder, e counterfactually depends on c when
C > E and ∼ C >∼ E, and Lewis stipulates that e causally depends on c when in addition
c and e both occur. So counterfactual dependence plus C and E entails Lewisian causal
dependence, and Lewisian causal dependence entails counterfactual dependence on its own.
The bias arises because causal dependence strongly suggests causation; whereas I deny that
events which are causally dependent in Lewis’s sense need instantiate causation. On the
other hand, to define my own version of causal dependence would invite confusion. So I
eschew the terminology of causal dependence.
3But not intransitive: for sometimes, c is a condition of d and d of e, but c is also
a condition of e. For instance, my birth is a condition of my drinking a cup of coffee
this morning, which is a condition of my perking up; and my birth is also a condition of my
perking up. So a view on which ∼ C >∼ E is necessary for causation rules out intransitivity.
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a good reason for endorsing transitivity; for in Chapter 4 I argued against the
view that causation is unselective among conditions.
5.3 Two Sorts of Transitivity Failure
There are at least two sorts of case where causation might appear not to be
transitive. One sort is relatively straightforward to describe roughly, if not
to characterise precisely: some event c seems to be too distant from some
causal descendant e for us to call it the cause. If there really are cases like
this, then they constitute direct counterexamples to the alleged transitivity of
causation. This is the sort of case which centrally concerns Hart and Honore,
in legal contexts; they want to uncover principles by which we draw the line
between events that are sufficiently proximate to count as a cause, and event
that are too remote (see especially Hart and Honore 1985, Chapter V). Let us
call this kind of transitivity failure proximity failure, and counterexamples due
to proximity failure distance counterexamples.4
The other sort of case exhibits a more complex causal structure: specifically,
double prevention. This is the sort of case the Lewis-inspired literature focuses
on. c causes d and d causes e, but c does not cause e; and moreover, the failure
does not seem to be because c is distant from e. The special feature of double
prevention cases is that c on its own would prevent e from happening; but
then d prevents c from preventing e. And the occurrence of d counterfactually
depends on the occurence of c. Paradigm cases are failsafes which actually
fire: the power supply to the hospital is disrupted, so the emergency generator
kicks in, causing the power to stay on. Although there is a clear chain of
counterfactual dependence, we do not normally say that the continued power
supply at the hospital is caused by the failure of the national grid.5
The two sorts of cases are seen as distinct, and the latter lends itself to the
counterexample culture, because once you know the double-prevention for-
4Pending a better suggestion, and without anything depending on it, the notion of dis-
tance may as well be spatiotemporal. (This diverges somewhat from legal usage, where
proximity can simply be a technical term for limiting liability within a set of causes — the
American version of the English distinction between “factual” and “legal” causation.) It is
often said that there should be no causal action at a distance, and perhaps this intuitive
principle is part of what motivates distance counterexamples. Note, however, that even if
this is part of the motivation, distance counterexamples to transitivity need not strictly vio-
late the principle, if it is formulated to allow causation between events connected by causal
chains. We are interested in events which are connected by causal chains, but which —
due to the length of the chains — are not naturally regarded as standing in a direct causal
relation.
5The point about failsafes and the generator example are due to Peter Lipton.
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mula it is fairly easy to generate examples. The most-discussed problems for
Lewis’s theory of causation take the form of counterexamples: cases of preemp-
tion, which challenge Lewis’s account as a necessary condition for causation.
Transitivity is a central focus of the more recent attention to the sufficiency
of Lewis’s account, and given the counterexample culture that has developed
in the discussion of preemption, perhaps it is natural that discussion of tran-
sitivity should also be cast in terms of counterexamples. But this has had an
unfortunate consequence: little attention has been paid to the principles un-
derlying our intuitions, and the way these generate counterexamples.6 What
attention has been paid, has been secondary, prompted by defence of transitiv-
ity. Given the transitivity claimed for causation, it is perhaps surprising that
little positive interest has been taken in why we fail to possess strong intu-
itions that causation is transitive (and perhaps the lack of intuitions has been
forgotten — see 5.2.1 above). The explanation, I think, is that the defence of
transitivity has been seen as a defence against counterexamples — central to
an activity which Hall, following Maudlin, calls “trench warfare” (Hall 2004b,
227). Whereas we might seek to articulate the principles governing our intu-
itions about transitivity, as well as merely defending theoretical accounts from
those intuitions.
The general goal of this chapter is to argue that causation is not transitive,
and we shall begin with the first sort of failure of transitivity distinguished
above — distance failure.
5.4 Proximity Failure
It is to be noted that, despite what is commonly said by philoso-
phers, causal relationships are not always ‘transitive’: a cause of a
cause is not always treated as the cause of the ‘effect’... Thus the
cause of a fire may be lightning, but it would be rare to cite the
cause of the lightning (the state of electric discharges in the atmo-
sphere) as the cause of the fire; similarly the cause of the motor
accident may be the icy condition of the road, but it would be odd
to cite the cold as the cause of the accident.
(Hart and Honore 1985, 43)
To the extent that Hart and Honore’s example of the ice and the road is
plausible, the Reverse Counterfactual has the resources to match our intuitions.
6Perhaps this is changing: a recent exception is Björnsson 2007.
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Applying the Inference Test: if the car had not crashed, then we might have
inferred there was no ice; but it is less obvious whether we would infer anything
about the temperature. This indicates that our confidence in —
If there had been no crash, there would have been no ice,
is (or should be) greater than in —
If there had been no crash, it would not have been cold.
Admittedly this is rather uncertain, but that reflects the limited details sup-
plied, and also the fact that our insistence on calling the ice, and our resistance
to calling the cold, the cause of the crash is perhaps not so strong as Hart and
Honore seem to think. (Note that it is the same example Lewis appeals to in
the passage quoted on page 111, when pumping our intuitions in the opposite
direction.) Nevertheless, to the extent that — and in the circumstances that
— we agree with Hart and Honore’s view, the Reverse Counterfactual agrees
too. In support of the claim, I employ the Inference Test: I suggest that our
inclination to call the cold (or the ice) the cause of the crash, will vary with
our inclination to assent to the inference from supposed absence of crash to
the supposed absence of cold (or ice).
Turning to a more common and perhaps more convincing example, my
birth does not cause my death, in the ordinary sense: it does not kill me. Yet
on Lewis’s analysis, my birth is a cause of my death, since if I had not been
born I would not have died. The Reverse Counterfactual, on the other hand,
does not count my birth as causing my death. Suppose I die in a car accident,
caused by a drunk driver, who could also be me. Legal and moral consequences
ensue for the drunken driver, even if it is me, since others may have a claim
for compensation against my estate. Nobody, however, has a claim against
my mother, simply for having brought me into the world. If the event of my
death had not occurred, then there is no obvious reason to suppose the event
of my birth would not have occurred (nor even that it would have occurred
differently); but presumably the car would have been travelling a bit slower,
or I would have reacted more quickly or deftly, or I would not have been so
drunk; or perhaps I would have taken the train, or some such. The Reverse
Counterfactual will identify the event which makes the actual case differ from
the counterfactual case where I do not die, as the cause of my death, selecting
them from other events in the chain that leads to my demise. There are many
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other deaths I could have died; supposing me unborn is by no means the only
or the closest alternative to the death I actually die.
To make the mode of argument explicit, the Inference Test confirms that
if I hadn’t died, the car wouldn’t have crashed as it did. If we suppose that I
arrived at my destination alive, we would naturally infer (assume, even) that
no crash had occurred.7 On the other hand, there is no support for the thought
that if I hadn’t died that death, I wouldn’t have been born. Suppose I had
survived; that would clearly not be a natural reason to suppose I had never
been born. And although supposing me out of existence entirely is perhaps a
minor change in the greater scheme of things, it is still a larger change than
allowing me to live a little longer, shorter or differently from how I actually
do.
This is perhaps a useful point to note how weakly the Inference Test needs
to be applied, in order to support the argument. I do not depend on any very
strong claim either about what we would or would not infer, under certain
counterfactual suppositions; all I really need is a clear asymmetry between
these things. In the case where we compare my birth to my drunken driving as
the cause of my death, that asymmetry survives minor quibbles about exactly
what we infer from the absence of my death. The Reverse Counterfactual
therefore appears to offer a way of ruling out my birth as a cause of my death,
at least in the common sorts of cases where we want to do so.
There remains some context-relativity, as we have already noted. The
medics might say that the cause of my death in the car crash was brain-
damage. But the Reverse Counterfactual account accommodates this sort
of context-dependence, by allowing that the vagueness of counterfactuals is
resolved differently in different contexts of inquiry. As I argued in the last
chapter, resolving this vagueness is quite different from choosing between true
counterfactuals whose vagueness has already been resolved — which is the
status of selection on the Lewisian counterfactual analysis. Resolving counter-
factual vagueness is necessary for any counterfactual account of causation: on
my account, therefore, selection is integral, and no less objective than causa-
tion itself will be on any counterfactual account.
The Reverse Counterfactual appears to offer a principled account of the
nontransitivity of causation. When c causes d and d causes e, c further causes
e only if ∼ E >∼ C. The principled argument of 4.5.4 applies here too. For
7As with the match-strike example of the previous chapter, we might not infer quite
that much — we might allow that a small crash could have taken place. But this just
demonstrates an obvious point: that some of the crash’s properties are causally relevant.
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some c to cause some e, c must be a difference between the actual case and
the counterfactual scenario where e does not occur. Very remote events sat-
isfy this condition less commonly, perhaps partly because — as Lewis’s own
view of counterfactuals implies — the counterfactual scenarios we conjure up
to assess our counterfactuals tend not to alter history more than they need
to. Of course, Lewis’s view about how much history needs to be altered differs
from my own. Nevertheless, if the Reverse Counterfactual can be defended
in the way I am defending it, by appeal to the Inference Test, then it seems
that endorsing backtrackers need not mean abandoning counterfactual asym-
metry altogether.8 Rather, we have uncovered another feature of the limited
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence which we are exploring as a sort of
side-effect of our discussion of causation.
5.5 Double-Prevention
5.5.1 Introducing Counterexamples
One advantage of the obsession of the modern literature with counterexamples
has been the rise to prominence of the relation between double-prevention and
transitivity. This is a special instance of the more generally important relation
between transitivity and redundancy. I shall characterise double prevention
more precisely below, but the general problem is supposed to be this: there
is a chain of dependence from c to e, yet intuitively c fails to cause e. In
this section, we shall seek to establish two things. First (5.5.3) I shall argue
that in cases of double prevention, the Reverse Counterfactual agrees with our
intuitions that c does indeed fail to cause e (5.5.2). This relieves us of the duty
some writers have felt to argue against our intuitions. Second (5.5.4) we shall
consider three other efforts to understand double prevention cases and their
relation to transitivity. Each fails, but I suggest that what is good about them
is captured by the Reverse Counterfactual account.
This section thus completes the main work of the Chapter, since it com-
pletes the defence of nontransitivity against various accounts which have been
devised in defence of the claim that causation is transitive. But it leaves the
nature of double prevention undiagnosed: in particular, we might ask whether
cases of double-prevention really are cases of transitivity failure. More gener-
ally, we might ask why causation was thought to be transitive, and why that
8And thereby endorsing the implausible view that counterfactuals imply entire counter-
factual histories, as well as, or — worse — instead of, counterfactual futures.
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suggestion has some intuitive pull. I address these questions together in 5.6.1,
and offer a diagnosis of proximity failure in 5.6.2.
Now let us consider some examples of double-prevention which occur in the
literature (and which I have slightly adapted by inserting the author as the
protagonist where a name is not supplied). These are the examples considered
by the three authors whose discussions of transitivity we shall focus on.
Dog-Bite. McDermott has occasion to detonate a bomb (McDermott 1995,
531). The day before he does so, a dog bites off his right forefinger. So
he detonates the bomb by pushing the button with his left forefinger. If
the dog-bite had not occurred, then the left-handed button-push would
not have occurred, and if that left-handed button-push had not occurred,
the bomb would not have detonated. If causation is transitive, and if the
truth of each of these counterfactuals suffices for causation, it follows
that the dog-bite caused the explosion. Yet intuitively, the dog-bite does
not cause the explosion.
Shock C. McDermott also invents a sadistic game called Shock C, played
by an unruly pair, Able and Baker (thinly disguised in McDermott’s
account as A and B). A poor subject, called C, is wired up to an electric
circuit with two switches. Able controls one, Baker the other. When
the switches are both set the same way, C receives a shock; when they
are set differently, C does not receive a shock. Able’s aim is to prevent
C being shocked, and Baker’s is to shock C. Able sees Baker’s switch
set left, so throws his right. Baker, seeing Able throw his switch right,
follows suit. The switches are aligned; C receives a shock. McDermott
says that “Common sense tells us that A’s move was a cause of B’s move,
that B’s move was a cause of C’s shock, but that A’s move was not a
cause of C’s shock” (McDermott 1995, 532).
Chest Massage. McDermott gives a chest-massage to a heart attack victim,
saving his life. The victim lives to travel to New York and die another
day. Sharing the preoccupation which seems to infect his profession,
McDermott specifies that the victim dies violently9 (McDermott 1995,
9This obsession is sometimes remarked upon (eg. Hall 2004a, 183) in passing. But
recent psychological research suggests that the choice of examples is of greater significance:
“Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific antecedents that could inhibit a bad outcome,
whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors” (McEleney and
Byrne 2006, 247). Investigating the differences between causal and counterfactual reasoning
would be an intriguing avenue of explanation for some philosophical difficulties that have
beset counterfactual analyses of causation.
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532). The massage is a cause of the journey to New York, which is a
cause of the death, but the massage is not a cause of the death, says
McDermott.
Skiing Accident. Right-handed Suzy goes skiing, breaks her right wrist,
writes a philosophy paper with her left hand, and submits it to a journal
where it is accepted for publication. The skiing accident is a cause of her
writing the paper with her left hand, and the writing of the paper with
the left hand is a cause of the publication, so by transitivity, the skiing
accident is a cause of the publication. Yet our intuitions disagree (Paul
2004, 205).
Dog Yelp. Suzy prepares to throw a water-ballon at a dog. Billy runs to stop
her, but trips over a tree-root. The balloon hits the dog, which yelps.
Billy’s run caused his trip, and the trip caused the dog’s yelp (assuming
if suffices for causation that, if Billy hadn’t tripped, the dog wouldn’t
have yelped). Thus, if causation is transitive, Billy’s run caused the dog
to yelp. Yet we do not want to say that the run caused the yelp (Hall
2004a, 183–4).
Discovered Bomb. An assassin plants a bomb under Hall’s desk, Hall finds
it and removes it, and thus survives. Planting the bomb caused Hall to
find it, finding it caused him to survive, but planting the bomb did not
cause Hall to survive (Hall 2004a, 183 — crediting Field).
Kvart’s Finger. Kvart’s finger is severed in an accident, and sewn back on
so well that a year later, it is as good as it ever was. The accident caused
the surgery, the surgery caused the finger’s health a year later, but the
accident did not cause the finger to be healthy a year later (Hall 2004a,
183 — crediting Kvart [1991]).
5.5.2 The Structure of the Counterexamples
Each of these cases has the following structure:
• c occurs;
• d occurs, and counterfactually depends on c;
• e occurs, and counterfactually depends on d;
• intuitively, c does not cause e.
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In my opinion, they also possess two features which cannot be characterised
as easily:
• they are all cases where c prevents some event d′, which would cause e;
but where
• d causes e instead of d′, thus preventing c from preventing e.
For example, take the Dog Bite. McDermott’s finger getting bitten off prevents
him from pushing the button with that finger, which would detonate the bomb.
But his left-fingered push does the job the right-fingered push would have done.
The left-fingered push thus prevents the bite from preventing the detonation,
which why this structure is called double-prevention.
This diagnosis is close to one given by Hall:
An event c occurs, beginning (or combining with other events to
begin) some process that threatens to prevent some later event e
from occurring (call this process “Threat”). But, as a sort of side-
effect, c also causes some event d that counteracts the threat (call
this event “Savior”). So c is a cause of Savior, and Savior — by
virtue of counteracting Threat — is a cause of e. But — or so it
seems to many philosophers — c is not thereby a cause of e, and
so Transitivity fails.
(Hall 2004a, 184)
Notice that I have weakened Hall’s picture, since I have not required that c
(which Hall calls “Threat”) causes d (which Hall calls “Savior”) and that d causes
e. For double prevention cases to be a counterexample to the transitivity of
causation, we need Hall’s stronger version. But for cases of double prevention
to be counterexamples to the claim that counterfactual dependence suffices for
causation, the weaker picture is all we need. In this section, we are considering
the latter question — that is, we are considering how transitivity is a problem
for a Lewisian theory of causation. In that tradition, it is widely assumed that
counterfactual dependence suffices for causation, so the distinction is often
blurred; but we must make the distinction because we have questioned that
assumption. In the next section we shall consider the more general question,
whether double-prevention cases are counterexamples to causal transitivity.
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5.5.3 The Reverse Counterfactual Gets It Right
I endorse each of these counterexamples, in the sense that in each, I agree that
the first event does not cause the final event. And the Reverse Counterfactual
reflects this fact. In Dog Bite, if the bomb had not been detonated, then
McDermott would not have pushed the button — with any finger. Suppose
you knew of McDermott’s plan, and noticed that no explosion occurred at
the appointed hour. You would infer that he had not pressed the button.
— Unless, of course, he is an avid but incompetent terrorist, whose bombs
routinely fail to explode; but in that case, the button push and the well-
made bomb jointly cause the explosion, and if the bomb does not explode,
you cannot decisively infer the absence of either rather than the other. Such
caveats should, by now, be growing familiar. Contrast the dog-bite: you would
guess nothing about a dog-bite from the failure of a bomb to explode; certainly,
you would not infer that a dog had not bitten his finger off on that basis. It is
false, then, that if the bomb hadn’t exploded, the dog would not have bitten off
McDermott’s finger. The dog-bite fails to be a cause of the explosion, according
to the Reverse Counterfactual, as it does according to our intuitions.
The case of Shock C is less clear. I have some doubts about the example: if
the current is switched on before Able moves, then C will receive a shock, and
the game will be over before Baker moves. So it must be switched on either
after Able moves or at exactly that moment. Then, I think, it is intuitively
clear that Baker’s move causes the shock, and that Able’s does not. Some time
elapsed between Able’s move and Baker’s, during which time, the power was
on, and C could have been receiving a shock. Then Baker moves, and C is
shocked. We could have intervened to prevent this, by overpowering Baker or
switching off the current. It is hard to see Able as causing the shock. Those
are our intuitions, and the Reverse Counterfactual agrees: in the absence of
a shock, we would infer that Baker had not moved, given the details we have
just filled in concerning the timing of the current being switched on relative
to Able’s move. Of course it once again depends how much we are supposed
to know about the circumstances — crucially, whether we hold Able’s switch
fixed or not. But this reflects our causal intuitions: after all, it is only because
we are told about Able’s move, and the fact it breaks the circuit, that we say
that Baker’s move caused the shock; if the case were less precisely specified,
our causal intuitions would not be as clear, if clear at all.
The case of the Chest Massage failing to cause a subsequent trip to New
York, and the ensuing violent death, is also handled by the Reverse Counterfac-
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tual. A different, peaceful death from the actual violent end would not license
an inference that no chest-massage had taken place. (Here, we are revisit-
ing our discussion of proximity failure: the chest massage is just too distant to
count as a cause of the subsequent death, even if it is a mere condition.) There-
fore the Inference Test undermines any claim that the chest-massage meets the
necessary condition imposed by the Reverse Counterfactual for causing death.
So our account rules out the chest-massage as the cause of death.
Paul’s Skiing Accident is very similar to McDermott’s Dog Bite, in that
the first event in the chain bears on aspects of the second event which are
causally irrelevant to the final event. Paul takes her cue from this point, as we
shall see. But here we need only note that the Reverse Counterfactual treats
it successfully, as it treated Dog Bite. If the paper had not been accepted,
we should not infer that no skiing accident had taken place. Whereas we
could infer from a rejection that the paper was not of sufficient quality, though
perhaps not with overriding conviction. But our lack of conviction reflects a
suspicion that there are non-meritocratic elements in the editorial policy of
academic journals, which might include eminence of author, chance, pressure
on publication, poor refereeing, and so on. These are all factors which diminish
both our confidence in the outcome of the Inference Test, and our confidence
that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of the writing of a high-quality paper
with respect to the subsequent publication. But that is no objection: for the
presence of anti-meritocratic factors equally diminishes our confidence in the
notion that writing a good paper causes publication on a given occasion, with-
out knowing a lot more about the process by which this particular publication
was achieved. (Indeed, a vehement case is sometimes made that writing a good
paper is no more than a mere condition, and perhaps not even that.) Thus
our causal convictions once again vary in tandem with the conviction which
the Inference Test recommends we should have in the Reverse Counterfactual.
In the Dog Yelp case, the problem is supposed to be that intuitively, we
deny that Billy’s run caused the dog’s yelp, despite agreeing that if he hadn’t
run he wouldn’t have tripped, and if he hadn’t tripped the dog wouldn’t have
yelped. But in this case, we have an extra step in the chain: we also have Suzy’s
throw, upon which all the other events counterfactually depend. Moreover,
intuitively we are inclined to count Suzy’s throw as causing the yelp. So we
need to check both that the Reverse Counterfactual correctly discounts the
run as the cause of the yelp, and that it correctly counts the throw as at least
among the causes. So: applying the Inference Test to the situation where the
5.5. DOUBLE-PREVENTION 123
dog doesn’t yelp, we might infer that Billy didn’t trip. But then we would
infer that he had still run, but simply avoided the tree root. And we would
infer that Suzy didn’t throw — Billy succesfully prevented her. So both the
trip and the throw count as causes of the yelp, but the run does not. The
trip and the throw are both differences between the actual case and the most
obvious counterfactual scenario where the yelp does not occur; but the run is
present in both actual and counterfactual cases.
In another context of inquiry (perhaps specified by explicitly drawing a
contrast) we might infer that Suzy didn’t ever make as if to throw in the first
place. In that case, Billy would neither have run nor tripped. Does the Reverse
Counterfactual thereby wrongly count those events as causes of the yelp, in
that context? There is indeed a problem here, but a different problem: this
is a case of spurious causation. For the difficulty is that Suzy’s throw is a
condition for Billy’s activities as well as for the dog’s yelp. This is a different
issue from the nontransitivity of causation, and will be addressed in Chapter
7.
Now remember Discovered Bomb, which an assassin plants and which Hall
subsequently discovers under his desk. The Reverse Counterfactual says: if
Hall hadn’t survived, the bomb wouldn’t have been discovered. Why? —
Because, on hearing that Hall had perished in a terrorist attack, we would
infer that he probably did not discover the bomb before it exploded. (If he
did, why didn’t he do something about it?) On the other hand, we would not
infer that the assassin had not planted a bomb: quite the opposite. So the
assassin’s action fails to count as a cause of the survival, whereas Hall’s finding
the bomb does count.
Finally consider Kvart’s finger, injured in a factory accident and, following
excellent surgery, healthy a year later. The Reverse Counterfactual pronounces
the surgery a cause of the health, surely: if the finger had not been healthy a
year later, that would be because the surgery hadn’t been so good. But it would
not be because the accident never occurred in the first place. The application
of the Inference Test is becoming routine: we could infer bad surgery, but
certainly not an accident-free past, from a less healthy finger a year later.
We could extend this defence to other examples, but I hope the pattern is
now clear. Let us run it by the example which I said was paradigmatic of the
double-prevention structure, and a good deal simpler and more obvious than
some of the previous examples. There is a power-cut, causing the hospital
generator to kick in, leaving the power supply at the hospital uninterrupted
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(or, in any case, on). If the national grid hadn’t failed, the generator wouldn’t
have kicked in; and if the generator hadn’t kicked in, there would have been no
power supply subsequently; but the grid failure does not cause the subsequent
power supply. The Reverse Counterfactual says so too. If the power at the
hospital had been down, the generator would not have been on, presumably;
but it is absurd, surely, to try to argue that if the power at the hospital had
been down, there would have been no power-cut. For then, why would the
power supply at the hospital have been down? So the generator, but not the
power-cut, qualifies as causing the power supply.
5.5.4 Other Accounts Get It Wrong
Let us consider three instructively erroneous efforts to defend causal transi-
tivity from the foregoing alleged counterexamples. McDermott suggests that
a counterfactual sufficiency account of causation might help — that is, an ac-
count on which causes are counterfactually sufficient for their effects. He is
right: it does; although the account he proposes suffers some difficulties. The
Reverse Counterfactual offers a better account of this sort. Paul suggests that
aspects, rather than events, be taken as the causal relata (where aspects are
property instances). This move highlights an important feature which some
alleged counterexamples to transitivity have. But they do not all possess this
feature, and besides it is unclear that how to cash out her suggestion. The
Reverse Counterfactual explains why aspects are sometimes relevant to ques-
tions of transitivity. Finally, Hall suggests that in some cases, we should reject
the claim that counterfactual dependence suffices for causation. Quite so: we
should; for in many cases, effects counterfactually depend upon events which
are mere conditions for them, and not causes. But we should reject depen-
dence in a wider range of cases than Hall suggests. — Thus each of these three
accounts includes components which I want to endorse.
McDermott’s Sufficiency Thesis
McDermott’s proposal is that we identify minimal sufficient sets of events
as direct causes, and chains of direct causes as indirect causes. A sufficient
condition for an effect e is a set of events such that, if any events outside
the set had failed to occur, e would still have occurred. A minimal sufficient
condition is just a sufficient condition which contains no sufficient conditions
as proper subsets (McDermott 1995, 533). A causal process is defined as a
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chain of minimal sufficiency leading from c to e. For c to cause e, there must
be a causal process running from c to e, and further, c must be a minimal
condition for the nominal essence of e. The nominal essence of an event is the
way we refer to it; the real essence is “a full intrinsic description of the event,
including a precise specification of the time of occurrence” (McDermott 1995,
540).
Consider the Chest Massage case. McDermott accepts that “there was a
causal process P leading from the massage to his death” (McDermott 1995,
543); however, he claims that the chest massage is not a minimal sufficient
condition for the nominal essence of the death in New York, at least under
certain ordinary descriptions. When we refer to the death, we specify the
event loosely enough to allow that it could have come about without the chest-
massage, because we speak loosely enough to allow that it could have come
about without the earlier heart-attack as well — even though the chest massage
cannot be eliminated from a minimal condition for the real essence of the death.
It seems to me that this distinction between real and nominal essences un-
dercuts some of the motivation for McDermott’s account, which was to handle
causal redundancy. Simple cases of redundancy seem to be counterexamples:
if there is a back-up assassin, then the primary assassin’s firing at the presi-
dent is not part of a minimal sufficient condition for the nominal essence of
the president’s death (whose nominal essence is just that — the president’s
dying). It may stand in that relation to the real essence, but then the chest
massage is part of a minimal sufficient condition for the real essence of the
death in New York (remove it, and there is no death in New York: the victim
dies of a heart attack years earlier). I am not clear how McDermott might
respond to objection.
But despite these doubts, the account serves to highlight an important
point. Double prevention involves redundancy, in the sense that the two pre-
venters taken together are redundant, cancelling each other out as it were.
We have already noted that redundancy is prima facie a problem for accounts
which make causes counterfactually necessary for their effects, and that its
bearing on sufficiency accounts is less obviously problematic. We will develop
this point in Chapter 6. The Reverse Counterfactual clearly does not make
causes counterfactually necessary for their effects; it makes them counterfac-
tually sufficient.
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Paul’s Aspect Thesis (and Anscombe on Extensionality)
McDermott’s account is inferior to the Reverse Counterfactual in two other
important ways. It is more complex, and it has nothing to say about proxim-
ity failure. Paul has an account which is better in these respects. The central
suggestion of Paul’s solution is to make event aspects, rather than events, the
causal relata. An aspect is a property instance (Paul 2004, 213). Paul then
seeks to combine counterfactual and regularity theories to yield an analysis
of causation, taking aspects as the relata, which handles preemption and pre-
serves transitivity.
Paul’s central idea is simple and intuitive. In her Skiing Accident, the arm-
break affects an aspect of the writing of the paper which is causally irrelevant
to whether the paper is published, even though it was that very writing which
caused the paper’s publication, and that very writing was left-handed. More-
over, Paul’s aspect thesis might shed some light on proximity failure. The
longer I live, the fewer aspects of my death plausibly depend on aspects of my
birth, even if my death depends on my birth. As far as I am aware, Paul does
not discuss this possible application, but at least it seems that she might.
Paul’s solution suffers from two severe difficulties, however. First, it lacks
generality. Hall notes this, pointing out that the solution will not generalise
even to fairly close counterexamples:
Suppose that after the dog-bite, the man does not push the button
himself but orders an underling to do so. The relevant intuitions do
not change: the dog-bite causes the order, and the order causes the
explosion, but the dog-bite does not cause the explosion. The only
way I can see to apply Paul’s observations is by way of a rather
strained insistence that there is one event — call it a “making the
button depressed” — which the dog-bite causes to have the aspect
“being an order,” and which otherwise would have had the aspect
“being a button-pushing.”
(Hall 2004a, 187)
Hall is being kind. This solution is not merely “unattractive”. It also undercuts
much of Paul’s motivation: for such a “strained insistence” that there is one
event which can possess the different aspects singled out by Hall, carries heavy
commitments concerning the nature of events, which was something Paul set
out to avoid.
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Secondly, Paul’s substantive suggestions about how to construct a theory
of causation based on aspects are not promising. She countenances two ideas:
influence and lawful entailment. Neither seems well-suited to hold between
aspects. Influence between events might be roughly characterised as counter-
factual dependence between the aspects of the events in question: dependence
of how on how and when on when, as well as whether on whether (Lewis 2004a,
91). What, then, is influence between aspects? The “how” and “when” of an
event are aspects of that event. If aspects influence each other, then do they
in turn have aspects? Aspects are property instances, and I suppose a prop-
erty instance could itself instantiate various second-order properties, but Paul
doesn’t give any details, so it does not appear likely that this is what she has
in mind. But if aspects don’t themselves have aspects, then it is hard to under-
stand how they can stand in “how-how” and “when-when” dependencies. For,
as property instances, they have their hows and whens essentially. Perhaps I
misunderstand Paul here: but she does not provide much guidance.10
It is also unclear how aspects are supposed to lawfully entail other aspects.
On its own, a single aspect will not lawfully entail much; fill in all the nomo-
logically independent details, and under determinism it will entail everything
that’s left. For instance, if it is genuinely the last remaining independent de-
tail, then by determinism, Paul’s body temperature will after all determine the
colour of the paper in front of her (Paul 2004, 219). For illustration, imagine
that we set her body temperature at a value of several million degrees: then
the paper will ignite, and so presumably change colour. On the other hand, if
we consider the lawful entailments of an aspect relative to some proper subset
of all the logically independent details, then we face a problem analogous to
the one we had hoped to escape. For there will be some sets such that the left-
handedness of Suzy’s writing will lawfully entail the publication of the paper.
The problem of working out what to specify and what to leave out is directly
analogous to the problem of characterising events more or less precisely, by
appeal to some properties rather than others.
So Paul’s point that transitivity sometimes fails when causally irrelevant
aspects are involved does not merit shifting our discussion of event-causation
to a discussion of aspect causation. For it is only sometimes. Moreover,
aspect causation appears not to have all the resources available to events-
based analysis (though of course, for all I have said, better aspect-analyses
might be forthcoming). Nevertheless, transitivity does sometimes seem to fail
10We will discuss influence in more detail in 6.4.3.
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for the reason Paul highlights, and the selectivity of the Reverse Counterfactual
captures this point. We might infer the absence of a writing from the lack of
publication, but since it is irrelevant which hand wrote the paper, we will not
infer anything about that; so we will have no reason to infer anything about
events which might determine which hand the paper was written with, such
as a skiing accident.
In fact, Paul’s real point has nothing to do with transitivity. It may be
brought out with single causal steps. Compare:
Suzy wrote the paper with her left hand because she broke her
right wrist in a skiing accident;
and:
Suzy wrote the paper because she broke her right wrist in a skiing
accident.
The first of these explanations is true, and the second is false. But these are
causal explanations; what makes the first one good but the second bad is that
the first, but not the second, identifies a cause of the publication.
In 5.6.1 below, I shall argue that all cases of double-prevention share this
feature. But I have already agreed with Hall that not all cases of double-
prevention succumb to Paul’s aspect analysis. The explanation, I think, is
that Paul has noticed one way in which a sine qua non for an effect can
clearly fail to be its cause. I suggest that this is a special case of a more
general phenomenon, namely, the selectivity of causation.
I said that Paul’s real point has nothing to do with transitivity. What is
her real point then? — I suggest that it is another way of putting the point
Anscombe was making when she said that causal contexts are not extensional.
Paul’s example has a similar structure to one of Anscombe’s:
There is an international crisis because the man with the biggest
nose in France made a speech.
(Anscombe 1969, 155)
That is silly, of course; the crisis was because the President of France made
a speech. But the example has the same effect as Paul’s: by picking out an
event by a causally irrelevant aspect, we create causal statements which are
intuitively false, or at best very strange. The chief difference between the two
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examples is that in Paul’s case, the left-handed writing entails the writing:
the causal event is specified by entailment. Whereas in Anscombe’s case, the
relation is not one of entailment, but of contingent fact: de Gaulle happened
to have the biggest nose in France at the time. I do not think this feature is
essential to the point underlying both examples.
Anscombe goes on:
...one... says, ... “But not because his is the biggest nose.” — Now of
course those who believe causal statements to be extensional will
give an account of the “greater explanatory force” of the second
member of each trio. But the question here is not whether one can
defend a thesis through thick and thin... but really whether there
was originally any good reason for this thesis at all. Here I am in
a bit of difficulty. For I have no sure insight into the source of the
conviction that causal statements are extensional.
(Anscombe 1969, 155)
Maybe we can help. Paul’s example only works in a climate where causal
selection has been rejected. We might, as Anscombe says, acknowledge that
saying “she wrote the paper with her left hand” is less explanatory or perhaps
even misleading; but if we accept the unselective orthodoxy, then as far as the
facts go, the writing of the paper with the left hand is a cause of the publi-
cation. Perhaps, then, the motivation for the conviction that causal contexts
are extensional is a commitment to an unselective notion of causation. An
unselective notion will force us to accept the speech of the big-nosed man as
a cause of the crisis: for that speech was a sine qua non of the crisis. If I
am right that there is a connection here, this is another reason to doubt the
orthodox view of selection; for Anscombe’s discussion of the intensionality of
causation is well-known, and her argument that causal contexts fail to be ex-
tensional is rather convincing. Yet it is hard to see how we could reject the
extensionality of causal contexts, with Anscombe, while keeping the doctrine
that causation is unselective, with the Mill-Lewis tradition. I will generalise
this point in 5.6.1, and argue that in every double-prevention case, only an
unselective conception of causation would tempt us to see the first preventer
as causing the second.
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Hall on Rejecting Dependence
Hall argues that “double-prevention is not causation”, and as I keep promising,
I will endorse this view in the 5.6.1. However, my reason is different from
Hall’s. His goal is to argue that transitivity conflicts with the dependence
thesis — the sufficiency claim that if e counterfactually depends on c, then
c is a cause of e (Hall 2004a, 181). He thinks that double-prevention cases
show this conflict, because we can resolve them by dropping either transitivity
or the dependence thesis. I endorse the suggestion that we reject dependence
whole-heartedly, but I think we also need to reject transitivity.
However, Hall does not think that all the cases we considered motivate the
rejection of the dependence thesis. He thinks that Dog Yelp does, but that
Kvart’s Finger, Dog Bite and Discovered Bomb do not. In each of these cases,
Hall thinks we should bite the bullet and accept that causation is transitive,
despite intuitions to the contrary. The distinction between the two sorts of
case is that, in one, there is a causal process connecting the first event to the
last, but in the other, there is not. An example of the latter sort is the Dog
Yelp case:
This last example is an Easy case — Easy because it is so obvious
how to respond to it in a way that safeguards Transitivity. After
all, the only sense in which Billy’s trip “causes” the dog’s yelp is
that it prevents something — Billy continuing to run towards Suzy,
reaching her in time to stop her from throwing the balloon, and so
on — which, had it happened, would have prevented the yelp. But
no causal process connects the trip to the yelp...
(Hall 2004a, 184)
And this easy answer amounts to rejecting the claim that counterfactual de-
pendence suffices for causation. In the other three cases lately mentioned,
however, there is a causal process connecting the events in question; so we
should bite the bullet, and accept transitivity.
I reject causal transitivity for independent reasons. But I agree with Hall
that double-prevention cases should be regarded with some suspicion: the
events may be counterfactually dependent each on the previous, but it is not
always natural to see them as a chain of causes and effects. However I reject
Hall’s diagnosis: in particular, I reject the suggestion that causal process has
anything to do with the matter. This distinction between causal process and
lack thereof is too important to leave undefined. If a causal process is simply a
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chain of direct causation (cf. McDermott 1995) then whether there is a causal
process will depend on whether there is a chain of direct causation. Hall
is arguing that we must reject either the dependence thesis or transitivity;
the absence of a causal process between the trip and the yelp is supposed
to motivate rejecting the thesis that the dependence of the trip on the yelp
suffices for the trip to cause the yelp. But on this definition of causal process,
the argument is circular: the trip does not cause the yelp, because there is no
causal process; but to say there is no causal process is just to say there is no
chain of causes and effects from trip to yelp, which implies that the trip does
not directly cause the yelp either (assuming, as seems reasonable, we allow
one-step chains). Another definition of causal process might be offered, of
course; until then, this line of argument is unlikely to sway a defender of the
dependence thesis. And since this case forces us to give up either dependence
or transitivity, this argument is not a solid defence of transitivity.
But I agree, and I think that the Reverse Counterfactual account agrees,
that double-prevention is not causation. Let me now propose my own alterna-
tive diagnosis.
5.6 Refinements
5.6.1 Diagnosing Double-Prevention Counterexamples
There is potential for dialectical confusion here. I have argued that causation
is not transitive. I have distinguished two sorts of cases where it appears to
fail: distance and double-prevention. But now I am going to argue that double-
prevention counterexamples do not really constitute counterexamples to causal
transitivity at all, because they fail to amount to causal chains. Why, given
that I reject transitivity, do I also reject these counterexamples to transitivity?
The reason is as follows. In a case of double-prevention, the only reason for
thinking that the first preventer causes the second is that Lewis’s counterfac-
tual is true of it. But I deny that Lewis’s counterfactual suffices for causation.
Moreover, I adopt the Reverse Counterfactual as a necessary condition for cau-
sation; and in each of the cases we have considered, the first preventer fails to
satisfy the Reverse Counterfactual with regard to the second. The only reason
we accept claims like, “the massage was a cause of his going to New York”, is
that the massage is a condition for his going to New York. If we endorse a
selective notion of causation, this reason is not a decisive one.
Let us consider each example, and argue that the first preventer fails to
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cause the second by intuitive lights, when we are careful to distinguish causes
from mere conditions. (I will assert the denial of the Reverse Counterfactual
claim in brackets after each intuitive argument. Since I am denying that cau-
sation occurs in each case, I will be denying the Reverse Counterfactual in
each case; and this is equivalent to asserting a might-counterfactual. So I will
assert the appropriate might-counterfactual, which I think is easier to grasp.)
Consider the Skiing Accident. I have already argued, inspired by Anscombe,
that the accident is not a cause of Suzy writing the paper, even if it does cause
her to write it with her left hand. (If Suzy had not written the paper, she
might still have had a skiing accident.) Similar remarks apply to Dog Bite:
the dog was not responsible for McDermott’s bombing, only for his choice of
finger. (If McDermott had not pushed the button, the dog might still have
bitten off his finger.) In the case of Shock C, where Able wants to save C and
Baker wants to shock him, perhaps the most strained aspect of the example is
that we are asked to see the well-meaning Able’s move as the cause of Baker’s.
But arguably Able’s move did not cause Baker’s, even though it was a mere
condition for it. (If Baker had not thrown the switch, Able might still have
thrown his.) We would more naturally attribute Baker’s action to his own
malice, or his skill at the game, just as we attribute the goal to the striker and
not to the goalkeeper — even though, if the goalkeeper had been positioned
differently in the goal mouth, the striker would have gone for the other corner
of the goal.
In each of these cases, the temptation to see c as a cause of d arises from the
fact c is a condition for d. But if we distinguish causes from mere conditions,
as I suggest we should, then it becomes less convincing that c causes d in each
case. Similar remarks apply to the other cases. Billy could easily have run
and not fallen; running may be a condition for the trip, but did not make it
happen. (If Billy hadn’t tripped, he still might have run.) And the assassin
planting a bomb under Hall’s desk is only seen as causing Hall to find it if
we accept that counterfactual dependence suffices for causation, which I have
argued we should not accept. (If Hall hadn’t found the bomb, the assassin
might still have planted it.) The chest massage may be a cause of the survival,
but it is hardly a cause of the journey to New York. (If the victim hadn’t gone
to New York, he might still have had the chest massage.) And Kvart’s accident
is only seen as causing the surgery in a special sense; it is not as if the accident
made the surgery happen — that was the job of the surgeon. (If Kvart had
not had surgery, he might nevertheless have injured his finger.) Finally, the
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generator fires up when the national grid goes down. The longer the generator
runs, the harder it is to see the grid failure as causing the generator to run. It
does not make the generator run. The only sense in which it might be seen as
a cause is the sense I am arguing we should distinguish from causation: if the
grid wasn’t down, the generator wouldn’t be running. That might be enough
to explain why the generator is running, if someone asks, but it does not make
the generator go in the way that diesel does. (If the generator had not come
on, the grid might still have gone down.)
We might wonder whether it is a mere coincidence that each example shares
the feature I have capitalised on. When c is the first preventer, d the second
preventer and e the effect, is it always a strain to see c as causing d? The answer
is, yes: in principle, cases of double prevention always have this feature. It is
not a coincidence. In a case of double prevention, c is a mere condition for
d, and d causes e. But it is always a strain to see c as causing d because,
intuitively, d prevents c from causing e. In a case where c and d are suitably
independent for the example to have intuitive force — where they are not parts
of the same mechanism, or some such — we will usually be inclined to see the
second preventer as caused by something appropriately independent. Cases
where c and d are not independent — for example, where they are conflicting
parts of a badly-built machine — we are not so likely to regard as failures of
transitivity, but rather as complex causal processes.
Another consideration compels us to reject the claim that c causes d in cases
like these. In this chapter, I have claimed that causation is neither transitive
nor intransitive. It is possible for c to cause d and for d to cause e, but for
c to fail to cause e. Since I have proposed the Reverse Counterfactual as a
necessary condition for causation, this means I must allow that the following
claims are both logically consistent and consistent with any further constraints
on, or claims about, causation:
(1) ∼ D >∼ C [because c causes d]
(2) ∼ E >∼ D [because d causes e]
(3) ∼ (∼ E >∼ C) [because c does not cause e]
Inspired by the suggestion that nontransitivity be seen as a case of causal
selection, we might be tempted to accept that c may also be a condition for d,
and d for e, and indeed that c may be a condition for e— yet c still not cause e.
That is, we might be inclined to accept the following Lewisian counterfactuals,
in at least some cases (those not exhibiting redundancy):
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(4) ∼ C >∼ D [because c is a condition for d]
(5) ∼ D >∼ E [because d is a condition for e]
(6) ∼ C >∼ E [because c is a condition of e, despite not causing e]
We might be inclined to accept this with regard to either kind of counterex-
ample — proximity failure, or double prevention. So we might accept it of the
chain birth – car crash – death, or we might accept it of the chain grid failure
– generator starts – power supplied.
But we should not, because the combination is inconsistent. A valid sub-
stitute for transitivity is this :
B > A
A > B
B > C
_______
A > C
(Lewis 1973c, 17)
If we plug in (5), (2) and (1) in that order, we entail the negation of (3). That
is:
(5) ∼ D >∼ E
(2) ∼ E >∼ D
(1) ∼ D >∼ C
_ _______
∼(3) ∼ E >∼ C
Of course, (3) states the key claim ∼ (∼ E >∼ C): that the Reverse Coun-
terfactual may be false of c and e even when they are related by a chain of
counterfactual dependence (of any kind).
There is a more general question here, about how consecutive causal rela-
tions add up to one big one. For when they do, it is not an extra and unrelated
fact that they do: when c causes e, it does so because it causes d, which causes
e. But if causation is not transitive, what does it mean to say that these
intermediate causal relations give rise or add up or amount to one big one?
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Compare touching, an ordinary nontransitive relation. Jack is touching Jill
and Jill is touching Jim; Jack might or might not be touching Jim, but if he
is, it has nothing to do with whether either of them is touching Jill. Whereas
in causal chains, the intermediate relations have everything to do with the
overarching one. It might be possible for c to cause e without doing so via d,
but then the case would be different. Whereas Jack and Jim might stand in
just the same touching relation to each other, regardless of whether either was
touching Jill. In other words, we need to explain why causation sometimes
seems to be transitive, if it is not.
The kind of argument above offers a powerful potential explanation. For
we could say that, although causation is not transitive, it effectively becomes
so when redundancy is absent in the right places. In a chain of three events,
each causing the next, the first will cause the third if the intermediate event
is also a mere condition for the third. Note that this is a partial explanation:
I do not say only if. There may be cases where the first event causes the
third, but where this condition is not satisfied. (Most obviously, the cases
of preemption which we will consider in Chapter 6 have this property.) The
suggestion, rather, is that when this condition is satisfied, causation must be
transitive. If we take longer chains, this generalises to the claim that causation
must be transitive in causal chains where each cause is also a mere condition
for its effect: that is, when there is no redundancy.
Although it is partial, this is quite a neat explanation, arguably more ele-
gant and more discriminatory than just stipulating causation to be transitive
across the board, as Lewis does. For every case where we accept that causation
fails to be transitive, we must do one of the following:
• deny (1) that c causes d (so we may assert ∼ (∼ D >∼ C)); or
• deny (2) that d causes e (so assert ∼ (∼ E >∼ D)); or
• deny (5) that d is a condition for e (so assert ∼ (∼ D >∼ E)).
I have just made an independent argument that we should deny (1) in cases
of double prevention, on the basis that I recommend a selective notion of
causation. The puzzle of double-prevention was that c may be a condition for d
and d for e, yet cmay fail to cause e. My solution, in a nutshell, is to assert that
c is a mere condition, and not a cause, of d. The puzzle of double-prevention
arises because philosophers often ignore this distinction (as illustrated by the
venerable Mill-Lewis tradition). Moreover, causal terminology is just vague:
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people can accept that the power failure caused the generator to come on, in
the sense that if the power hadn’t failed the generator wouldn’t have come on.
But this is a case of conversational charity; if we distinguish causation from
conditionhood, we see that the first preventer is all condition, no cause, with
regard to the second.
Now let us see if we can achieve a similar diagnosis of proximity failure.
5.6.2 Diagnosing Proximity Failure
Our discussion of the appearance of causal transitivity also explains why
double-prevention counterexamples to transitivity exist. Does it explain dis-
tance counterexamples too? Not all distance counterexamples share the crucial
failure of the first step in the proposed causal chain, which we used to explain
double-prevention. For example, my birth is plausibly seen as both a cause
and a condition of my first breath; and my first breath is a mere condition for
my last; that gives us all the counterfactuals we need to prove that the Reverse
Counterfactual holds between my last breath and my first.
But as we have already noted, claims like,
If I hadn’t been born, I wouldn’t have just had a coffee
are ambiguous. On the one hand, they are obviously true, if the antecedent
refers to the mere fact of my birth. But compare:
If I hadn’t been born, my grandparents would not have had a phone
call at 3am that morning.
The same form of words in different contexts yields what are effectively two
different antecedents. It is not plausible to suggest that my actual birth,
specified in any detail, is a condition for many other events in my life, such as
my going to university and studying philosophy. After all, many other people
have had rather different births, at different times and in different places, with
different parents and different degrees of ease or difficulty, yet some of them still
seem to manage to study philosophy too. Returning to our previous example,
my birth as it actually happened may be a both a cause and condition for my
first breath; but the details of my first breath are irrelevant to the details of
my last, unless they are very close together (which in my case they were not).
In sum, proximity failure occurs when the long chain of Lewisian counter-
factuals fails. This is because, the longer the chain, the greater the possibility
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of redundancy: the likelier we are to wonder whether the effect in question
might not have come about by some other, maybe unguessed, route; so we
stop regarding the earlier events as mere conditions for the later. This is the
Paul-Anscombe point: it is hard to see the details of my coffee drinking as
depending on the details of my birth. We can circumvent this difficulty by
specifying events very blandly — the fact of birth, and the fact of drinking
coffee. But then the causal links become less plausible. The mere fact of birth,
considered on its own and without details, does not put a coffee in my hand,
though it is a mere condition for my drinking coffee.
It would be nice to check the correctness of this analysis with a little thought
experiment. Suppose someone provided a very long chain of events, and argued
convincingly that each was a mere condition for the next, taking into account
all the foregoing remarks about detail. Suppose it was also convincing that
each event also caused the next. Then, if I am right, we would be inclined to
accept that it also caused the last. In practice, however, it is extremely hard to
do this, precisely because it is unconvincing to chain many events together and
claim convincingly that each is a condition for the next. The more events we
include, and the longer the chain gets, the easier it is to wonder whether one
of these events might have come about anyway, by some other means. In such
cases, we are not compelled to take the first event in the chain as the cause of
the last. That, I think, is why causation fails to be transitive when causes are
not proximate to their effects. I have not, however, shown positively that we
should not take the first event as the cause of the last in such circumstances.
Perhaps the reason for that comes down to further details of the selectivity of
causation, which this account does not capture.
5.7 Summary
It has been argued that causation is not transitive. Despite the widely held
view to the contrary, the four motivations we considered were found wanting.
It is far from clear that the transitivity of causation is an “a priori insight” or a
“bedrock datum”; at any rate, I do not share the insight. Lewis stipulates that
causation is transitive to help his account handle preemption, but that way
of dealing with preemption is the weakest aspect of Lewis’s account (and no
other account has gained general acceptance either). It also relies on the denial
of backtrackers, a denial we have not endorsed. Both these points will receive
further discussion in the next chapter. Lewis has an argument concerning the
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actions of Apollo, but that argument was found wanting; moreover it was first
published in 2000, so hardly explains the wide acceptance of transitivity for
three decades or more previously. Opposition to a selective, or discrimina-
tory or inegalitarian notion of causation was also considered as a motive for
defending transitivity. It may be an important motivation, but this simply
strengthens our case. We have already seen that there are good reasons to
rebel against the anti-selective orthodoxy, making it all the more natural that
we should question the doctrine of causal transitivity.
Two sorts of cases were distinguished in which causation fails to be tran-
sitive: cases where the cause is too distant from, or fails to be sufficiently
proximate to the effect; and cases where there exists a special causal struc-
ture which I identified as double prevention. It was argued that the Reverse
Counterfactual correctly reflects our intuitions about cases of proximity failure.
At somewhat more length, the same was claimed in the case of double pre-
vention, where we tested the Reverse Counterfactual against seven purported
counterexamples to transitivity from the literature. In each case, the Reverse
Counterfactual agreed that the first event failed to cause the last. Three de-
fences of transitivity against these counterexamples were criticised, and their
useful parts found to be either incorporated in or explained by the Reverse
Counterfactual account. Finally it was noted that certain combinations of
counterfactuals could not consistently be held.
This enabled us to deepen our understanding of causal nontransitivity.
First, in a sense it corroborated the defences of transitivity in the literature,
since we found reason to deny that the first preventer can legitimately be seen
as causing the second, in a case of double prevention. I suspect the lack of
a theoretical distinction between causes and mere conditions has led many
thinkers to miss this feature of double-prevention cases. Second, again reduc-
ing the distance between my account and the common view, it was found that
causation is transitive in any case where there is no redundancy and where
each event genuinely causes the next. This partly explains why causation is so
often treated as transitive over short chains, and also why the nontransitivity
of causation fails to have the pure contingency of other nontransitive relations
like touching. Finally, we were able to offer an account of proximity failure by
noticing that the longer a causal chain, the less plausible it is simultaneously
to maintain that each event strictly causes the next, and that it is counter-
factually necessary for the next. The longer the chain, the greater the scope
for redundancy, and for wondering whether later events might have been how
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they actually were, even if earlier events had been a bit different.
Redundancy has played a big part in this chapter. Now let us give it our
full attention.
Chapter 6
Redundancy1
6.0 Abstract
The term “redundant causation” is an umbrella. Overdetermination among
existing events is distinguished from redundancy due to non-occurring back-
ups. Symmetric and asymmetric overdetermination are further distinguished,
and within the latter, preemption and trumping are distinguished. It is pro-
posed that the Reverse Counterfactual holds true of cause-effect pairs even in
cases of preemption. This gives us the basis for distinguishing causes from
preempted events. I argue that the Reverse Counterfactual is true only of
causes in some easy cases, allowing us to distinguish causes from preempted
events. Then I argue that we can make the same distinction in harder cases,
if we employ an intuitive notion of a causal chain. Next we discuss trumping,
where appeal to causal chains appears not to help. I argue that the Reverse
Counterfactual distinguishes trumping events from trumped events with what-
ever intuitive resources are provided to motivate the intuitive distinction; if no
such resources are provided, trumping collapses into symmetric overdetermi-
nation. Finally we discuss symmetric overdetermination, which does not yield
counterexamples in the way that preemption does. Nevertheless I argue that
the Reverse Counterfactual account avoids the difficulties which beset Lewis’s
account associated with mereological summing.
6.1 Preemption, Necessity and Sufficiency
Before we dig into the main discussion, it might help to remember why various
sorts of redundant causation — notably preemption — have caused problems
1This chapter is based on material in [Broadbent, 2007].
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for counterfactual analyses. The heart of the problem is this. The tradition of
counterfactual analysis starts with the thought that a certain counterfactual,
∼ C >∼ E, is sufficient for causation (a claim which the last two chapters have
disputed). The existence of redundant causation shows that this counterfactual
cannot also be a necessary condition for causation. For in cases of redundant
causation, it is false that ∼ C >∼ E, yet true that c causes e.
The reason that redundant causation poses this sort of challenge to coun-
terfactual accounts is as follows. Counterfactual accounts in the Lewis tradi-
tion make causes necessary, in a certain sense, for their effects. That is, the
standard counterfactual account makes causes necessary for their effects in a
counterfactual sense: in the sense that, had the cause not happened, the effect
would not have happened. We might also say that the cause was necessary in
the circumstances, or some such. But this is problematic: although causes are
sometimes necessary in this way for their effects, in other circumstances they
are not. There is often more than one way for a given effect to come about:
often, causes are redundant in this sense.
At this point it is important not to get our necessities mixed up. Lewisian
accounts offer a sufficient condition for causation which makes causes counter-
factually necessary for their effects. By contrast, the Reverse Counterfactual
offers a necesary condition for causation, which (I shall argue shortly) makes
causes sufficient for their effects. In short:
Lewis’s Account: If ∼ C >∼ E then c causes e.
Reverse Counterfactual Account: If c causes e then ∼ E >∼ C.
Redundancy is what prevents Lewis’s counterfactual being a necessary condi-
tion for causation as well as a sufficient one; and this is because causes fail to
be counterfactually necessary for their effects in cases of redundancy.
Redundant causation is a problem for any account which makes causes nec-
essary for their effects. An account which does not do this, will not suffer from
redundancy counterexamples, such as cases of preemption. Giving an example
of a case where c fails to be counterfactually necessary for e will be of little
interest to an account which does not assert any such counterfactual necessity
in the first place. Mine is such an account. The Reverse Counterfactual can-
not be seen as asserting that causes are counterfactually necessary for their
effects; in fact, it is better read as asserting that they are counterfactually
sufficient (a claim I shall defend in a moment). That is to say, for c to cause e,
the occurrence of c must be enough for the occurence of e, in a certain sense.
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Prima facie, cases where c causes e yet where the occurrence of c fails to be
required for the occurrence of e are irrelevant to this claim. The claim that
c suffices for e is not in the least undermined by exhibiting cases where, if c
hadn’t happened, e might have happened anyway.
It is not uncommon to see writers generalising from the difficulties arising
from redundant causation and suggesting that preemption is a problem for all
counterfactual approaches. For example:
...the failed intermediary and would-be differences strategies that
extant [counterfactual accounts of causation] use are inadequate as
general solutions to the preemption problem. Of course there may
yet be some new strategy for [counterfactual accounts of causation]
which will prove adequate, but at this point the prospects look
dark.
(Schaffer 2004a, 71)
These sentiments echo Lewis’s charismatic dismissal of the regularity approach,
in favour of his promising new counterfactual alternative. But in the present
context, such a discussion is hasty. The difficulties with preemption have
nothing to do with counterfactual accounts per se. Rather, they arise because
Lewis’s is a necessity account of cause. A counterfactual account not sharing
this feature need not suffer from preemption in the way that Lewis’s account
does.
The Reverse Counterfactual clearly does not make causes counterfactually
necessary for their effects, but one might wonder whether it really makes them
counterfactually sufficient. The most obvious way to characterise the notion
that c is counterfactually sufficient for e would be to assert that, if c were
to happen, then e would happen: that is, C > E. This is not equivalent
to ∼ E >∼ C, because contraposition fails for counterfactuals.2 In general,
the counterfactual necessity of A for B is not equivalent to the counterfactual
sufficiency of B for A. And the Reverse Counterfactual appears to characterise
the counterfactual necessity of the effect for the cause — a notion which has
little intuitive appeal.
2Cf. Lewis 1973c, 17). For example: “If I had not been in the pub at 7pm yesterday, I
would have been in the library” might be true, but “If I had not been in the library at 7pm
yesterday, I would have been in the pub” might be false. The first counterfactual would
have helped you find me, had you been looking, while the contrapositive would have led
you astray. For as it happens I was in the library, not the pub, and if I hadn’t been in the
library, I would have been at home.
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Nevertheless I think we should see the Reverse Counterfactual as charac-
terising a kind of counterfactual sufficiency of cause for effect. On Lewis’s
semantics (and this is an aspect which I am not disputing), C > E is true
automatically when C&E. So that is not available as a useful characterisation
of the way causes are counterfactually sufficient for their effects: every pair of
actual events would satisfy it. The Reverse Counterfactual might be seen as
the nearest non-trivial alternative. More positively, the Reverse Counterfac-
tual makes causes sufficient for their effects in a very clear way. For C and
∼ E >∼ C entails E, by counterfactual modus tollens. In other words, given
that c causes e, the occurrence of c is logically sufficient for the occurrence
of e. This is surely intuitively right: it is hard to see how c could happen,
and cause e, and yet e fail to happen. For these reasons, then, I suggest that
the Reverse Counterfactual be seen as a sufficiency account of causes; there-
fore we can be optimistic that it will cope well with the infamous preemption
counterexamples which we are going to consider.
6.2 Varieties of Redundancy
Let us say that an event is redundant with respect to a given effect when it
fails to be counterfactually necessary for it. The problem this poses for Lewis’s
counterfactual account of causation is then clear: sometimes, events which
are redundant with respect to e nevertheless cause e. Among these, we can
distinguish cases where c1 causes e, but is redundant due to a non-occurring
back-up event, c2, which would occur and cause e if c1did not. We can restrict
the term overdetermination to cases where two or more actually occurring
events are redundant with respect to a given effect, and e is caused by at least
one of them. Then c1 and c2 both occur, but are redundant because if either
were to fail to occur, e would still occur thanks to the other. Among these, we
can further distinguish symmetric and asymmetric cases. In symmetric cases,
c1 and c2 have equal claim to cause e; in asymmetric cases, it is intuitively
clear that only c1 and not c2 causes e. Asymmetric cases may be subdivided
yet further by distinguishing those where c1 causes e in virtue of causing some
intermediary event which causes e. Let us call these cases preemption. The
remaining cases, asymmetric and without intermediary events, we call cases
of trumping. Finally, for convenience, let us include cases of redundancy due
to non-occurring back-ups with the cases of preemption. Figure 6.1 illustrates
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Figure 6.1: Kinds of Redundancy
this classification.3
These distinctions differ somewhat from Lewis’s. In particular, Lewis con-
siders trumping to be a kind of preemption. I prefer to distinguish it, however,
since I think it is a rather special sort of case (as I shall argue in 6.6). In
addition, Lewis usually assumes that preemption occurs only between actu-
ally occurring events. However this distinction is not rigorously observed (eg.
see Lewis 1986a, 195–6), and it will make our discussion neater if we include
redundancy due to non-occurring back-ups with cases of preemption among
actually occurring events.
Most of the discussion of preemption focuses on a distinction which I have
not given: the distinction between early and late preemption. This distinction
is not intuitive, and cannot only be given in terms of the first of Lewis’s three
solutions to the problem of preemption. Let us therefore introduce the first
solution, and the rival here to be preferred.
3Throughout, when I speak of a non-occurring event I mean a possible event which does
not actually occur. “Non-actual event” or “potential event” could equally have been used; I
prefer “non-occurring” because it can be used also for the term “back-up”, whereas talk of
non-actual or potential back-ups might be confusing.
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6.3 Early Preemption
6.3.1 Lewis’s First Solution: Chains
Able and Baker are philosophical vandals. They enjoy throwing rocks at bottles
and falsifying theories of causation. One day, they set up a bottle, retire to
a respectable distance, and select some good rocks. Able throws a rock, and
smashes the bottle. If Able hadn’t thrown, Baker would have done; so the
bottle might have smashed. So it is false that, if Able hadn’t thrown, the
bottle wouldn’t have smashed. Yet Able’s throw caused the bottle to smash.
Lewis’s analysis starts with the thought that c causes e if ∼ C >∼ E.
Preemption counterexamples make it difficult to add a necessary condition to
this sufficient condition. Lewis’s first proposal is as follows. Causation is to
be identified, not with counterfactual dependence, but with chains of causal
dependence.4 There is causal dependence between actual and distinct events
c and e iff ∼ C >∼ E (Lewis 1986a, 166–7). c causes e iff there is a chain of
causal dependence running from c to e.
There can be causation without causal dependence, because of the failure
of transitivity for counterfactuals. Suppose e causally depends upon d and
d upon c. Then c causes e. But it does not follow that e causally depends
upon c: it is logically possible that, if c had not happened, e might still have
happened (Lewis 1986a, 167).5
Lewis’s solution to early preemption is bipartite, and employs this point
first. Although the smash does not causally, or counterfactually, depend on
Able’s throw, there is a chain of dependence leading from the throw to the
smash. The chain might go like this. Able throws, and if he hadn’t thrown,
his rock would not have hit the bottle — Step One. If his rock had not hit the
bottle, the bottle wouldn’t have broken — Step Two. Thus we have a chain
of events, and each counterfactually depends on the previous, even though the
last does not counterfactually depend on the first.
But might we not protest that, if Able’s rock had not struck the bottle,
maybe Able wouldn’t have thrown, and then Baker would have thrown, and so
the bottle might have broken anyway? (We would be objecting to Step Two
in the chain above.)
No, says Lewis, because this objection is based on a piece of backtracking
4As previously noted, to claim causal dependence between two events is equivalent to
claiming counterfactual dependence plus the claim that the two events actually occur (2).
5Lewis also protects the claimed transitivity of causation against the nontransitivity of
counterfactuals with this point.
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reasoning. It includes the claim, “If Able’s rock had not struck the bottle, Able
wouldn’t have thrown”, and that is clearly a backtracker. This invocation of
the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is the second part of his solution
to early preemption.
It remains only to reply to the objection that [the effect] e does
not causally depend upon [the intermediate event] d, because if d
had been absent then [the cause] c1 would have been absent and
[the preempted] c2, no longer preempted, would have caused e. We
may reply by denying the claim that if d had been absent then c1
would have been absent... I rather claim that if d had been absent,
c1 would have somehow failed to cause d. But c1 would still have
been there to inferfere with c2, so e would not have occurred.
(Lewis 1986a, 172)
Lewis asserts that if Able’s rock hadn’t hit the bottle, then he would still have
thrown, but for some reason the rock would not have hit the bottle.
Notice two things. First, Lewis does not merely deny this backtracker:
If Able’s rock hadn’t hit the bottle, he wouldn’t have thrown.
He does not merely deny ∼ D >∼ C1. Rather, he asserts ∼ D > C1: that is,
he asserts:
If Able’s rock hadn’t hit the bottle, he would still have thrown.
The reason is that merely denying the backtracker in question would amount
to asserting ∼ (∼ D >∼ C1), which is equivalent to ∼ D ≥ C1. In words:
If Able’s rock hadn’t hit the bottle, he might have thrown.
But obviously this is compatible with —
If Able’s rock hadn’t hit the bottle, he might not have thrown.
And that is enough to run our objection: Able might not have thrown, so
Baker might, so the bottle might have broken anyway. That is enough to
falsify the claim that it would not have smashed, had Able’s rock not struck
it. To rule this out, Lewis must not merely deny the backtracking reasoning
powering the objection; he must employ some of his own.
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The obvious point here is that Lewis endorses a backtracker of his own.
But I don’t think this is a killer point: I think he would say this is one of
the backtrackers licensed by his account (see 2.4.1). Perhaps less obvious but
more important is the point that merely denying backtrackers is not enough to
make Lewis’s solution to early preemption work. Lewis’s arguments concerning
the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence support denying backtrackers,
but nothing more. If Lewis’s solution does indeed rely on the asymmetry of
counterfactual dependence, then it does so in a more subtle and less obvious
way than that which he presents.6 I have not seen this point attended to.
Second, the notion of preemptive causes “interfering” with preempted causes
is somewhat distant from our ordinary understanding of the term “preemption”.
On Lewis’s picture, Able’s throw preempts Baker’s because it prevents it — at
least, because it prevents it from causing a bottle smash, by preventing either
the throw itself or some event further along the causal chain which would oth-
erwise lead from Baker’s throw to the smash. But this is not how we ordinarily
use the term: usually, preemption involves no interference; the preemptor just
gets there first. Lewis’s slight deviance from ordinary usage suggests the obvi-
ous place to look for more difficult counterexamples, namely, in places where
there is no interference between the two causal processes, and the preempting
one indeed just gets there first. Late preemption cases are like this. We will
come to the distinction between early and late preemption shortly, but first,
let me advocate a different solution to cases of the sort we have just discussed,
where redundancy is due to the presence of non-occurring back-ups.
6.3.2 The Reverse Counterfactual Solution
We saw in 6.1 that the accounts which make causes sufficient for their effects
ought not, in principle, be threatened by preemption counterexamples. Cases
of preemption show that causes are not always counterfactually necessary for
their effects, thereby threatening the claim that counterfactual necessity is it-
self a necessary condition on causation. But a necessary condition on causation
which claims that causes are always counterfactually sufficient for their effects
will not be counterexampled when causes fail to be counterfactually necessary
for their effects. Such are preemption cases, and the Reverse Counterfactual
is a sufficiency account of cause; so it ought, in principle, not be threatened
by preemption.
6Presumably by depending on the backtrackers which, as we have seen, his account
implies.
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And indeed, it seems that the Reverse Counterfactual does not need any
qualification to deal with our example of preemption. The closest world in
which the bottle does not smash is one where Able does not throw the rock,
or misses. True, nor does Baker. But Baker does not actually throw a rock.
So he can hardly be said to actually cause the smashing of the bottle: causes
must be actually occurring events.
Maybe that was too quick. Is the nearest world where the bottle doesn’t
smash one where Able doesn’t throw (or misses)? What justifies the claim
that it is?
Suppose you were watching Able and Baker throwing rocks at the bottle.
You watch Able take aim and then your attention is distracted for a moment.
You look back, and see Able and Baker casting around for good-sized rocks,
and the bottle still intact. “What happened, did you miss?” you call out. “Or
perhaps you decided to look for a better rock, and didn’t throw?” If you share
the intuition that this is how you would respond, then I think you share the
intuition that the closest world where the bottle does not smash is one where
Able does not throw, or throws and misses. You have arrived at that conclusion
by an application of the Inference Test: you supposed the antecedent true (that
the bottle didn’t smash), and inferred the consequent (that Able didn’t throw
accurately, or at all).
It will be noticed that I have inserted the qualifier “accurately”. It might be
objected that the closest worlds where the bottle doesn’t smash include some
where Able misses, and thus it is false that if the bottle hadn’t smashed, he
wouldn’t have thrown (because he would have thrown and missed). Actually
I think this objection brings out an advantage of the account. Accuracy is
causally relevant, in this case. The cause of the smash is Able’s accurate
throw. The fact that the Reverse Counterfactual specifies that Able throws
accurately (by specifying that if the bottle hadn’t smashed, Able wouldn’t
have thrown or would have missed) is hardly a criticism.
It appears, therefore, that reversing the Lewisian counterfactual provides
us with a counterfactual which can deal with this example of preemption with
no modification at all. This is very promising. Note, however, that this case of
preemption has a special feature. The preempted event does not actually occur:
Baker does not actually throw. The distinction which Lewis draws between
early and late preemption does not correspond to a distinction between cases
where the preempted event does not occur, and those where it does: early
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preemption includes cases where both candidate causes actually occur.7 So the
Reverse Counterfactual solution is not really a solution to early preemption, as
Lewis defines it, but to a limited set of cases where the preempted alternative
does not actually occur. Nevertheless I shall argue that the solution extends
to cases where both causes do occur, whether they are cases of early or late
preemption.
Note that, even though Lewis requires causes to be actual events, our move
is not available to Lewis. His is the problem that ∼ C1 >∼ E is false, even if
the competing c2 does not occur. Whereas the Reverse Counterfactual faces a
charge, not of falsity, but of too much truth. This is no problem for a necessary
condition. Another necessary condition for causation, the actual occurrence
of causes, can then be appealed to, in order to rule the preempted non-actual
event out.
6.4 Late Preemption
6.4.1 The Early/Late Distinction
Now that they have limbered up, Able and Baker start a quick-fire bottle
smashing competition. Both throw as quickly as they can at a given signal.
Able’s rock breaks the bottle, and moments later, Baker’s rock whistles through
the scattering shards where the bottle till lately stood. As in the previous
example, if Able had not thrown, the bottle might still have broken. But
Lewis’s solution will not work. For unlike in our previous case, there is no
chain of true Lewisian counterfactuals with which he can defensibly replace
the single false one. Consider the impact event, Able’s rock hitting the bottle.
Suppose that hadn’t happened, by some miracle: the rock swerves slightly.
Baker’s rock was just a few centimetres away; surely, it would — or at least
might — still hit the bottle. And might is enough: if the bottle might still have
smashed, then it is false that it would not have. This reasoning does not rely
on backtracking of any kind, so Lewis cannot avail himself of his asymmetry of
counterfactual dependence to rule it out of order. When we imagine that Able
misses, we need not reason back to the absence of any earlier event, because
Baker’s rock is already on its way.
Although it is a difference between our two examples, the difference between
early and late preemption in general does not come down to the difference
7And, I shall suggest, if we allow preemption of non-occurring back-ups, then these can
be cases of late-preemption.
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between cases where a preempted event occurs and those where it does not.
So what exactly is the distinction between early and late preemption?
In early preemption, the process running from the preempted al-
ternative is cut off well before the main process running from the
preempting cause has gone to completion. Then somewhere along
that main process, not too early and not too late, we can find an
intermediate event to complete a causal chain in two steps from
the preempting cause to the final effect. The effect depends on the
intermediate, which depends in turn on the preempting cause.
(Lewis 1986a, 200)
The distinction is thus theory laden, depending upon the circumstances in
which Lewis’s first solution to the problem of preemption fails. It is, of course,
possible to specify these circumstances, as Lewis does above. First, at some
point in the preempted causal chain, there is a non-actual event which would
occur if some event in the actual chain did not. Second, there must be at least
two further events between the preventing event in the actual chain, and the
effect (cf. Lewis 1986a, 200). These circumstances may be described, but I
do not see any special significance about them. (Nor do I see Lewis claim any
further significance for them.) I draw attention to the fact because the Reverse
Counterfactual does not respect the early/late distinction, as we shall see. If
the distinction is a theoretical one, and does not have a clear intuitive basis,
then this need not worry us in itself. Nevertheless the early/late distinction is
a big deal for Lewis, precisely because it appears to be a distinction between
cases he can handle by denying backtrackers in the way described, and cases
he cannot handle in that way.
Late preemption has proved to be the thorn in the side of counterfactual
analysis. It would be a serious task to survey all the responses that have
been made, and also a dubious expenditure of energy, since none has won a
widespread following. Instead we will briefly consider Lewis’s own two subse-
quent efforts to handle preemption.
6.4.2 Lewis’s Second Solution: Quasi-Dependence
Lewis provides a tentative solution in terms of quasi-dependence, which we
will briefly consider. His later solution in terms of influence is arguably more
important, however, since it constitutes a thorough revision of his theory of
causation.
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Quasi-dependence between events consists in their being exactly like a nom-
ically possible set of events which display counterfactual dependence. The
thought is intuitively grasped. Lewis thinks that causation is an intrinsic mat-
ter (except, perhaps, for the involvement of the laws of nature); if there are
two spatio-temporal regions governed by the same laws, which match exactly
in matters of intrinsic fact, then there cannot be causation in one case but not
in the other (Lewis 1986a, 206).
The intuitive observation underlying this account is that cases of preemp-
tion include events which are not causally relevant, but which affect the truth-
value of the counterfactuals. Baker’s throw doesn’t have any effect on the
bottle, it just changes the truth-value of the counterfactuals concerning what
would have happened to the bottle if Baker hadn’t thrown. We can imagine
Baker’s throw away without changing the causal facts concerning Able and
the bottle. In effect, Lewis’s quasi-dependence account suggests doing exactly
this. There is a similar possible situation in which Able’s throw and the bottle
smash are exactly as they are, but Baker’s throw is absent; and in that situa-
tion, the bottle smash counterfactually depends on Able’s throw. In virtue of
this, it quasi-depends on Able’s throw in the actual world.
Lewis did not endorse quasi-dependence eagerly.
The extended analysis, which allows causation by quasi-dependence,
is more complicated than my original analysis... While I would still
welcome a different solution to the problem of late preemption,
within my original analysis, I now think that the extended analysis
[in terms of quasi-dependence] may well be preferable.
(Lewis 1986a, 207)
Not only was Lewis tentative about it in the first place, he produced a su-
perseding theory, which we shall shortly discuss. Several obvious difficulties
beset quasi-dependence. First, it sits uneasily with Lewis’s (suitably qualified)
view that causation is intrinsic. On a quasi-dependence account, what makes
a causal process causal its similarity to some other possible process. Similarity
to some other process is not an intrinsic property. This is particularly awkward
given the role that intuitions about the intrinsicness of causation are supposed
to play in motivating quasi-dependence in the first place. Second, it makes
nothing of Lewis’s strong intuition that event fragility has something to do
with preemption. This is rather a therapeutic worry; nevertheless it could well
be something preventing Lewis’s fuller endorsement.
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Finally, the position does not really seem to capture whatever features
of our concept of causation power our intuitions about preemption cases. We
could accept the thought that two intrinsically alike processes must be causally
alike, but why should we say that causation occurs in both if counterfactual
dependence occurs in one? We could equally deny causation of both, as far as
the directive goes, that intrinsically alike processes are causally alike. Yet to
do so would be ridiculous, in cases where causation is clearly present in both.
Moreover it is arguable that our intuitions about causation in preemptive cases
do not derive from their possible likeness to non-preemptive cases. We might
accept that, for any case of causal redundancy, there is a possible case that is
intrinsically similar with respect to the cause and the effect, but which displays
no redundancy. But we might expect that this should be explained by the fact
that the process is causal in the preemptive case, rather than vice versa.
6.4.3 Lewis’s Third Solution: Influence
Lewis’s most recent efforts to deal with late preemption (along with trumping,
which we will discuss next) involve a significant adjustment of his view. In place
of counterfactual dependence characterised straightforwardly by counterfactual
conditionals, he introduces a notion of influence. The idea is to make the effect
depend counterfactually not just on whether the cause happens, but on when
and how it happens. For some putative cause c (Able throwing a rock, say) and
some putative effect e (the bottle smashing), there is a range of alterations,
c1, ..., cn, and e1, ..., en. These are events each occupying a different world,
and each differing from c and e to a greater or lesser degree. Strictly, c and e
count as alterations of themselves. We don’t need to decide at what degree the
differences threaten the identity of the events in question — at what point the
alterations stop being alterations to c and e and start being different events.
This will be a strength of the position, if we agree with Lewis that our intuitions
regarding event identity are frequently indeterminate and fickle (Lewis 2004a,
86). Now we can say:
Where C and E are distinct actual events, let us say that C in-
fluences E iff there is a substantial range C1, C2, ... of different
not-too-distant alterations of C (including the actual alteration of
C) and there is a range E1, E2, ... of alterations of E, at least some
of which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have oc-
curred, and if C2 had occurred, E2 would have occurred, and so
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on... C causes E iff there is a chain of stepwise influence from C
to E.
(Lewis 2004a, 91)
The intuitive idea is easy enough to see. If Able had thrown a little harder,
or chosen a different rock, or aimed at the neck rather than the base of the
bottle, the bottle would have smashed a little differently. Whereas Baker’s
whims would have made no difference.
Causation as influence has had a mixed reception in the literature. On the
one hand, it overcomes the problems recently sketched for quasi-dependence.
It does not generate tensions about the intrinsicness of causation, it explains
why making events extremely fragile seems to help with preemption, and it
explains why our intuitions about causation in preemptive cases do not seem
to derive from our intuitions about non-preemptive cases. On the other hand,
it lacks the striking simplicity of Lewis’s original proposal. More worryingly,
it has been called a subject change: causal influence and causation may turn
out to be two distinct concepts, both of which we possess. They may even
be extensionally distinct concepts. Collins cites one of Lewis’s own earlier
examples:
If a poison kills its victim more slowly and painfully when taken on
a full stomach, then the victim’s eating pudding before he drinks
the poisoned potion has a causal influence on his death, since the
time and manner of the death depend counterfactually on the eat-
ing of the pudding. Yet the eating of the pudding is not a cause of
his death.
(Collins 2004, 114)
Substituting causal influence for causation risks counting all sorts of things
as causes which we would not intuitively admit, although they make a differ-
ence to how the effect happens. If the light breeze that was blowing when
Able threw had been a little different, then the bottle would have smashed a
little differently; but our common judgement does not allow that the breeze
caused the smash. I criticised Lewis’s simplest counterfactual account for be-
ing unselective, but this amendment seems to make the problem a great deal
worse. Even those who see no problem with an unselective notion of causation
might baulk at accepting that the breeze which ruﬄed my hair on the way
to the office is a cause of my arrival in the office, that arrival being — as it
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was — a ruﬄed one, with many differently ruﬄed alterations corresponding to
different possible breezes. More generally, universal gravitation means every
massive object influences every other: a range of nearby alterations exist in
which I move my hand more or less to the left, corresponding to each of which
is a minute alteration of Saturn’s orbit. But I do not claim to cause Saturn’s
heavenly progress just by waving my hands around, even though I exert an
influence on the orbit.8
Another problem is that some sorts of cause-effect pairs may not exhibit the
sort of variation Lewis envisages. This will particularly be the case when the
effect is an all-or-nothing sort of event, either by nature or by circumstance.
Crediting a conversation with Yablo, Hall points out that Able’s rock could
be replaced by a Smart Rock — a computerised jet-propelled rock, which can
be programmed to attain a particular velocity and orientation when it hits
the bottle (Hall 2004b, 237). Minor variations in Able’s throw now count for
nothing (though we might say he cheated in the quick-draw bottle smashing
contest).
When Lewis discusses the question of whether making events fragile would
rule out all cases of preemption, in the postscripts to his 1973 paper, he says
this:
...residual cases of redundancy, in which it makes absolutely no
difference to the effect whether both causes occur or only one...
probably... would be mere possibilities, far-fetched and contrary to
the ways of the world. Then we could happily leave them as spoils
to the victor.
(Lewis 1986a, 197)
In this vein, perhaps it could be argued that invoking computerised guidance
systems for rocks is a bit far-fetched? — But there is no need to go hi-tech.
My alarm clock is set to go off at 7am if someone presses the On button any
time in the previous twenty-four hours. When I go to bed, I press it; but had
I bothered to look I would have seen that the alarm was already set, because
my wife had pressed it earlier. My wife’s pressing the On button is the cause
of the alarm going off, but if she hadn’t pressed it, it would still have gone
off because I pressed the button too. Moreover, the alarm’s going off at 7am
the next morning is highly insensitive to minor variations in how and when
8I owe the point about gravity to Dan Heard.
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my wife pressed the button: its time and manner are not affected by small
differences in the time and manner of my wife’s action.
I do not propose to go any further into the details of Lewis’s analysis, nor
the possible problems it might face. Nor do I propose to discuss any other
attempts to resolve the problem of late preemption. Instead, I would like to
illustrate how these kinds of problems are very readily avoided by the simple
reversing move I have been advocating, without appeal to quasi-dependence,
causal influence, or any resource beyond the simple and intuitive notion of a
causal chain.
6.5 Developing The Reverse Counterfactual So-
lution
6.5.1 The Modified Condition
Able and Baker both throw, and Able’s rock gets there moments before Baker’s.
If the bottle hadn’t smashed, neither Able nor Baker would have thrown accu-
rately. The Inference Test yields this result: we would surely infer the absence
or inaccuracy of both throws from the survival of the bottle. In worlds talk,
at the nearest world where the bottle doesn’t smash, surely neither Able nor
Baker throws accurately. These are both salient differences from the actual
world. The Reverse Counterfactual is true of them both. But in this com-
petitive context, Able will insist — rightly — that his throw and not Baker’s
caused the smash.
There are two (compatible) ways we could respond, one more boring and
one less. The more boring way would be to point out that the Reverse Coun-
terfactual is offered as a necessary condition for causation: pointing out that
it is met by non-causes does not threaten the claim that all causes meet it.
However, this response is boring. Perhaps it would not be entirely uninterest-
ing to discover that the Reverse Counterfactual is true when c1 causes e, even
if it is also true of the preempted c2. But we might have hoped for more: just
as we used the necessary condition consisting in the Reverse Counterfactual
to discriminate between causes and mere conditions, we might have hoped to
use it to discriminate between causes and preempted events. This is the less
boring response, and the one which we shall explore here.
Notice how the problem for the Reverse Counterfactual is different from
the problem Lewis’s approach faces. The problem for Lewis is the falsity of
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∼ C >∼ E, and something needs to be found to replace it — a chain of
causal dependence, quasi-dependence, influence or one of the many more or
less exotic theories which we have not considered here. The problem with the
Reverse Counterfactual, however, is not falsity, but too much truth: it is true
of causes and of preempted events. Seen the less boring way, this is a challenge
to the discriminatory power of the proposed necessary condition for causation.
To meet this challenge, we need to find some further feature distinguishing
cause from preempted event, given that the Reverse Counterfactual is true
of both. Moreover, as noted previously, we need this solution not just for
late preemption, but for any case of preemption where both preempting and
preempted events actually occur: for the previous solution relied on the non-
occurrence of the preempted cause (the fact that Baker didn’t throw in that
case).
To find this distinguishing feature, imagine for a moment that we were
asking, not about Able and Baker’s throws, but about the impact of Able’s
rock on the bottle. We have two rocks, A-rock and B-rock. A-rock hits the
bottle, causing it to break. But A-rock is redundant, because if A-rock hadn’t
hit the bottle, B-rock would have, and the bottle would still have broken.9
Since this case is just like the easy case where Able threw and Baker didn’t, it
is predictable that the Reverse Counterfactual handles it easily. If the bottle
hadn’t broken, A-rock wouldn’t have hit it: nor indeed would B-rock have;
but B-rock does not actually hit the bottle, so B-rock hitting the bottle can
hardly be said to cause the break. The Reverse Counterfactual is one necessary
condition on causation, and the actual occurrence of causes is another: and
only the impact of A-rock meets both; the preempted impact of B-rock satisfies
the Reverse Counterfactual, but fails to occur.
But if we can distinguish A-rock and B-rock in this way, then surely we
can distinguish Able’s throw from Baker’s. Lewis’s original solution fails to
distinguish A-rock from B-rock. And the failure to distinguish A-rock from
B-rock is the reason — the whole reason — why Lewis’s first solution fails
for late-preemption; for it is at this point in the chain that we run out of true
counterfactuals.10 But the Reverse Counterfactual can distinguish A-rock from
9This is a case of late preemption, because there is no suitable event in between which
Lewis might use to deploy his first solution. It is also a case, we can suppose, where there is no
chain of events connecting cause to effect. This shows again that the early/late distinction
fails to match the occurring/non-occurring preempted event distinction. There are thus
cases of late preemption of non-occurring back-ups, as well as cases of early preemption of
occurring back-ups (which are the ones Lewis focuses on).
10There is (we can suppose) no chain of events connecting A-rock’s strike with the bottle’s
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B-rock; so one would think it ought to be able to distinguish between Able’s
throw and Baker’s throw.
Let us ask the obvious question. Why do we think that Able’s throw caused
the bottle to break, but that Baker’s did not? The answer is equally obvious:
because Able’s rock hit the bottle, whereas Baker’s did not. This is not an
accident of the example. The way we have defined preemption, there is never
a causal chain from a preempted event all the way to the effect. And this,
in turn, is no artifice of definition, but a highly intuitive description of the
obvious reason we give for saying that Able’s throw caused the smash, but
Baker’s didn’t.
An obvious suggestion, then, is that for c to cause e, there must be a chain of
events from c to e, each causing the next. But this obvious suggestion is wrong,
because events can also cause each other directly, without intervening chains.
(Indeed the events in the chain must cause each other directly, unless we are
to posit an infinity of links in every causal chain.) The necessary condition
which Able’s throw meets and Baker’s throw fails to meet in the bottle smash
case is not that there is an intermediate event, but that if there is a chain of
intermediate events, then it is unbroken: it goes all the way, as it were, to the
effect. Able’s throw satisfies this requirement, but Baker’s does not. This has
nothing to do with the Reverse Counterfactual per se; rather, it is a further
necessary condition on causes which preempted events fail to satisfy. This is
in line with the strategy we employed in the easy case, where Baker did not
actually throw: there, we appealed to a platitudinous condition that causes
occur, in order to rule out the competitors of which the Reverse Counterfactual
was also true. The requirement that causes be connected to their effects by an
unbroken chain is a less straightforward notion, and accordingly I now need to
specify it more clearly.
I think the easiest, though perhaps not the only, way to tell whether a
chain is unbroken is to see whether it changes under certain counterfactual
suppositions. By definition, in a case where some candidate c is redundant
with respect to e, there will always be further redundant events, which are
counterfactually independent of c. Suppose those events away. Does the chain
between c and e change at all? If so, you can rule c out as a cause.
Take Able’s throw. There is a chain of Reverse Counterfactuals between the
subsequent shattering. The one causes the other immediately (at least, close enough for the
everyday purposes which our everyday concept of causation serves). If A-rock had not hit
the bottle, it would nevertheless have smashed, thanks to B-rock; and we don’t need to
employ any backtracking reasoning to arrive at this conclusion.
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shattering of the bottle and the throw. But the throw is redundant; meaning
nothing more than that it fails to be a condition for the smash — it fails to
satisfy Lewis’s counterfactual. Now suppose away any other events which are
counterfactually related to the smash, but not to Able’s throw, and which
are also redundant. So we leave Able’s chain intact: he throws, his rock flies
through the air and strikes the bottle, and the bottle smashes. But we remove
Baker’s throw, because it is counterfactually related to the smash (by the
Reverse Counterfactual — we can assume this, because it is the problem) and
also redundant. (Grant that we have enough of a grasp of the causal order to
be able to ignore events after the shattering, that is, effects of the shattering.
The causal order will receive more discussion in the next chapter.) We can
likewise suppose away the events in Baker’s chain, such as the flight of his rock
through the air towards the bottle. Now ask: Does anything change in Able’s
chain? Clearly not. Under this counterfactual supposition, a chain of Reverse
Counterfactuals connects the same events in the same way from Able’s throw
to the smash. We can pronounce Able’s chain unbroken.
Now hold Baker’s throw constant, and remove other redundant events
which are counterfactually related to the effect (by the Reverse Counterfac-
tual). That means getting rid of Able’s throw and the events in the chain
leading to the shattering. It also means keeping the flight of Baker’s throw
towards the bottle, since that is related by the Reverse Counterfactual to the
shattering on one side and to Baker’s throw on the other. (If the bottle hadn’t
smashed, surely no rocks — Baker’s included — would have flown towards it;
and if Baker’s rock hadn’t flown, Baker wouldn’t have thrown.) But there is
another event which, under this counterfactual supposition, forces its way into
the chain. In the absence of Able’s throw, Baker’s rock would have hit the
bottle. And it would clearly have been related to the subsequent shattering in
just the way that the actual impact of Able’s rock is — meaning, I claim, that
the Reverse Counterfactual would then relate it to the shattering on one side
and to other events in Baker’s chain on the other (Baker’s throw, the flight of
his rock). Under this counterfactual supposition, then, the chain of Reverse
Counterfactuals between Baker’s throw and the smash changes. This, I say,
means we can pronounce the chain in the actual world broken.
I said that the unbroken chain condition was a further necessary condition
on causation, in addition to the Reverse Counterfactual. It might then be
doubted whether the Reverse Counterfactual account can really take credit
for any success which this solution might enjoy. In response, note two points.
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First, to reiterate, the problem which I face is one of too much truth: I have a
necessary condition which non-causes meet, which is just to say that it is not a
sufficient condition. Given that I claim only that the Reverse Counterfactual
is necessary for causation, it is completely acceptable to point out other nec-
essary conditions which causes meet and non-causes fail. Second, the Reverse
Counterfactual is essential to the working of the distinction I have proposed
between broken and unbroken chains. For I propose we suppose away all those
redundant events which are nevertheless counterfactually related to the effect,
except those chained up to the candidate cause under consideration. Since “re-
dundant” means nothing more than “fails the Lewisian counterfactual”, it is the
truth of the Reverse Counterfactual which limits this supposition to redundant
causes or their back-ups, and prevents it from extending to irrelevant events
of all kinds. It is likewise the Reverse Counterfactual which forms the chain
between the candidate cause under consideration and the effect. The distinc-
tion I have proposed between broken and unbroken chains therefore depends
essentially on the Reverse Counterfactual.
I think this broken/unbroken chain distinction is an intuitive diagnosis of
the preemptor/preempted distinction, and I think it generalises. In general,
when c1 preempts c2 with respect to e, that is because c1 causes d1 which
causes e. By contrast, c2 does not cause d1; and if c1 were absent, then c2
would cause some other event d2, which would be a cause of e. But this event
d2 is preempted by d1; and moreover, d2 is preempted in such a way that it
does not actually occur. The modification I propose for my account, then, is
nothing more than a method for detecting events like d2 — events which do not
occur but which, were they to occur, would complete a causal chain between
preempted causes and their would-be effects. I suggest that we can detect the
place of an event like d2 in the chain originating with c2 by supposing away
other redundant candidate causes.
When I say this is an intuitive diagnosis, I believe I am being honest. Com-
monly, we would say that Able’s throw causes the break because his rock hits
the bottle, whereas Baker’s fails to cause the break because his rock does not
hit the bottle. Perhaps this intuitive analysis is not entirely uncontroversial.
It differs from the intuitive thought underlying Lewis’s influence account, for
example, which was that differences in Able’s throw are reflected in the bottle
smash whereas differences in Baker’s are not. But we already saw some good
reasons to doubt that influence is either necessary or sufficient for causation.11
11Smart Rock and the alarm clock show it isn’t necessary; the breeze on the rock, the
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Moreover, an intuitive initial position would have it that causes influence their
effects (when they do) because they cause them, not vice versa. On the other
hand, the intuitive analysis I have proposed is very close to Lewis’s first thought
— his solution to early preemption, the underlying idea of which was that there
is a causal chain between cause and effect, but not between preempted event
and effect. In this sense, we can agree with the general form of Lewis’s original
solution to preemption, although the details are quite different.
Let us summarise the foregoing discussion.
Reverse Counterfactual Modified for Preemption. If c causes e, then:
(i) ∼ E >∼ C [the Reverse Counterfactual requirement] and C&E [the oc-
currence requirement];
(ii) the chain of events {x, ...y} between c and e such that ∼ E >∼ Y, ... ∼
X >∼ C must be unbroken (where “between” is to be understood as
including c and e in the limit case).
The point of the slightly deviant understanding of “between” is to allow coun-
terfactuals with no events intermediate between antecedent event and conse-
quent event to be subject to the test. We thus do not rule out immediate
causation because ∼ E >∼ C counts as a chain, and hence could qualify as
an unbroken chain if it passed the test. We can say define a broken chain as
follows:
Broken Chains. A chain of events {x, ...y} between c and e such that ∼
E >∼ Y, ... ∼ X >∼ C is broken iff:
[redundancy] c is redundant with respect to e such that ∼ (∼ C >∼ E);
and
[supposition] supposing away redundant events (other than e) which are
counterfactually independent of c yet counterfactually related to e —
[new chain] the chain of events between c and e such that ∼ E >∼ Y, ... ∼
X >∼ C under this supposition would differ from {x, ...y}.
This is the outline of my proposed solution. Now we shall turn to the defence
of the key claims upon which it rests.
poisoned pudding and gravity show it is not sufficient.
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6.5.2 Questions
Probably the clearest way to defend this proposal is to distinguish the questions
we might ask about it, then answer them.
Is It True That ∼ D >∼ C?
What is the basis for the claim that the Reverse Counterfactual holds between
the actual impact d of Able’s rock with the bottle, and Able’s throw c? What
is the basis for the claim that, if A-rock hadn’t hit the bottle, Able wouldn’t
have thrown? Applying the Inference Test: would we infer that Able hadn’t
thrown, if his rock hadn’t hit the bottle?
There are two ways to go. One way says that, if his rock hadn’t hit the
bottle, we wouldn’t know what to infer. Maybe Able didn’t throw: but maybe
he missed, maybe he threw slightly slower, or maybe Baker threw slightly
quicker. So the Reverse Counterfactual is false. The other way sets all these
possibilities aside, and agrees that we would infer that Able hadn’t thrown,
and therefore that the Reverse Counterfactual is true.
Why should we set those possibilities aside? Well, we should not set them
all aside. In line with my argument in 4.4.2, I suggest that the possibility that
Able misses is relevant. All this shows is that the accuracy of Able’s throw is
causally relevant. If Able’s rock had not hit the bottle, he would have either
missed or not thrown. I am happy to accept that accuracy is part of the cause;
nor do I have any objection to saying that the impact is jointly caused by his
throwing and his not-missing, if it is insisted that these are distinct events. A
similar response might be made to the suggestion that Able could have thrown
a bit slower. In this context, the timing of Able’s throw was crucial to his rock
hitting the bottle: had he delayed, Baker would have got there first, and there
would be no bottle for Able’s rock to hit. Sometimes, timing matters: the
context in which Able’s throw occurs is one such occasion.
More difficult is the question whether Baker might not have thrown a bit
quicker. This would have led to Baker’s rock smashing the bottle, and thus
Able’s rock would not have hit the bottle; if such worlds are close enough, then
it seems that if Able’s rock hadn’t hit the bottle, he might still have thrown.
In a competition between two evenly-matched competitors, that seems just
as likely as Able throwing a bit slower, or missing, or not throwing. And it
is possible to devise set-ups which make Able’s throw much less potentially
variable than Baker’s. Replace Able with a tennis-ball launcher, for example;
Baker is practising his quick-fire bottle-smashing against a machine which
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always launches a ball exactly 0.3 seconds after Baker’s coach shouts “Go!” and
presses the launch button. Surely Baker is more variable than the machine;
yet it is still the firing of the machine which is responsible for the tennis ball
hitting the bottle.
This is a version of Lipton’s objection concerning background radiation
which we considered in 4.6.2. The general stategy of this kind of objection is
to devise a case where the cause is counterfactually rather stable, then argue
that the nearest worlds where the effect does not occur will be ones where
the cause still does occur. Thus in the present case, Baker’s throw is more
prone to variation than the tennis-ball launcher’s launch, so if the effect had
not occurred, it seems more of a departure to suppose that the launcher had
not launched, than to suppose that it did still launch but that Baker threw
quicker. (At any rate, it is not obviously less of a departure to suppose the
latter.)
However, parallel to my argument in the case of background radiation,
there may be contexts of inquiry where we hold Baker’s throw constant and
consider the ball-launcher the cause of the strike, even if the ball-launcher is
less prone to variation than Baker. We might do so with a contrastive why-
question: “Why did the tennis ball hit the bottle, rather than staying in the
launcher?” More generally, the suggestion is this: in the context where we say
that the launch c was the cause of the ball striking the bottle d, we say the
counterfactual ∼ D >∼ C is true.
There are contexts where ∼ D >∼ C is false: in such contexts we say
that if the ball had not hit the bottle, maybe the launcher would not have
launched, but maybe Baker would have thrown faster. I suggest, however,
that this is a good time to remember that our attribution of causation in cases
of causal redundancy also display a certain sensitivity to context. We might
equally say, in some contexts, that the reason the ball hit the bottle was that
Baker’s threw too slowly to smash the bottle before the ball got there. (We
might be particularly so inclined if Baker usually beats the launcher: and if
anything important hung on it, Baker might blame himself.) In this sense,
we sometimes do admit that Baker’s late throw was at least part of the cause
of the smash — perhaps jointly with the launcher. Cases of preemption test
our intuitions (contrary to the clarity that is often claimed for them). A
revolutionary facing a firing squad is killed by a bullet fired by a single soldier,
before any of the other bullets hit him; nevertheless, part of the purpose of
a firing squad is to spread the responsibility for the execution over a larger
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number of people. The redundancy in the case gives us a choice. In certain
contexts, it is appropriate to say that the soldier killed the revolutionary,
but in other contexts the massive redundancy makes it inappropriate: the
revolutionary faced certain death even if the soldier had not fired.
Returning to the original example, where Able and Baker both throw, con-
sider this question: “Why did Able’s rock rather than Baker’s hit the bottle?”
We naturally respond, “Because Able threw before Baker (or perhaps he threw
slightly harder).” We mention both their throws. In this context, then, it looks
like we naturally consider Baker’s throw to be part of the cause of Able’s rock
hitting the bottle. This should do something to upset the ease with which it
is customary to say that, obviously, Able’s throw causes the bottle to smash.
Proper attention to our real intuitions makes this less than obvious. What is
meant, and acquiesed to, by the claim that Able’s throw “obviously” causes
his rock to hit the bottle, is arguably something slightly less general than that
bald claim. It might be the answer to a question like this: “What causes Able’s
rock to hit the bottle, rather than stay in Able’s hand, or on the ground at his
feet?” The answer to that question evidently has nothing to do with Baker’s
throw. But if we specify the context of inquiry that way, then the Reverse
Counterfactual is satisfied by Able’s throw and not by Baker’s. The difference
between the case where Able’s rock hits the bottle and the counterfactual sce-
nario where it stays in his hand, is Able’s throw. Admitting that is tantamount
to admitting that, if the rock hadn’t hit the bottle but had stayed in Able’s
hand, he might still have thrown. Whereas Baker’s throw is not a difference
between these two cases: admitting which is tantamount to denying that, if
Able’s rock had not hit the bottle, then Baker would not have thrown.
In short, then, it is questionable whether∼ D >∼ C is true in an unqualifed
sense, but that is because it is questionable whether preemptors are intuitively
seen as the sole causes of their effects. However, to the extent and in the
context that we accept that a preemptor does solely cause its effect, it will be
the case that ∼ D >∼ C, i.e. that the Reverse Counterfactual is satisfied for
the intermediary event d and the preemptive cause c.
Is It True That ∼ E >∼ D?
Yes — I take it that this is the most obvious part of the proposal, and it has
already received some defence in 6.5.1. It is easily seen with the Inference
Test. If the bottle hadn’t smashed, then why would we infer that A-rock —
or any other rock for that matter — might have hit it anyway? Of course
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it is quite possible that the rock would have just brushed it; but I think we
can safely stipulate that that would qualify as a different event.12 What this
shows, again, is that mere contact did not break the bottle; the force of the
impact was causally relevant. There are more outlandish possibilities — that
the bottle was made of iron, that it had an internal bracing structure, that
the rock was made of jelly, that a miracle occurred, and so on. But we would
not infer any of these without a good reason, because they are outlandish. In
worlds talk, they happen at more distant worlds; the nearest worlds where the
bottle doesn’t break are surely those where it is simply lucky enough not to
get hit by any rocks.
Are We Relying On A Special View of Event Identity?
We might wonder whether we are using some special view of event identity.
In particular, a distinction is made between the impact of Able’s rock and the
non-occurring impact of Baker’s rock. If Able’s rock had not hit the bottle,
then Able wouldn’t have thrown. But instead of speaking of Able’s rock hitting
the bottle, we might speak of an impact more generally; and had no impact
occurred, then presumably neither Able nor Baker would have thrown. Then
the Reverse Counterfactual does not distinguish Able’s throw from Baker’s,
even though only Able’s rock hits the bottle. If no rock had hit the bottle,
then neither of them would have thrown.
We could say so, and sometimes we might: but in that context of inquiry,
it is no longer acceptable to say that Able’s throw caused the break. Able’s
throw did not cause some rock to hit the bottle: the quick-fire bottle-smashing
competition did that. This sense of cause is the sense in which the soldier in
the firing squad whose bullet first pierces the revolutionary’s heart does not kill
him, because it was so massively redundant in that context (which is one reason
why firing squads are used). But in this discussion, we have confined ourselves
to the sense of causation in which the soldier’s bullet does kill the victim, even
though it is very redundant in the circumstances. Likewise, there are contexts
where we blame the quick-fire competition, rather than any particular throw,
12If you disagree, ask a friend first to first brush you with a rock and then to hit you
with a rock. Why would you react differently to these events? You ought not, if they are
sufficiently similar that they only fail to be identical because they fail to be numerically
identical. So that is not the only reason they fail to be identical. Assuming we can set
aside the possibility that your different reactions to these two actual events are due to some
cumulative effect, a change in your dispositions, or some other extraneous factor, it seems
therefore that an actual strike fails to be identical with a counterfactual brushing, at this
level of description.
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for the bottle breaking. This shows once again the flexibility of selection, which
we have already discussed in some detail (4.4.3 and 4.6); and it also shows once
again how the intuitive situation in cases of preemption is not quite as clear-cut
as it is sometimes said to be.
Does The Proposal Work For The Alarm Clock Example?
Let us briefly apply the proposal to another example which we used to make
trouble for Lewis’s influence account. My wife presses a button, which connects
a circuit in the clock, setting the alarm. When I push the button later, the
circuit has already been connected and I am just moving internal parts of the
clock without connecting any circuits. If the alarm had not gone off, then
that connection of the circuit would not have occurred; and if the connection
had not occurred, then my wife would not have pressed the button. But it is
false that, if that connection had not occurred, I would not have pressed the
button. Note that the connection event occurring when my wife pushes the
button is different from the one that would have taken place if I had pushed
the button an hour later, even if its intrinsic properties are the same. To see
this, note that it is possible for both to occur — for example, if the battery
were removed and replaced between our respective button-pushes, disarming
the alarm. Then a connection would occur when my wife pushed the button
and a connection would occur when I did. This would be impossible if the two
connection events were one, since then they could not be two in any world.
6.6 Trumping
6.6.1 The Problem
We have been assuming that, in all cases of preemption between actually oc-
curring events, there is a failure of intermediary events in the preempted causal
chain. However, there might be cases where:
• c1 and c2 both occur;
• each would suffice to cause e in the absence of the other;
• there are no intermediary events;
• c1 causes e and c2 does not cause e.
166 CHAPTER 6. REDUNDANCY
Suppose, with Schaffer, that Merlin and Morgana both cast spells to turn the
Prince into a frog at midnight. Suppose further that Merlin casts his spell
earlier in the day, and that “it is a law of magic that the first spell cast on a
given day match the enchantment that midnight” (Schaffer 2004a, 59). Hence,
had Merlin preferred a toad, the Prince would have become a toad; but had
Morgana preferred a toad, the Prince would still have become a frog, due to the
priority of Merlin’s frog spell. But in fact they both felt that the appropriate
amphibian for the Prince to become was a frog. Had Merlin not cast his spell,
the Prince would still have become a frog, due to Morgana’s spell; and likewise,
had Morgana not cast her spell, the Prince would still have become a frog, due
to Merlin’s spell. This clearly presents a problem for Lewis’s original analysis
in terms of dependence; it also creates a problem for the influence account, if
we assume — as we are free to — that magic is a fairly coarse art, so Merlin
can’t vary how or when the Prince becomes a frog.
On the first pass the Reverse Counterfactual analysis appears to suffer
equally, and for the same reasons:
...there is neither a failure of intermediary events along the Mor-
gana process, ...nor any would-be difference in time or manner
of the effect absent Merlin’s spell, and thus nothing remains by
which extant [counterfactual accounts of causation] might distin-
guish Merlin’s spell from Morgana’s in causal status.
(Schaffer 2004a, 59)
The Reverse Counterfactual analysis appears unable to distinguish trumping
from trumped cause. For the modified condition proposed in 6.5.1 above only
works if there is a failure of intermediary events along the preempted process,
but not in the preempting process. And by stipulation, there is no such failure
in a case of trumping.
I think the best way to handle trumping is to ask for further justification
of the claim that the trumper, and not the trumped event, is the cause of
the effect. Stipulation is not enough. We need to know exactly why this fails
to be a case of symmetric overdetermination: why we should acquiese to the
assertion that Merlin’s spell caused the transformation, and not Morgana’s. In
Schaffer’s example, there is a law of magic which ensures that the spell and the
enchantment match; but simple matching is a weaker notion than our intuitive
notion of causation.
I think there are two ways we might justify the claim that Merlin’s spell
is effective and Morgana’s ineffectual. The first is that there is some sort of
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underlying mechanism by which Merlin’s spell takes priority (and over which
the law generalises). The second is by appeal to some notion of influence,
close to Lewis’s: some contrast exists between the way possible differences
in Merlin’s spell match up to possible differences in the effect, and the way
possible differences in Morgana’s spell do. I shall argue that neither option
preserves the trumping objection as it applies to the Reverse Counterfactual.
Finally I shall suggest that, if the trumping objector takes neither of these two
options, trumping collapses into symmetric overdetermination.
6.6.2 Supressed Mechanisms
What justifies the claim that Merlin’s spell, but not Morgana’s, causes the
Prince to turn into a frog? One thought is that there is some mechanism — in
the loosest sense of the word — by which a spell operates on its victim, and
this mechanism operates for Merlin’s spell but not Morgana’s. We could think
of this in any number of ways. Perhaps the fact of Merlin’s earlier utterance
renders Morgana’s spell entirely impotent, an empty utterance — a spell only
in the sense that it is the right form of words to have had magical consequences
in other situations. Then Morgana’s spell becomes like my button-push in the
alarm-clock case; somehow it does not do whatever it would have to do in
order to have an effect. Or perhaps Morgana’s spell is potent, but as it issues
forth towards the Prince, it is blocked, prevented from reaching him, either by
Merlin’s spell or by something triggered by Merlin’s spell.
In other words, we might say that Merlin’s spell causes the Prince to turn
into a frog in virtue of some suppressed mechanism, suppressed from our de-
scription but underlying both the law of magic and our causal claim. Such a
response would give us a clear intuitive reason to say that Merlin’s spell, but
not Morgana’s, acted on the Prince. But it is pretty clearly in tension with
the claim that there are no intermediary events which a theory could deploy in
defence against the counterexample. And if it is the difference between cause
and trumped event, it is clear that the Reverse Counterfactual account can
handle trumping just as it handles preemption. For then there is at least one
event between Merlin’s casting and the Prince’s turning, though we don’t know
what it is: we can gloss it as the spell somehow taking hold of the Prince. If the
Prince hadn’t turned into a frog, this event would not have occurred. And if
this event — Merlin’s spell taking hold of the Prince — hadn’t occurred, then
Merlin wouldn’t have cast his spell. Morgana’s spell fails the last condition,
though: if Merlin’s spell hadn’t taken hold, there is no reason to suppose that
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Morgana didn’t cast.
Let us take it, then, that the trumping objector will reject the claim that
there is some mechanism, suppressed in the description of the law of magic, in
virtue of which Merlin’s spell rather than Morgana’s causes the Prince to turn
into a frog.
At this point it is worth noting the magical nature of this trumping case. It
is all too easy to suppress a mechanism when the example is entirely magical, or
to simply stipulate that there is no mechanism. The question is not whether
cases like this are logically possible: they seem to be. The real question is
whether they qualify as cases of causation, and this is where I have sought to
exert some pressure. If it is denied that any (or stipulated that no) mechanism
mediates Merlin’s casting and the Prince’s transmogrification, then, I suggest,
we must look elsewhere for our justification of the claim that Merlin’s spell is
has some sort of causal priority over Morgana’s.13
6.6.3 Influence
If we reject the suggestion that there is some suppressed mechanism, then in
what sense does the law give Merlin’s spell priority? An obvious thought is
that what Merlin does matters: if he prefers a toad, the Prince will become
a toad. Whereas, what Morgana does, does not matter: if Morgana prefers
a kangaroo, the Prince will not become a kangaroo unless Merlin also prefers
a kangaroo. And there is no reason to suppose that Merlin and Morgana’s
wishes vary in tandem.
Clearly, though, this response violates the second of Schaffer’s claims against
trumping: that there is no “would-be difference in time or manner of the effect
absent Merlin’s spell” (Schaffer 2004a, 59). Thus it offers a foothold for coun-
terfactual accounts to distinguish trumped event from trumper. Lewis presses
this line:
If Merlin’s first spell of the day had not been prince-to-frog, but
rather king-to-kangaroo, the transmogrification at midnight would
have been correspondingly altered. Whereas if Morgana’s trumped
spell had been, say, queen-to-goanna (holding fixed Merlin’s spell
13Stipulating that there is no suppressed mechanism is rather less plausible in real-world
examples, such as Lewis’s case of a Sergeant and a Major simultaneously shouting “Advance!”
(Lewis 2004a, 81). The Major trumps the Sergeant. To me it seems pretty difficult to deny
that there is some mechanism, some way, in which the Major’s order takes priority over the
Sergeant’s, although Lewis claims that the denial is epistemically possible.
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and the absence of any still earlier spell) what happened at mid-
night would have been exactly the same as it actually was: The
prince would have turned into a frog, and that would have been
all.
(Lewis 2004a, 93)
We have seen that influence is not generally either necessary or sufficient for
causation. In cases of trumping, however, it does seem to be one way in which
we might distinguish trumper from trumped event.
To make trouble for the Reverse Counterfactual, the proponent of the
trumping objection must assert that ∼ E >∼ C2, which is equivalent to
∼ (∼ E ≥ C2).14 Translated back into English, and applied to Schaffer’s
example, we get this claim: it is false that, if the Prince had not turned into
a frog, Morgana might have cast her frog spell.
This rules out one way in which the objector might try to characterise the
distinction between trumped event and trumper. The objector cannot admit
that the effect could have been different, while the trumped cause might have
been the same. But how plausible is that? Merlin cast first; he could have cast
a toad spell; then Morgana might still have cast her frog spell, yet the Prince
would not have turned into a frog. In worlds talk, among the worlds where
the Prince does not turn into a frog, are some where Merlin is still angry, but
thinks “Hmm... I’m bored with frogs; I think it shall be a toad today.” And
in some of those worlds, Morgana’s spell remains a frog-spell, yet the Prince
becomes a toad, as Merlin wishes. At least, that arrangement of worlds would
be a reason to accept the claim that Merlin’s spell has causal priority over
Morgana’s. If that is the reason, then the Reverse Counterfactual fails for
Morgana’s spell, because as we have just seen, it is false that worlds where the
Prince fails to become a frog and where Morgana does not cast her spell are
all closer than any where she still casts her frog spell.
The objector could seek to deny that the Reverse Counterfactual is true
for Merlin’s spell, but that is not plausible either: if the Prince had not turned
into a frog, then surely Merlin at least would not have cast his frog spell. To
use the worlds locution, worlds with earlier sorcerors or different laws seem to
be further away.
It seems, therefore, that distinguishing Merlin’s spell from Morgana’s by
their variable influence on the effect makes the Reverse Counterfactual true
14Removing double negation from ∼∼ C2.
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of the trumper but false of the trumped event. At least, it seems so in this
example. The objector might respond, however, by tightening the example so
as to preserve some sort of intuitive distinction between trumper and trumped
event, while removing the resources to which the Reverse Counterfactual ap-
peals. Let us therefore focus our attention on this effort.
Although the Reverse Counterfactual is not appealing directly to the no-
tion of influence, it might be objected that the foregoing argument relies on
trumpers being counterfactually more fragile than trumped events, in a cer-
tain way.15 But some sorts of cause-effect pairs are quite rigid: they either
happen or don’t. Suppose we have a rigid cause-effect pair trumping a cause
which admits of much more variable effects: then supposing the effect away
would mean supposing the cause and the trumped event away, but we could
characterise the causal priority of trumper over trumped event by mentioning
all the ways the trumped event could have been different, without having any
bearing on the effect.
An example will make this clearer. I want a coffee, and I am about to go
out to get one, when the fire-alarm rings. A fire-alarm is pretty much a one-
trick pony: all it ever does is get people to leave the building. Desires, on the
other hand, can vary widely, and cause a wide range of actions. I might have
wanted biscuits, which are on a tin by the window; or tea, which is available
along the corridor: but I would still have left, because the fire alarm trumps
my desires.16 This is an objection to the Reverse Counterfactual because
it exhibits an intuitive way to cash out the priority of the trumper over the
trumped event, while ensuring that the Reverse Counterfactual is true of both,
and is therefore useless to distinguish between them. If I had not left, then I
would neither have heard a fire alarm nor wanted coffee. Yet the fact that I
would still have left even if I had wanted biscuits or tea seems a good reason
to say that the fire alarm and not my desire for coffee made me leave (and
indeed to leave the coffee out of any explanation I might offer to an inquisitor
waiting outside the building).
As it stands, however, this modification of the example does not establish
causal priority. If we honestly restrict the possible variations in the trumper
so severely, and hold one event fixed, then no matter how you vary the other,
15This is another variation on the Lipton objection discussed in 4.6.2.
16Both the alarm and the desire for coffee admit of variation in time, but let us ignore this,
because it does not distinguish between them. Had I left earlier, at least one of them would
have happened earlier, but we can’t tell which; had I left later, both would have happened
later. (The situation is the same Lewis’s way round: if I had wanted coffee earlier, I would
have left earlier, and if the alarm had gone off earlier I would have left earlier.)
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the outcome is the same. Hold the fire alarm fixed and vary my desires, and
I will still leave the building; hold my desire for coffee fixed, and vary the fire
alarm the only way we are allowing — that is, suppose it didn’t go off — and
again, I leave the building.
The point is a little subtle, perhaps, but I think it is important. At first,
it looks like there is good intuitive force behind the thought that, whatever
my desires had been, I would still have left when I heard the alarm. Indeed
there is: my desires are irrelevant when the alarm is ringing. But on its own,
that does not establish the causal priority of the alarm, only the inefficacy
of my desires. That priority is only established through an implicit contrast
with the case where the alarm — somehow, or perhaps even per impossibile
— ellicits a different effect from the actual one. It boils down to a contrast
between two counterfactual scenarios. In both I stay inside; in one, the alarm
still rings, and in the other, I still want coffee. Clearly there is a sense in which
the latter is a more likely scenario, a closer world. In this sense, if I had not
left the building, I might still have wanted coffee, but there would have been
no alarm. For me to ignore an alarm would take a serious departure from the
actual world — deafness, obsession with earplugs, a hostage situation, or some
such.
So appealing to ineffectual variation in the trumped event will not provide
a distinction — either for our intuitions or for Lewis’s influence theory —
between trumped and trumping event, without the crucial admission that ∼
E ≥ C2 — that if the effect hadn’t happened, the trumped cause still might
have done, even if the sense in which it might have done might be rather
artificial, restricted, determined by the context of inquiry. The artifice is due
to the strange nature of the case. If you asked me why I had left the building,
I would probably say, “Well, there was a fire alarm, and I wanted a coffee
anyway.” The case presents itself as one of overdetermination. So, like the
sense in which I might have stayed inside but still have wanted coffee, the
sense in which this is not a case of symmetric overdetermination is somewhat
artificial.
Notice, finally, that Lewis’s account does not appear as well placed. Vari-
ations in the fire alarm will not produce variation in the effect, but equally
small variations of my desire will do so as well — in particular, if either oc-
curs slightly earlier, I will leave the building slightly earlier. We can modify
the Merlin example to have a similar property as the fire-alarm case: suppose
Merlin has only one spell, being an old dog, whereas Morgana has a load of
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new tricks she could use, but on this occasion chooses to use the frog spell.
Lewis’s account struggles: if Merlin had not cast his frog spell, but Morgana
had cast hers, then the requirement that Merlin is a one-trick pony means that
the Prince would still have turned into a frog. For worlds where Merlin varies
his spell slightly are further than worlds where he does not cast a spell at all.
By starting with the effect, the Reverse Counterfactual avoids this difficulty,
and, I suggest, comes closer to capturing the intuitive distinction we draw.
Merlin’s spell does not “make the difference”, in any ordinary sense, because of
the presence of Morgana’s spell. If we want to recapture the intuitive notion
of difference making, in order to preserve the suggestion that Merlin’s spell
takes priority, then we have to contrast the case where the effect doesn’t hap-
pen and Merlin still casts with the case where the effect doesn’t happen and
Morgana still casts. Morgana’s spell is not a reliable difference between the
actual and the former case: had Merlin’s spell not worked, we just don’t know
what would have become of Morgana’s. She might have cast, or she might not.
But Merlin’s spell is a somewhat more reliable difference between the actual
and the latter case. Had the effect not occurred, Merlin would not have cast;
supposing Morgana to have cast merely requires that we suppose something
else to have prevented her spell from working, when in actuality Merlin’s spell
prevents it.
6.6.4 Trumping and Symmetric Overdetermination
Our objector might, however, push one stage further, and insist that neither
the effect, nor either of the putative causes, admits of enough variation to run
this sort of response. Suppose there is only one spell, and it turns people into
frogs. But then the law of magic, that the first spell uttered in a day takes
priority, would be replaced by a law which said that if anyone uttered a spell
that day, the target would become a frog at midnight. There would be no
sense in which Merlin’s spell took priority over Morgana’s. Again, if my heart
has only ever known the desire to leave the building, then how do we make
sense of the suggestion that the alarm had priority over the desire to leave the
building?
Each of these cases is a case of symmetric overdetermination: two sufficient
causes occur, and are indistinguishable with regard to the effect. If there is no
suppressed mechanism, and no counterfactual difference, then it is hard to see
what justifies the claim that one rather than the other is the cause. For it is
hard to see what the claim of priority amounts to. It is neither a claim about
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the way the candidates are differentially linked up to the effect, nor about how
they vary differentially with the effect in counterfactual scenarios. The case
displays all the characteristics of symmetric overdetermination. And as we
are about to see, the Reverse Counterfactual offers a respectable account of
symmetric overdetermination.
6.7 Symmetric Overdeterminaton
6.7.1 Lewis’s Position
Lewis’s early view of symmetric overdetermination is dismissive. Because our
intuitions about symmetric cases are vague, such cases are not useful for testing
a theory of causation against, and may be left as spoils to the victorious
theory (Lewis 1986a, 171 — note 12). His view subsequently became more
sophisticated, classifying and saying more about different sorts of symmetric
cases, but his attitude to the residual cases remained largely unchanged.
His relaxed attitude arises in part from the following reasoning.
I should dispel one worry: that if we were ever to decline to count
redundant causes as genuine causes, we should be left with gaps in
our causal histories — no cause at all, at the time when the redun-
dant causes occur, for a redundantly caused event. For consider the
larger event composed of the two redundant causes... Whether or
not the redundant events are genuine causes, the larger event will
be there to cause the effect. For without it — if it were completely
absent, with neither of its parts still present, and not replaced by
some barely different event — the effect would not occur.
(Lewis 1986a, 212)
Whatever Lewis might be able to say about various sorts of symmetric overde-
termination, his underlying attitude to residual cases is that causal histories
can always be preserved from gappiness by appealing to all overdetermining
causes, and saying that if that event had not occurred, the effect would not
have occurred.
We need to be careful to distinguish two claims, one of which I will argue
is intuitive, the other problematic. The intuitive claim is that, in overdeter-
mination cases, both redundant causes cause the effect. Two bullets pierce
the heart, and we want to say the same thing about both of them; as Lewis
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anticipates, we don’t want to say neither caused death, and risk a gap; so we
might be inclined to say they both did. The less intuitive claim is that in
symmetric overdetermination, two redundant causes together form one larger
cause. This is the Lewisian solution, and I will seek to explain why I think it is
problematic, and distinct from the intuitive view to which it bears similarity.
What is the nature of this “larger event” composed of two redundant causes?
I lifted the answer from the previous quotation, and now give it:
I mean their mereological sum. Not their disjunction — I do not
know how a genuine event could be the disjunction of two events
both of which actually occur. It would have to occur in any region
where either disjunct occurs. Hence it would have to occur twice
in one world, which a particular event cannot do.
(Lewis 1986a, 212)
Why does Lewis mention disjunctions? — Because, on Lewis’s analysis, the
most natural first thought would be that the disjunction is causal. For to say
that neither c1 nor c2 occurs is to say that ∼ (C1 ∨ C2). Lewis can, and does,
suggest that we should ignore this point. But the argument proceeds from a
theory of events. It does nothing to say whether or why ∼ (C1 ∨ C2) >∼ E is
false; and nor should it, since it is true (assuming the overdetermining events
are not themselves collectively redundant).17 But Lewis cannot allow disjunc-
tive events as causes, and not only for the reason he gives above. It would allow
all sorts of spurious cases of causation, such as my walking or my talking caus-
ing my arriving (cf. Lewis 1986a, 190). Lewis argues that disjunctive events
cannot be allowed, because then they would be wholly present whenever their
disjunts were, meaning a numerically identical event could occur twice in one
world. Obviously any event can be represented with a disjunction; he disallows
disjunctive events whose disjuncts are “highly varied” (Lewis 1986a, 190) —
that is, occupying disjoint spatial temporal regions. This leaves him with a
problem regarding the most obvious application of his analysis to overdeter-
mination. Although ∼ (C1 ∨ C2) >∼ E is true, the disjunction of c1 and c2
is not the cause of e, because it is not an event. On the (not entirely trivial)
17It would not be any help to reformulate thus: ((∼ C1& ∼ C2) >∼ E). First, perhaps
pedantically, this does not have the form of the Lewisian analysis, since the antecedent of
the counterfactual is not a negated proposition that an event occurs. Second, what would
be the cause, on this account? Presumably the event whose occurrence is designated thus:
∼ (∼ C1& ∼ C2). But it is not clear what is meant by saying, “The cause of e is not the
non-occurrence of c1 and the non-occurrence of c2”. Whereas the disjunctive version yields
a version that is more readily intuitively grasped: “The cause is c1 or c2.”
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assumption that all events have causes which are also events, a replacement
must be found.
Lewis proposes a replacement, as we have seen. He asserts that the mere-
ological sum of the two redundant causes is the cause. The sum of c1and c2
forms a further “sum event” s, such that ∼ S >∼ E. Presumably the thought
is that conjoining events to give bigger events is not a problem in the way
that disjoining them is: it does not yield the unfortunate result that the same
event can occur twice in the same world. But given the difficulty of disjunctive
events, it is precarious to depend on the hope that sums will not be problem-
atic. And indeed, on reflection, they do seem to be problematic.
Consider an event c1 causing some other event e. Find any other actual
event c2 whose absence would not itself cause e. Let s be the mereological
sum of c1 and c2. Now ∼ S >∼ E is true, and since Lewis offers a sufficient
condition for causation, presumably that means that s causes e. But the only
restriction we placed on c2, was that its absence not prevent e. Other than
that, the extra could be anything at all: so it might be something entirely
irrelevant. Lewis wants to rule out my talking or walking as a cause of my
arrival, because he denies disjunctive events (and events are the causal relata,
for Lewis). But on the mereological summing picture, my talking and walking
qualifies as a cause my arrival, because if the entire talking-walking event had
not occurred, I would not have arrived. Surely, though, walking and talking
didn’t get me here: the walking did that by itself, and talking played no part.
Lewis could further require that the sums be spatiotemporally continuous,
but this would not help, for two reasons. First, a cause of some event e will
be spatiotemporally contiguous with many other events that do not cause e.
(Otherwise, either there are gaps in space and time, or else everything causes
e.) If two events are contiguous, their sum will be continuous. So many non-
causal sums would still be admitted as causes. Second, many overdetermining
causes are not spatiotemporally contiguous. Two assassins fire at just the same
time, and both cause the president’s death, though the action of either alone
would have sufficed. But the assassins are not holding hands: they are in quite
different places, and certainly not spatiotemporally contiguous. So this further
stipulation would rule out many overdetermining causes.
Realising this, we might ban arbitrary mereological sums from being causes,
as they are banned in Lewis’s own theory of reference, for example (Lewis
1984). But then, I think, we have no response to the problem of symmetric
overdetermination. For the mereological summing required by that response
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will surely violate any useful restriction on arbitrary sums: redundant causes
can be events of very different kinds.
Let us return to the notion, which I claimed was intuitive, that in symmetric
cases, the two redundant causes both cause the effect. I hope the difference
between this claim and Lewis’s response is now clearer. It is one thing to say
that two events both caused a third; it is not so very different from making any
other claim about two events, for example, that they both took place in Turkey
in 2003. It is something else entirely to roll two events together, and claim
that they form one larger event, which causes a given effect. Lewis moves from
former to the latter, but they are clearly not the same. To say that I was both
married and drunk on the beach in Turkey in 2003 is perfectly acceptable; but
to sum these events would be a slur on my character. For there is no event of
my wedding and drunkenness on the beach. We cannot sum arbitrary events to
create larger events, any more than we can disjoin them; for the mereological
sum of two events is not necessarily an event. This is an intuitive constraint
which any theory of events should respect, at least if it is to be used to analyse
other concepts subject to common judgement such as causation. The sum of
my wedding and drunkenness on the beach is caused by nothing, and causes
nothing — though clearly, both events had causes and consequences. Perhaps
arbitrary summing is to be disallowed, then. But whatever restrictions might
be required to prevent arbitrary summing being a serious problem for any
event-based theory of causation, Lewis’s solution to overdetermination surely
violates them, as I have argued, because it does not restrict the sorts of things
that can be summed.
6.7.2 The Reverse Counterfactual and Symmetric Overde-
termination
In cases of symmetric overdetermination, where c1 and c2 have equal claim to
cause e, it is the case both that (∼ E >∼ C1) and that (∼ E >∼ C2). Consider
Able and Baker throwing so that their rocks strike the bottle at the exact same
moment. If the bottle had not smashed, Able would not have thrown, and if
the bottle had not smashed, Baker would not have thrown. Neither would
have thrown. Applying the Inference test: an intact bottle would have led you
to infer that neither Able nor Baker threw accurately. And in worlds talk, the
nearest worlds where the bottle does not smash are worlds where neither Able
nor Baker throw accurately. The Reverse Counterfactual is true of both Able’s
throw and Baker’s.
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We could apply the condition proposed in 6.5.1, but because the case is
symmetric, that will not yield any difference between the two throws. And nor
should it, of course. Note that the proposed condition allows both events to be
causes. For each throw, there will be at least one event which is both between
the throw and the break, and which the Reverse Counterfactual connects to
both the throw and the break. This event is the impact of the relevant rock.
Moreover, the impact itself satisfies this condition trivially, since there is no
further event between the simultaneous impacts and the break.
The advantage of the Reverse Counterfactual account over Lewis’s response
to symmetric overdetermination is that we can neatly avoid all this trouble
arising from the disjunctive antecedent of the Lewisian counterfactual, or from
the mereologically suspect substitute. Once again, the reason is that we have
two true counterfactuals, where Lewis has two false ones. We can simply stick
to the view that if c causes e then ∼ E >∼ C, and if there is more than one
c fitting that bill, and nothing further to choose between them, then e has
more than one cause. We can admit that (∼ E >∼ (C ∨ D)). But we do
not thereby need to commit to admitting problematically disjunctive events.
The disjunction in that claim can be taken at face value, as a disjunctive
claim about two events; we remain free to deny, with Lewis, that disjunctive
events make much sense. For we are free to claim that the causes are the events
represented by each of the disjuncts, and that the disjunction simply represents
a claim about both of them — in the same way that disjunctions normally do,
without causing problems. Of course this was not an option for Lewis: for
the disjuncts themselves were not individually causal, on his account; only
the disjunction was causal. Whereas on the Reverse Counterfactual account,
the disjuncts are both causes. We can speak about one or the other without
committing to the causal efficacy of their mereological disjunction. And their
mereological sum need not be mentioned at all.
Note that on this account, there is a distinction between joint causes and
overdetermining causes. Our condition on joint causation (4.5.2) required that
causes feature ineliminably in the jointly causal set. Since overdetermining
causes are each sufficient, they would feature eliminably in any set contain-
ing more than one of them. The two bullets which simultaneously killed the
president could each be removed, and the president would still die. I think
this is a positive feature of the account, since there does seem to be an in-
tuitive distinction between symmetric overdetermination and ordinary joint
causation.
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The Reverse Counterfactual evidently offers a much simpler account of
symmetric overdetermination than any available to Lewis, since it requires no
fancy footwork concerning the metaphysics of events. I think it also reflects
our intuitive judgments better. For when Able and Baker throw rocks at the
bottle, we do not say that the event of both of them throwing caused the
smash. We say something that sometimes looks similar, but really is not: that
both of them throwing caused the smash. We do not thereby mean to imply
that both of them throwing was one event. There might be contexts where
we do something like that — for example, if there are many throwers, and we
say the bottle smashed in a hail of rocks. But that is quite a different causal
claim: I am not obliged to make it in order to say that Able and Baker both
smashed the bottle. I might regard Able’s throw as something quite distinct
from Baker’s, but still say, in a symmetric case of overdetermination, that they
both caused the smash. Allowing the mereological sum of Able’s and Baker’s
throws to be causal means lifting restrictions on summing and opening the
door to an awful lot of intuitively non-causal sums. For Able and Baker’s
throws might be quite different; whatever restrictions there are, we can surely
think of redundant cause pairs that would violate them. In general, redundant
causes need not be similar in any particular respect. The clarity of this point
is a nice feature of the case of Camper, to which we now turn.
6.7.3 The Mysterious Case of Camper
The night before Camper is to set off into the desert where the
water in his canteen will be his only available drink, Poisoner puts
a fatal poison into the canteen. Early the next morning, Spiller
maliciously empties the canteen, in complete ignorance of what
Poisoner had done the night before. Camper then sets off into the
desert, in all innocence, and dies of thirst. Who killed Camper?
(Philosophy pre-interview test, King’s College, Cambridge. Adapted
from Mackie 1974, 44-6.)
When my seventeen-year-old self sat this test, I answered that Camper killed
himself, by failing to check his water bottles as he should have. It has long been
an ambition of mine to improve on this answer, and I will take this opportunity
to do so. At the same time we will be able to apply some of our machinery to
an intuitively tricky example.
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Mackie argues, against Hart and Honore (1985), that Spiller caused the
death. He reasons as follows.
...the event which was the traveller’s death was also his death from
thirst, and we must say that the puncturing of the can caused it,
while the poisoning did not. ...it is the chain puncturing—lack-
of-water—thirst—death that was realized, whereas the rival chain
that starts with poison-in-can was not completed.
(Mackie 1974, 46)
Therefore, Spiller caused Camper’s death; Poisoner would have caused it if
Spiller had not. According to Mackie, then, this is a case of preemption.
Contrarily, I shall argue that it is a case of symmetric overdetermination.
Mackie’s reasoning is objectionable because the causal chain he maintains
was realized was not, in fact, realized. The chain “puncturing—lack-of-water—
thirst—death ” is the causal chain that would have occurred, had Poisoner
not previously put poison in the water cans. To say, as Mackie says, that
puncturing caused the lack of water, and the lack of water caused the death,
is an equivocation on the term “water”. The water which Spiller poured away
was fatally poisonous. To say that depriving Camper of this fatal liquid caused
him to die is implausible; it only gains plausibility if we call that liquid “water”,
for everyone knows that without water, Camper will die of thirst. We could
bring the point out by denying that the fatal liquid was water, or denying that
it was pure or good water, or some such; but I do not think we need to rely
on any such claim to make the central point.18 That point is that the realized
chain from Spiller’s action goes puncturing—lack-of-poisonous-water—death.
This makes rather less sense, because lack of poisonous water would usually be
thought to be a condition for life, not a cause of death. Yet lack of poisonous
water is all that Spiller’s actions caused (assuming Poisoner had been thorough,
and poisoned all the water cans).
So what should we say about the case of Camper? A number of consid-
erations spring to mind. First, the time and manner of Camper’s death is
no different than it would be if only Spiller had acted. If we hold Spiller’s
action constant, then Poisoner’s actions had no effect on the time and manner
of the death. On the other hand, if we hold Poisoner’s actions constant, then
18I understand that, in interviews following the test at King’s, applicants are sometimes
asked how their answer might change if Poisoner’s place was taken by Petroler, who empties
the canteens and refills them with petrol, which is toxic. I am in effect suggesting that our
answer should not change, whether Poisoner or Petroler acts that night.
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Spiller’s action did not make any difference to whether the death took place.
The same point applies in reverse, of course: if we hold Spiller’s actions con-
stant then Poisoner’s earlier activity is irrelevant to whether the death occurs
as well as to how it occurs. But here, I think temporal order is relevant to
our intuitive judgements. At the time at which Poisoner acted, Camper’s fate
was not sealed, because nobody had fatally sabotaged his water supply. From
the point after Poisoner acted, however, it was. Whereas when Spiller’s turn
came, he might as well not have bothered; indeed maybe he would not have
bothered, had he known that Poisoner had already acted. Poisoner might also
have desisted if he had known of Spiller’s future actions, of course; but in
doing so he would be taking a risk, with regard to his murderous intent. On
the other hand, the way things actually turned out, no poison ever entered
Camper’s bloodstream. Poisoner might be an expert in his field, who prides
himself on picking just the right poison for the job; but in this case he would
have no reason to boast.
That is a barrage of intuitions. We could produce variations on this example
which removed the niceties of this particular case, in order to push one intuition
or another. But these niceties are interesting because the case is so realistic: it
could happen just like that. We can imagine the lawyer for Spiller arguing that
Spiller’s action made no difference to the fact of death, only to the manner;
and we can imagine Poisoner’s defence arguing that his poison was rendered
irrelevant by Spiller’s later action, and pointing out that no gram of the fatal
substance entered Camper’s bloodstream. The prosecution would presumably
wish to secure a conviction against both Spiller and Poisoner, but the claim
that they both caused Camper’s death will be disputed by both defence teams
(since each will dispute the claim that their client caused the death at all).
How are the prosecution to secure a conviction?
It seems to be emerging that influence is of little help here. It may play
a role in Poisoner’s defence: the manner of death was influenced by Spiller’s
actions, but not by Poisoner’s. But denying that influence and causation are
the same thing will be a key part of Spiller’s defence: for that case would
turn on the fact that Spiller’s actions merely changed the manner, and not the
by-then-inevitable fact, of death. The defence would be arguing that Spiller’s
actions were like the pudding discussed previously: they delayed the death (if,
as seems plausible, it takes longer to die of thirst than poison), and changed
its manner; but it was going to happen anyway. If the prosecution accept that
causation is influence, Poisoner goes free; if they deny it, they must find a
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substitute analysis, or Spiller goes free.
Let us see how the Reverse Counterfactual would establish causation in the
Camper case. If Camper hadn’t died, then Poisoner wouldn’t have poisoned;
and if Camper hadn’t died, Spiller wouldn’t have spilled. In the possible
worlds idiom, the closest worlds where Camper lives are worlds where neither
Poisoner nor Spiller act. Applying the Inference Test, if Camper had made an
uneventful trip across the desert, we would infer that his water supply had been
both sufficient and wholesome. The prosecution now have a basis from which
to argue that both murderers caused the death, because they can establish
that each event satisfies a necessary condition for being a cause of the death.
Of course, a necessary condition will not prove causation: for practical as well
as theoretical purposes, we need a sufficiency component to our analysis. That
shall be the topic of the next chapter. But given the discriminatory power of
this necessary condition, establishing that an alleged cause meets it could be
important and useful.
6.8 Summary
We have explored the consequences, for various overdetermination problems,
of reversing the counterfactual standardly used in counterfactual analyses of
causation. This trick has yielded an account which, without any further mod-
ification, can deal with cases where a cause has a non-occurring back-up. Pre-
emption in which both candidate causes occur can be handled with a relatively
minor addition to the basic account, an addition which has sound intuitive
motivation. Trumping requires no further amendment. In cases of symmetric
causal overdetermination, the Reverse Counterfactual analysis concludes that
all the overdeterminants are causes, which I have argued is a neater account
than Lewis’s. Finally we imagined ourselves in court following Camper’s mur-
der, and sought to apply the Reverse Counterfactual approach to a hard case
of overdetermination, in which both the sine qua non condition and the notion
of influence would have been of little help.
Before we move on, let me reiterate a general point with which we began
the chapter. In cases of redundancy, it seems more profitable to think of causes
as counterfactually sufficient for their effects than to think of them as coun-
terfactually necessary. Perhaps the idea that causes might be counterfactually
necessary has arisen from confusing the plausible suggestion that some cause
is necessary for a particular effect with the distinct suggestion that a partic-
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ular cause is necessary. The Reverse Counterfactual makes particular causes
counterfactually sufficient, given a certain background, whereas the ordinary
account makes them counterfactually necessary. But prima facie, particular
causes are not generally necessary for their effects: there are often other ways
to bring a given cause about. Hence the falsity of the Lewisian counterfac-
tual in cases of preemption, which I have argued the Reverse Counterfactual
is well-placed to solve. To say that c necessitates e, or that c makes e happen,
is not to say that c is necessary for e, but that c suffices for e: which I suggest
we understand as the claim that, if e hadn’t happened, then c wouldn’t have
happened.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.0 Abstract
A synopsis of the defence of the Reverse Counterfactual as a necessary condi-
tion for causation is presented. I then argue that there can be no counterfactual
sufficient condition for causation. I argue that simultaneous causation occurs.
Since the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is temporal, counterfactual
dependence can never offer a full characterisation of causation, no matter how
sophisticated a thesis might be proposed of the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence. Thus there is more to causation than counterfactual dependence
among particular events. I finish by compiling the more complicated versions
of the Reverse Counterfactual which are developed in earlier chapters, along
with other important claims which have been defended, in a concise summary.
7.1 Synopsis
The substantive discussion began in Chapter 2 with an outline of Lewis’s se-
mantics for counterfactuals. I sought to understand the relation between three
theses: the asymmetry of overdetermination, the asymmetry of miracles and
the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. I argued that they supported
each other in that order, and we considered various internal criticisms: that
Lewis’s semantics requires the truth of some backtrackers; that the asymme-
try of miracles does not hold, thanks to the possibility of “Bennett-worlds”,
convergence to which is as easy as divergence from; and that the asymme-
try of overdetermination fails when we consider the implications of statistical
mechanics, as illustrated by “Elga-worlds”. In Chapter 3, we considered what
independent case exists (aside from Lewis’s semantic theory) for an asymme-
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try of counterfactual dependence. It is commonly thought that backtrackers
and foretrackers are true under different resolutions of vagueness. But I crit-
icised two common reasons for thinking so. Backtrackers and foretrackers are
compatible, and may be mixed without any peculiarly pathological logical con-
sequences. And the grammatical awkwardness associated with backtracking
expressions does not show that they are false. On the other hand, indepen-
dent reasons exist to deny that counterfactual dependence is asymmetric —
at least, to deny that it is so strongly asymmetric as to yield the result that
almost all backtrackers may be written off as false in normal circumstances. I
proposed a method to assess counterfactuals by deploying our ordinary capac-
ity to make and assess inductive inferences (having argued that other methods
are inadequate). The Inference Test claims that our acceptance of A > C and
of the inference from A to C ought to covary, where that inference accords
with our actual standards, but concerns the counterfactual situation in which
A would occur. This test is circular as an analysis, but it was defended as a
simple, intuitive test which deploys skills in which we are practised and display
considerable reliability — our skills to make and assess inferences.
Thus prepared, we turned to the main topic: causation. Lewis’s coun-
terfactual is widely accepted as at least a sufficient condition for causation,
making causation radically unselective: the presence of oxygen is the cause
of the flame as much as the strike of the match. In Chapter 4, the unse-
lective orthodoxy was criticised. I argued that it does not provide either a
descriptive explanation of the principles governing our selective practices, nor
an explanation of why we should make such heavy use of causation to select.
We examined various efforts to tack a theory of selection onto an unselective
theory of causation, focusing on the effort to assimilate causal selection to se-
lection of the explanatory cause in contrastive explanation. All these efforts
were found wanting, however. The Reverse Counterfactual was introduced as
a natural way to explicate the notion of the cause as making the difference to
its effect. It was defended as a necessary condition which causes but not mere
conditions meet. The Reverse Counterfactual was promoted over competitors
for several reasons. It is considerably simpler. It achieves considerable theoret-
ical unification, depending on context only in the way that all counterfactuals
do, and not in any hard-to-explain secondary way. The context-sensitivity, or
flexibility, of selection is thus assimilated to the context-sensitivity of counter-
factuals. It may be hard to explain exactly how counterfactuals themselves are
sensitive to context, but that is a problem we already have, in giving a coun-
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terfactual account of anything. Finally, the approach I have advocated makes
selection central to causation, offering an account of why we use causation to
select in such explanatory, predictive, manipulative, moral and legal contexts.
Any account which purports to be an analysis of our ordinary concept, and
yet which does not make selection central to causation, must shoulder a heavy
explanatory burden with respect to the frequency and gravity with which we
apply causal concepts to select.
Chapter 5 extended the argument to cover selection of the cause in pref-
erence to other events in the same causal chain. I argued that causation is
not transitive. Reasons for the widely-held view that it is transitive were con-
sidered and rejected. Two circumstances in which causation seems to fail to
be transitive were distinguished: those where the cause fails to be sufficiently
proximate to the effect, and those involving double-prevention. I argued that
the Reverse Counterfactual readily distinguishes causes that are sufficiently
proximate from those that are not, being true of the former but not of the
latter. Double-prevention counterexamples to transitivity were considered in
some detail, and it was found in each case that the first event in the sequence in-
deed failed to cause the last. Three diagnoses were considered, and the Reverse
Counterfactual was found to have links to all of them. Finally I proposed a
diagnosis of my own, arguing that in cases of double-prevention, the first event
does not cause the second. So these cases are not really counterexamples to
transitivity. A suggestion was made as to why causation does appear to be
transitive over shortish chains of certain kinds, to the effect that a valid sub-
stitute for counterfactual transitivity is available in those circumstances which
entails that the Reverse Counterfactual is true.
Lewis’s account makes causes counterfactually necessary for their effects,
but causes are sometimes redundant, meaning that they are sometimes coun-
terfactually unnecessary for their effects. In Chapter 6, I argued that the Re-
verse Counterfactual should be read as making causes sufficient, in a certain
sense, for their effects, and therefore that redundancy would not threaten the
Reverse Counterfactual with falsity, as it threatens Lewis’s accounts. Various
kinds of redundancy were considered, to see whether the Reverse Counter-
factual could further distinguish redundant causes from non-causal events. I
argued that the Reverse Counterfactual can readily handle any case of preemp-
tion where the preempted event does not actually occur. Where both potential
causes occur, I argued that the same strategy could be applied to events fur-
ther down the respective causal chains. The chain from a preemptor to an
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effect goes all the way, whereas the chain from a preempted event does not.
Where it fails, there will be events which do not actually occur but which, if
they had occurred, would have completed the chain to the effect. I suggested
we appeal to the contrast between these events and the occurring events in
the complete causal chain from cause to effect to distinguish preemptor from
preempted event. This enabled me to propose a solution to both early and late
preemption. Cases of trumping, however, are designed to have no intermediary
events which might be used for this sort of solution. It was argued that, to set
up a convincing case of trumping, either an implicit appeal must be made to
some intermediary events between cause and effect, or else an implicit appeal
must be made to the claim that, if the effect hadn’t happened, the trumped
event might have happened anyway. The Reverse Counterfactual handles ei-
ther sort of case without further modification. If neither claim is accepted, I
argued that trumping cases collapse into cases of symmetric overdetermina-
tion. We considered the latter, and found that the Reverse Counterfactual
offers an account which is simpler, more intuitive, potentially more useful and
less mereologically committing than Lewis’s.
I have finished advocating the central claim of this work, that the Reverse
Counterfactual is necessary for causation. In what is left of this concluding
chapter we shall consider the other big question: whether counterfactual de-
pendence, of any kind, is sufficient for causation.
7.2 Causal Asymmetries
7.2.1 The Need For A Sufficient Condition
The Reverse Counterfactual has been defended as a necessary condition for
causation, and various claims have been made for its power, and the power
of more complex derivatives, to discriminate between causes and non-causes.
But to discriminate between causes and non-causes more generally, we need
a sufficient condition as well as a necessary condition. The Reverse Counter-
factual and the various derivatives we have considered clearly fail to amount
to a sufficient condition for causation. The reason is obvious. The Reverse
Counterfactual says that, when c causes e, it will be the case that ∼ E >∼ C.
In many cases, Lewis’s counterfactual will also be true: ∼ C >∼ E. If the
Reverse Counterfactual sufficed for causation, then not only would c qualify
as causing e, but e would also qualify as causing c. This is implausible: effects
rarely, if ever, cause their causes. Relatedly, when c causes two effects, e1 and
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e2, it might well be the case that at least one of the effects counterfactually
depends upon the other — for example, it could be that ∼ E1 >∼ E2. It might
also be the case that ∼ E2 >∼ E1. If the Reverse Counterfactual sufficed for
causation, then on some occasions, effects of a common cause would cause each
other. But effects of a common cause rarely, if ever, cause each other.
In short, the Reverse Counterfactual cannot provide a sufficient condition
for causation until it has been supplemented by some means of identifying the
causal order. The Reverse Counterfactual is “Reverse” with respect to Lewis’s,
running from effect to cause rather than from cause to effect. But unless I
have a way of distinguishing cause from effect, my theory will be unable to
distinguish the Reverse Counterfactual from other counterfactuals, and thus I
will be unable to recommend it as a sufficient condition for causation.
The causal order matters because causation is asymmetric. In fact, there
are many asymmetries associated with causation. Hausman provides a non-
exhaustive list (Hausman 1998, 1), and his list could no doubt be extended by
a study of a diverse bundle of literature on time, quantum physics, laws and
explanation. I propose to focus on just two causal asymmetries. The first is
the metaphysical asymmetry of causation. This is the fact that causation is
an asymmetric relation.1 The intuited asymmetry of causation seems to be of
a strong rather than a weak sort. We can say that a relation R is symmetric
iff (∀x)(∀y)(Rxy ⊃ Ryx), and weakly asymmetric iff it is not symmetric. R
is strongly asymmetric iff (∀x)(∀y)(Rxy ⊃∼ Ryx). Strong asymmetry implies
weak, but not vice versa. Causation appears to be strongly asymmetric, in
common cases: we move readily from “c caused e” to “e does not cause c”,
which is licensed by strong asymmetry, but not weak. I call this a metaphysical
asymmetry to reflect the fact that it is not a matter of logical impossibility
that an effect does not cause its cause, but rather a matter of metaphysical
impossibility.2
The second asymmetry we shall examine is the temporal asymmetry of
causation, which in its simplest form consists in the fact that effects do not
precede their causes, in our common experience. In short, effects neither cause
nor precede their causes.
It is possible that neither asymmetry in fact holds. It may be discovered
that effects sometimes precede their causes, or that effects sometimes cause
their causes. My characterisation of these asymmetries is not intended as a
1If it is a relation at all, of course. If not, it had better be something which admits of
asymmetry in a similar way.
2In this formulation I am grateful to Dan Heard.
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statement of unalterable conceptual necessity. Rather, it is a statement of the
principles which seem to govern our concepts as we put them to ordinary use.
Ordinarily, we do not see how effects could cause their causes. We might be
corrected by abstruse cases from the borders of physics, but until we are, I
suggest, we take something like the metaphysical asymmetry to hold. Some-
one alleging a case where an effect caused its cause would have some serious
explaining to do, and perhaps also some extension and revision of our ordinary
concept. The temporal asymmetry is even more obviously prone to exception
or revision; we can imagine backwards causation, but we do not normally think
it happens. Again, this shows clearly in our causal reasoning: we do not expect
our current actions to have past consequences, nor the events we witness to
have future causal origins. Some physicists may postulate backwards causation
(cf. Dowe 1996), but again, abstruse cases merely highlight the fact that we
ordinarily take an asymmetry to exist. Evidently, we use both the temporal
and the logical asymmetries of causation in ordinary causal thinking. For this
reason, a theory of causation should address itself to the nature of at least
these two causal asymmetries, and perhaps to others as well.
Let us examine Lewis’s effort to relate these two causal asymmetries, and
to provide a characterisation of them in terms of counterfactuals (7.2.2). I
shall argue (7.2.3) that the occurrence of simultaneous causation means that
the temporal asymmetry of causation is not always present: so it cannot be
analysed with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence (even if
the latter were accepted). We shall consider (7.2.4) an argument from Haus-
man which seeks to reclaim a weaker asymmetry than Lewis proposes. Finally
(7.2.5) I shall argue that none of this is really Lewis’s fault: any counter-
factual account will suffer similar problems, because the only obvious way in
which counterfactuals might potentially display asymmetry is temporally, and
causation does not always display temporal asymmetry. Thus counterfactuals
cannot provide the resources to model the metaphysical asymmetry of causa-
tion — even if Lewis’s, or any other, thesis of the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence were true. Therefore, I shall argue, no counterfactual suffices for
causation.
7.2.2 Lewis’s Hope
Lewis identifies two problems associated with causal asymmetry: the problem
of effects and the problem of epiphenomena. The problem of effects is the
problem, for an analysis of causation, of characterising the difference between
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cause and effect: that is, characterising the basic asymmetry of causation. The
problem of epiphenomena is the problem of telling cause-effect pairs apart from
effects of a common cause. The two are different versions of the same theo-
retical challenge: that of distinguishing instances of the causal relation from
other relations satisfying whatever theory is proposed, but failing to be cases
of causation. Lewis sees this clearly, and offers a single, elegant solution: deny
backtrackers. This solves the problem of effects as it arises for his counter-
factual analysis, because causes precede their effects but not vice versa. And
it solves the problem of epiphenomena. Suppose c causes e1 and e2 — the
falling air pressure causes the barometer to fall, and soon it starts to rain. We
might be tempted to think that if the barometer hadn’t fallen, it would not
have rained. But our reasoning backtracks. The reason we think that, if the
barometer hadn’t fallen, then it would not have rained, is that we suppose the
barometer’s failure to fall would have been due to a corresponding failure of
the air pressure to fall. We think that, if the barometer hadn’t fallen, then nor
would the air pressure. But that is a backtracker, so we should reject it as false:
if the barometer hadn’t fallen at t, then the air pressure would already have
started to fall by then. We cannot backtrack and suppose it would not have
fallen. And we had no other basis for supposing the rain to counterfactually
depend on the barometer’s movements; so we should deny that it does. In fact
we should go further, and assert the stronger claim: if the barometer hadn’t
fallen, it would have rained all the same. For supposing something else to
interfere after the fall in air pressure to prevent the rain would be a gratuitous
departure from actuality.
Lewis’s ambition is to identify the direction of time with the direction of
counterfactual dependence, and simultaneously to give the direction of causa-
tion and explain why causes precede their effects. The reason he gives is that
causation is just counterfactual dependence, in the end, and counterfactual
dependence is asymmetric. It is important that the dimension in which coun-
terfactual dependence is asymmetric is temporal. Although Lewis’s picture
doesn’t presuppose the direction of time, the asymmetry makes no sense with-
out a prior order in which the asymmetry is expressed. Lewis’s picture presup-
poses a temporal ordering. Without it, counterfactual dependence might still
be asymmetric, in the sense that if A > C then ∼ (C > A). But Lewis’s argu-
ments for that claim (from the asymmetries of overdetermination and miracles)
clearly depend on events being temporally ordered. Without a temporal order,
Lewis’s asymmetry thesis might still be true, but the reasons for thinking so
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would be absent.
If that is correct, then it appears that Lewis’s solution to the problems
of effects and epiphenomena rely on a questionable assumption: that causes
always precede their effects. To show this, and at the same time to show why
it is problematic, I shall argue that Lewis’s solution does not work in cases
where cause and effect are simultaneous.
7.2.3 Simultaneous Causation
I reach for the door-handle, and push it down. It turns. The mechanism is
smooth and tightly-fitting. On the other side the handle I am not touching
turns too. As far as I can tell, the handles turn simultaneously. Let us accept,
for now, that the handles do turn simultaneously. The turning of this handle
causes the turning of that one, and not vice versa. But it does not precede the
turning of that one.
How, then, should we apply Lewis’s solution to the problem of effects?
c is the handle on this side turning, e is the handle on that side turning.
They are distinct events: the handles are separate objects, not touching each
other, but connected by a third object — a metal spindle running between
them.3 Lewis asserts that ∼ C >∼ E — that if the handle on this side hadn’t
turned, then the handle on that side wouldn’t have. And he wants to deny
that ∼ E >∼ C — that if the handle on that side hadn’t turned, the handle
on this side wouldn’t have. He would do so on the basis that the latter is
a backtracker. But c and e are simultaneous, so neither counterfactual is a
backtracker. Lewis’s solution to the problem of effects does not apply, then,
to cases of simultaneous causation.
Likewise, if the effects of a common cause are simultaneous with the cause,
then there will be no basis on which to deny that the two effects depend on
each other, one way or the other or both ways. For the basis on which Lewis
maintained the counterfactual independence of effects of a common cause was
3Is it doubtful whether this handle turning and that handle turning are distinct events?
Granted, there is a level of description at which they are parts of the same event. However
it seems fairly clear that there is also a level at which they are distinct. They come apart
in different possible worlds: if there were no spindle between the handles, then when this
handle turned the other would not. Yet it seems we can suppose that this handle turns in a
spindle-less world, just as in our world. So the event of this handle turning has a counterpart
in a spindle-less world where the other handle doesn’t turn. Hence the two handles turning
together, though it may be an event, is not the same event as just one handle turning. For
another discussion of the possibility of simultaneous causation, see (Taylor 1974, 35–39):
he gives the example of a locomotive pulling a caboose, which would serve my argument
equally well.
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that their dependence could only be asserted by reasoning back from one effect
to the cause and out to the other. This was supposed to be bad reasoning
because of the problems associated with backtracking, but if effects and cause
are simultaneous, then backtracking is not involved.
It might be retorted that I have confused the order: it is not that reason-
ing is bad, and counterfactuals false, because of backtracking; rather, certain
counterfactuals are false, and it so happens they are backtrackers. In a case
of simultaneous causation, there are no backtrackers and no foretrackers, but
asymmetries in counterfactual dependence persist: the effect depends on the
cause, but not vice versa. — Perhaps: but what reason do we have to think so?
Lewis’s arguments for the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence appear to
depend on events being temporally ordered, even though they do not depend
on the direction of time. It is very hard (for me, anyway) to comprehend the
motivation for accepting, say, the asymmetry of overdetermination as a thesis
about simultaneous events. — Then, comes the retort, perhaps the temporal
order is indeed generally important: the reason for the asymmetry of coun-
terfactual dependence in simultaneous cases might depend somehow on the
more general asymmetry. If causes counterfactually depended on their effects
in simultaneous cases, then those counterfactuals somehow wouldn’t fit into
the general pattern. — Maybe there is an argument to that effect, but it does
not present itself to me.
Perhaps it will be contested whether simultaneous causation ever occurs.
Perhaps the handle on my side turns slightly before the other one: the metal
spindle twists slightly, maybe only microscopically, and there is a slight time-
delay. Two points deserve making. First, retreat to scientific sophistication is
a departure from the analysis of our ordinary concept of causation. Ordinarily,
we consider the events to be simultaneous; our ordinary concept of causation
can treat simultaneous events as asymmetrically causally related. Even if it
turns out as the result of physical theory that causes always slightly precede
their effects, our concept of causation does not require this: it is quite compat-
ible with the world turning out to contain genuine simultaneous causation.4
Second, retreat to scientific sophistication might compound the trouble
rather than solve it. In a Newtonian framework, some causal relations are
simultaneous. Consider a force, exerted on a free body, which accelerates.
4Epistemically compatible, I mean: of course it is possible that a world differing from ours
in some fundamental physical way might be so different as not to contain anything recog-
nisable as causation. My point is rather that we don’t know that, merely from considering
our concept.
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The acceleration a is related to the force F and the mass m of the accelerating
object thus: a = F/m. This is instantaneous acceleration. The equation does
not say that force at t1 leads to acceleration at some slightly later time t2.
Causation does not feature in the equation: if there is a causal relationship,
we decide what it is independently. What should we say about this particular
case? Intuitively, we judge that the force causes the acceleration, or perhaps
that the force and the mass cause it together.5 But if we accept that the
effect is determined by the equation, then we accept that the causation is
simultaneous. We could deny the equation. I take it we will not do that. Or
we could deny that causation occurs. Russell did that, but not for this reason
(cf. Russell 1917). If we take this route, then we adopt an error theory about
a huge tranche of common causal judgements: any involving force. I take it
that this is not an attractive option for someone seeking a conceptual ansalysis
of causation.
It is therefore far from clear whether we can appeal to science to underpin
an assertion that causes precede their effects. Newtonian mechanics suggests
the opposite. In particular, forces, unlike the spindles connecting door-handles,
do not flex or stretch. At a microphysical level, much direct causation will be
simultaneous on a Newtonian view. Whether this argument can be extended
to a more modern physics, I do not know. Even if it cannot, it illustrates the
first point, that our concept of causation is perfectly compatible with simul-
taneous causes and effects. It is compatible, especially, in the sense that the
metaphysical asymmetry of causation can exist when the temporal asymmetry
does not.
These arguments apply equally to the problem of epiphenomena, when
epiphenomena are simultaneous with their common cause. Lewis’s solution to
the problems of effects and of epiphenomena are both troubled by simultaneous
causation.
The alleged failure of Lewis’s solution to the problem of effects and, by
extension, epiphenomena arises in cases of simultaneous causation. Why? If
Lewis’s solutions have the structure previously exhibited, then an explanation
is ready. The metaphysical asymmetry of causation and the temporal asym-
metry of causation are distinct. Causation is temporally asymmetric if effects
do not precede their causes; that is compatible with their being simultaneous.
To assert that causes always precede their effects is a stronger claim. It is
this stronger claim, in conjunction with the asymmetry of counterfactual de-
5It doesn’t matter what we take to cause what: the same point holds.
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pendence, which entails the metaphysical asymmetry of causation. But the
stronger claim is implausible, I have argued. Common sense admits simulta-
neous causation (in a way that it does not admit backwards causation), and
science is not guaranteed to help.
7.2.4 Hausman’s Limited Asymmetry
Hausman appears to defend a counterfactual asymmetry between cause and
effect, not by appeal to time, but by appeal to inference. Hausman thinks
counterfactuals are subject to a Prediction Condition, repeated here:
P (Prediction condition) The knowledge that b would occur if a
were to occur and that an event of kind a occurs taken by itself
justifies the prediction that an event of kind b will occur.
(Hausman 1998, 120)
Hausman uses the Prediction Condition to defend an asymmetry of coun-
terfactual dependence which is weaker than Lewis’s. Hausman argues that
∼ C >∼ E satisfies the Prediction Condition, but that ∼ E >∼ C does not.
In general, knowledge of the absence of a cause allows us to predict the absence
of an effect, but knowledge of absence of an effect does not allow us to predict
the absence of any cause in particular. It allows us to predict that some cause
is absent, but not which one. In other words, according to the Prediction Con-
dition, ∼ (∼ E >∼ C). This is equivalent to asserting that ∼ E ≥ C — that if
the effect hadn’t occurred, the cause might have occurred. But it falls short of
asserting that ∼ E > C — that if the effect hadn’t occurred, the cause would
have occurred. Hausman takes himself to be helpful to Lewis, who sometimes
appears to commit himself to the stronger claim that ∼ E > C: Hausman
helpfully points out that a weaker claim will still establish an asymmetry.
Two problems aﬄict Hausman’s proposal. First, Lewis has a reason to
prefer the stronger claim, as we saw in our discussion of preemption in 6.3.1.
When c1 preempts c2 with respect to e, Lewis’s original solution relies on an
intermediary, d. It must be the case that, if d hadn’t happened, e wouldn’t
have happened. To defend this claim, Lewis argues that, if d hadn’t happened,
then c1 still would have happened, not that it merely might have happened:
∼ D > C1. We saw that the weaker claim, ∼ D ≥ C1, would not do, since it
would allow that the preempted cause c2 and thus the effect e might still have
happened anyway, undermining the claim that ∼ D >∼ E (that the effect
depends on the intermediary).
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Second, I have argued at length for the negation of Hausman’s central
premise. I have argued repeatedly that we do predict the absence of causes
from the absence of effects. Hausman asserts, without clear argumentation,
that in the absence of an effect, we are equally entitled to predict the absence
of any of the causes. If the match had not lit, Hausman seems to think that
we are equally entitled to predict that the oxygen or the match strike would
have been absent. I have argued that the opposite is true. You see me holding
a lighted match; if the match in my fingers had not been lit, you might have
thought I had mis-struck it, which shows that the manner of the striking is
part of the cause; but you certainly would not have thought the oxygen was
absent: kitchens are not equipped with oxygen masks.
Both these arguments have already been put. I hope, then, it is clear
why I think that Hausman’s limited asymmetry is neither useful for Lewis nor
decisive against the Reverse Counterfactual analysis.
7.2.5 The Lack of a Counterfactual Sufficient Condition
The argument against Lewis generalises. There can be no counterfactual suffi-
cient condition for causation, because counterfactuals cannot be used to anal-
yse the metaphysical asymmetry of causation.
There is no hope of using the temporal asymmetry of counterfactual de-
pendence — no matter how strong or sophisticated an asymmetry can be
established — to analyse all the asymmetries of causation. It may be possible
to explain why causes do not follow their effects. But if we admit simultaneous
causation, we cannot appeal to any temporal asymmetry of counterfactual de-
pendence to explain any causal asymmetries persisting in simultaneous cases.
As we have seen, this means that we cannot use the temporal asymmetry of
counterfactual dependence to explain the metaphysical asymmetry of causa-
tion: for the latter asymmetry persists in the simultaneous case, while the
former obviously does not. And this means we cannot use the asymmetry
of counterfactual dependence — even if it were accepted — to explain the
metaphysical asymmetry of causation at all.6
The Reverse Counterfactual analysis of causation, as it stands, is incom-
6Unless, that is, we are willing to countenance a disjunctive picture, on which the meta-
physical asymmetry of causation when causes precede their effects arises from their order in
time, while the metaphysical asymmetry of simultaneous causation arises from something
else. To adopt such a picture would be to deviate substantially from our common concept of
causation — which admits no such disjunction — and therefore to deviate from the project
of conceptual analysis.
7.2. CAUSAL ASYMMETRIES 195
plete. I have proposed and defended a counterfactual necessary condition for
causation. I have not proposed a sufficient condition. Now, we have a prima
facie reason to deny that a sufficient condition can be found, at least sufficient
for establishing causation in the singular case (considering just a cause-effect
pair). When c causes e, it is sometimes the case that ∼ C >∼ E; and I have
argued it is always the case that ∼ E >∼ C. If counterfactual dependence of
any sort suffices for causation, then in many cases, effects cause their causes.
To provide a sufficient condition for causation, it would be necessary to
account for the metaphysical asymmetry of causation; and, I have argued, this
cannot be done with counterfactuals, because the only asymmetry which coun-
terfactuals might capture is temporal. Causation is temporally asymmetric,
but weakly so: simultaneous causation is possible, where the cause and effect
are temporally “symmetric”. And in such cases, the metaphysical asymmetry
of causation persists. The lack of a sufficient condition for causation would
be a serious drawback of the Reverse Counterfactual analysis, if an alternative
analysis existed on which the asymmetry of causation could be analysed, and
thus a counterfactual sufficient condition for causation could be given. But
there can be no such account.
All this implies that there is more to some c causing some e than coun-
terfactual dependence between c and e. But it does not follow that there is
more to causation than patterns of counterfactual dependence between events
generally. The Reverse Counterfactual is true much more rarely than Lewis’s.
Perhaps this can give us a general direction for causation. Which of a given
pair of events causes the other might then be settled by appeal to this general
direction, and the way the events in question fit into it. In that case, there
would be something more to causation than the counterfactuals between those
two events, but that something more might be the pattern of counterfactual
dependence between events more generally.
Yet even if it turns out that there is more to causation than counterfactual
dependence, even counting general patterns of dependence not intrinsic to
causal pairs, this need not deprive counterfactual analysis of all interest. We
need not despairingly conclude that causation is something else entirely, which
merely has counterfactual entailments. Knowledge is sometimes thought to
have a counterfactual component among components of other sorts: satisfying
a counterfactual is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to know, on
such an analysis (cf. Nozick 1981). Causation might be like that: a hybrid of
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counterfactual and other components.7 Given its complexity and the diversity
of applications to which it is suited and put, that ought not be a surprise. And
just as specifying the counterfactual component of knowledge is worthwhile,
so is specifying the counterfactual component of causation.
7.3 Conclusion
Let us put together a concise statement of the central claim, which has been
argued for concerning causation. We have the Reverse Counterfactual itself,
a complication for joint causation, and a complication to handle certain kinds
of redundancy. Combining these yields the following.
The Full Reverse Counterfactual Necessary Condition on
Causation
If c1, ..., cn cause e, then:
(i) c1, ..., cn include at least one actually occurring event, distinct
from e [existence and distinctness requirements];
(ii) ∼ E >∼ (C1&...Cn) [Reverse Counterfactual];
(iii) c1, ..., cn figure ineliminably, such that for every non-empty
proper subset cx, ..., cy of c1, ..., cn, ∼ (∼ E >∼ (Cx&...Cy))
[ineliminability requirement];
(iv) the chain of events {x, ...y} between c1 and e such that ∼
E >∼ Y, ... ∼ X >∼ C1 (where “between” is to be understood
as including c1 and e in the limit case) must be unbroken, and
so for each of c1, ..., cn [unbroken chain requirement];
(v) a chain of events {x, ...y} between c and e such that ∼ E >∼
Y, ... ∼ X >∼ C is broken iff: c is redundant with respect to
e such that ∼ (∼ C >∼ E); and supposing away redundant
events (other than e) which are counterfactually independent
of c yet counterfactually related to e — the chain of events
between c and e such that ∼ E >∼ Y, ... ∼ X >∼ C un-
der this supposition would differ from {x, ...y} [broken chain
definition].
7Sartorio approach in one of her papers leaves such a possibility open: “the view that I
defend here is not an analysis of causation. It sets a constraint on the concept of cause, and
thus it helps to carve up the concept, while at the same time leaving some room for different
ways of pinning it down” (Sartorio 2005, 71).
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I have argued in the context of various examples that causes satisfy this
condition. I have also argued in principle that the Reverse Counterfactual
captures our intuitive notion of making a difference. The conclusion of these
arguments is that the Reverse Counterfactual can provide a necessary condi-
tion for causation, and the above composite condition (i)-(v) is an effort to
formalise and concisely state that necessary condition. I have also argued for
the following claims concerning it:
• the Reverse Counterfactual captures the difference between causes and
mere conditions, by being true of causes but false of mere conditions
(where a condition c for e is an event such that ∼ C >∼ E);
• the Reverse Counterfactual thus offers an account of causal selection,
and of the way that it is sensitive to context, by assimilating the prin-
ciples governing causal selection to the principles governing our context-
sensitive assessment of counterfactuals;
• the Reverse Counterfactual thus explains why we use causation to select,
so addictively and in such a wide range of contexts (eg. common speech,
explanation, prediction, manipulation, ethics and law);
• the Reverse Counterfactual captures the circumstances in which causa-
tion fails to be transitive, by being true of causes only when they are
sufficiently proximate;
• the Reverse Counterfactual partly explains why causation sometimes ap-
pears to be transitive, by making it effectively transitive in certain cir-
cumstances (the chain c–d–e will always be transitive when c causes d
which causes e, and when d is a condition for e);
• the Reverse Counterfactual distinguishes causes from preempted events,
because, although the Reverse Counterfactual may be true of preempted
events, the chain from a preempted event to an effect will include events
which actually fail to occur;
• the Reverse Counterfactual is true of symmetrically overdetermining
causes, allowing us to say that overdetermining causes each cause their
effect.
We have, however, seen that a sufficient condition for causation cannot be
stated using counterfactuals, due to the impossibility of capturing the meta-
physical asymmetry of causation with any temporal asymmetry. When c causes
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e, the Reverse Counterfactual is true; but there is more to c causing e than
counterfactual dependence between c and e. The Reverse Counterfactual thus
offers as much of a counterfactual analysis of causation as can be given.
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